National Security Journal | Andrew Latham
Iran has not aimed to close the Strait of Hormuz, but rather to create permanent uncertainty through mines, shore-based anti-ship missiles, fast attack craft, and cheap drones, making every transit a calculation. Global oil inventories dropped 250 million barrels across March and April, with the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve at 384 million barrels in early May, and the IEA projecting Q2 drawdowns averaging 8.5 million barrels daily. This strategy, which Washington lacks a military answer for, has already led shipping companies to reprice Gulf routes and energy ministries in Tokyo and Seoul to revise procurement assumptions. China, which takes 90% of Iran’s exported crude and routes 45% of its own crude imports through Hormuz, benefits from this unsettled environment, gaining leverage without naval deployments. Beijing's 2021 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and its role in the 2023 Saudi-Iran normalization underscore its economic influence, which is crucial for Iran's survival. Reversing this de facto Iranian influence requires directly addressing IRGC posture, considering China's economic footprint in sanctions relief, and explicitly stating American red lines. Western governments are quietly adjusting to this new reality, which does not require formal acceptance.
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