Can India and Pakistan Walk Back from the Brink of War?

Peter Suciu

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Regional rivals India and Pakistan have fought four border conflicts, as well as a series of regional skirmishes and military standoffs.

The roots of the animosity go back before the 1947 Partition of India, which divided the country in half. Inter-communal violence between Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims will likely ensure that lasting peace in the region remains elusive.

As India launched missiles into Pakistani-controlled territory on Tuesday, the countries inched closer to full-blown war, a worrisome trend as both are nuclear powers.

“It is often said that India and Pakistan know the dance of escalation better than most nations on Earth. They have rehearsed it for decades: a terrorist attack occurs, New Delhi blames Islamabad, airstrikes or artillery fire follow, and the world holds its breath while diplomats scramble to contain the crisis,” geopolitical analyst Irina Tsukerman, president of threat assessment firm Scarab Rising, told The National Interest.

“Then, almost as suddenly, the temperature drops. Statements are walked back. The Line of Control (LoC) simmers but doesn’t boil. The script resets.”

India’s War On Terror – Analysis

A. Jathindra

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In a calculated and strategic move, India has launched Operation SINDOOR, targeting Islamic “terrorist infrastructure” in Pakistan and Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir. These groups have consistently posed a persistent and significant threat to India’s national security. The operation was undertaken as a measured and “non-escalatory” response to recent Pahalgam attacks that claimed the lives of numerous Indian civilians.

The global fight against terrorism has consistently underscored that the sovereignty of a nation cannot serve as a shield for harboring extremist elements. A precedent for such measures was established after the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers. On October 7, 2001, then-President George W. Bush announced the commencement of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. These strikes, strategically targeted at al-Qaeda training camps and Taliban military strongholds, set a global standard for counter-terrorism measures.

The aftermath of 9/11 marked a pivotal moment in modern history, heralding a new paradigm under the banner of the Global War on Terror (GWOT). In a globally resonant response, President George W. Bush underscored the collective responsibility to combat terrorism, declaring:

“The attack took place on American soil, but it was an attack on the heart and soul of the civilised world. And the world has come together to fight a new and different war—the first, and we hope the only one, of the 21st century. A war against all those who seek to export terror and a war against those governments that support or shelter them.”

Operation Sindoor And Beyond: India’s Response And Pakistani Calculus – Analysis

Harsh V. Pant and Yogesh Joshi

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As a direct response to the 22 April terror attack in Pahalgam, which claimed the lives of 26 civilians, India launched its most extensive cross-border strikes since Balakot, targeting nine terrorist facilities in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). Codenamed ‘Operation Sindoor’, the rapid and coordinated 25-minute operation eliminated over 80 terrorists affiliated with the banned groups Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and Hizbul Mujahideen in precision strikes. Following the strikes, India underscored the non-escalatory nature of the action even as it made it clear that it remains ready to retaliate resolutely should Pakistan decide to escalate. The ball is now in Pakistan’s court regarding how far it wants to climb the escalation ladder.

The unfolding crisis has once again forced the Indian leadership to confront a recurring strategic nightmare: How should India respond to Pakistan’s continued support for terrorism in Kashmir? And haow can India establish deterrence against Pakistan’s proxy war?

Deterrence is difficult even in the best times, as it hinges on the adversary’s cost-benefit calculations. Despite asymmetries in power, a determined opponent may still opt for using force. Whether through proxy means or conventional war, with or without nuclear weapons, Pakistan’s revisionist goals, ideological mindset, high-risk tolerance, and the dominant role of its military make it especially hard to deter. Pakistan is not a normal state—it does not perceive the consequences of using force in the manner that other states do.

Jammu And Kashmir: A Region Torn By Conflict And A Global Call To Combat Terrorism – OpEd

Narinder Kumar and Hakim Singh

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Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), especially Kashmir, is one of the world’s most militarized zones. It has remained a focal point in India-Pakistan’s bitter relations, sparking three wars since 1947 due to conflicting strategic interests.

Pakistan’s ongoing interference, including its control over Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK), has hindered governance and fueled local discontent. The Indian government’s mismanagement of internal issues and limited civil society engagement have deepened public mistrust. The unilateral revocation of J&K’s special status has intensified divisions, weakened decentralization, and allowed external forces to exploit the unrest. Despite efforts at democratization, political infighting and recurring violence—such as the recent Pahalgam attack—have stalled development, worsened inequality, and perpetuated instability.

Strategically, located at the crossroads of South and Central Asia and bordered by nuclear-armed Pakistan and China, Jammu and Kashmir holds immense geopolitical importance. Its proximity to Afghanistan further enhances its value as a gateway to Central Asia. The region’s disputed status continues to fuel Indo-Pak tensions, frequent skirmishes, and insurgencies, amplifying its volatility. The conflict’s implications go beyond regional borders, affecting global trade and energy routes. Initiatives like China’s Belt and Road and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor underscore its connectivity. Persistent violence in J&K challenges international counter-terrorism efforts, necessitating coordinated global strategies to ensure security and stability in this critical region.

The U.S.-India Relationship Is Built on Interests, Not Illusions

Andrew Latham

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For years, the idea of a U.S.-India alliance has hovered in the background of American strategic thinking—persistent, appealing, but ultimately illusory. Ever since the Bush-era civil nuclear deal, successive administrations have cast India as a natural partner: a fellow democracy, a counterweight to China, a potential pillar of a liberal international order that no longer exists. That illusion has now faded, replaced by something more durable and grounded: not alliance, but partnership. Strategic, yes. Deepening, yes. But bounded. And rooted not in shared ideology, but in converging interests.

India does not want to be an American ally. That has never changed. What has changed is that Washington finally seems to understand—and even accept—this. After two decades of costly post-Cold War overreach, American strategy is adjusting. What’s emerging in its place is a dense but flexible partnership, one that functions without treaty guarantees or formal blocs. It works precisely because it acknowledges difference, because it’s structured around mutual interest rather than illusions of alignment.

This is not a Cold War redux. It’s something far more fluid: the strategic landscape of multipolarity, in which states hedge, balance, and maneuver across multiple axes of power. In this world, India has adopted a strategy of deliberate multialignment—cooperating with several major powers, including rivals, to advance its own sovereign priorities. That’s not ideological drift. It’s strategic prudence.

India's Strike on Pakistan Isn't About Terrorism or Kashmir | Opinion

Imran Khalid

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The latest military confrontation between India and Pakistan is not a spontaneous response to terrorism, but rather a premeditated maneuver by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi—one rooted in domestic politics rather than regional security. As the subcontinent teeters on the edge of open war, the world must understand the underlying motivations behind India's recent strikes across the Line of Control in Kashmir that divides the two: calculated redirection of public attention to redirect attention away from internal failings and toward a familiar external scapegoat—Pakistan.

Two weeks ago, the tragedy in Pahalgam that claimed the lives of Indian tourists sparked rightful outrage. But outrage alone does not justify airstrikes on civilian areas in Pakistan. More concerning is New Delhi's outright dismissal of Islamabad's offer for an impartial, international investigation into the incident. Instead of accepting transparency, Modi's government chose escalation—launching "Operation Sindoor," a military campaign cloaked in symbolism, but anchored in cynical domestic politics—particularly after losing parliamentary strength in the 2024 general elections.

For Modi, this pattern is not new. In the run-up to the 2019 general elections, his administration similarly used the Pulwama-Balakot crisis to whip up nationalist fervor. Then, as now, Pakistan offered cooperation and even returned an Indian pilot within days—a gesture aimed at de-escalation. But the lesson Modi seemed to have drawn from that episode was not about the cost of conflict, but its electoral utility.

Unpacking the Current India-Pakistan Crisis

Arsalan Bilal

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India and Pakistan, two nuclear-armed neighbors in South Asia, are on the brink of an open conflict yet again. The two countries have fought several wars since their independence from British colonial rule in 1947, with tensions frequently flaring up over the disputed region of Kashmir. Hostilities between the two countries have long been simmering, but rarely have military engagements gone beyond the de facto border that the two countries share in the disputed Kashmir region.

Now, however, the strategic calculus has shifted owing to India’s missile strikes inside Pakistan, in its heartland. For the first time in decades, India has significantly expanded the geographic and operational scope of its military operations against Pakistan.

India has struck deep inside Pakistan after over half a century. The 1971 full-scale war between the two sides was the last occasion when this happened. Conducting strikes deep inside mainland Pakistan marks an alarming departure from the longstanding pattern of restricting military engagements primarily to the Kashmir region, where neither country has de jure jurisdiction. Also, it is unprecedented since 1971 that India has reportedly used all three forces against Pakistan—the army, navy, and air force.

By extending the theatre of military confrontation beyond the traditional flashpoint of Kashmir and by employing all military instruments, India has effectively redefined the rules of military engagement with Pakistan. It has demonstrated that it is willing and capable of carrying out swift yet extensive conventional military action not only along the border region in the disputed Kashmir region but also potentially anywhere inside the internationally recognized Pakistani territory.

The Return to Strategic Ambiguity: Assessing Trump's Taiwan Stance

Thomas J. Shattuck

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Would the United States come to the defense of Taiwan if the People’s Republic of China (PRC) invaded? Would the U.S. Navy break a PRC blockade of Taiwan? How would the U.S. military respond to a limited missile strike against military facilities in Taiwan? What would the United States do if the PRC seized one of Taiwan’s offshore islands? Would the U.S. president trade an American city for Taipei in a nuclear tit-for-tat to defend Taiwan?

These questions and related contingencies are at the heart of America’s Taiwan policy. There are endless possibilities for what Beijing may decide to do with Taiwan, and each possibility has plenty of response options.

Despite a growing consensus around Beijing’s desire to take Taiwan by force in the coming years, Washington has maintained its long-term policy of strategic ambiguity on all Taiwan contingencies. That policy is quite simple: the U.S. government will not commit to a specific action in response to a PRC action on Taiwan.

This policy has existed since 1979, when the United States severed its diplomatic relations with the Republic of China for the PRC. President Jimmy Carter abrogated the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of China after severing official diplomatic relations, so the United States has not provided Taiwan with a security guarantee for forty-five years. In response to breaking formal ties, the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which has vague language regarding the possible U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan.

The Evolving Dynamics of China’s Middle East and North Africa Strategy: Future Scenarios

Meia Nouwens, Henry Boyd, Erik Green, Wolf-Christian Paes & Albert Vidal Ribe

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China’s engagement with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has evolved since it established diplomatic relations with countries in the region during the latter half of the twentieth century, from a predominantly bilateral approach to one incorporating both bilateral and multilateral cooperation. As countries in the MENA region seek to diversify their economies away from hydrocarbon exports and balance their security partnerships with the United States, they are increasingly turning to China as a partner of choice.

As China seeks to play an even greater normative role in reshaping the international order through its Three Major Initiatives (三大倡议) – the Global Security Initiative, Global Development Initiative and Global Civilization Initiative – and continues to pursue a high-tech advanced economy, its relationship with the MENA region will remain important for the foreseeable future. China also sees the region as an opportunity to showcase to the world, and particularly to Global South countries, the success of the ‘China model’ for governance, economic development and multilateralism.

China’s current strategy regarding the region is driven by four strategic principles:

• Achieving China’s national rejuvenation and ensuring regime security (including by supporting China’s economic model, securing hydrocarbon supply, advancing China’s strategic aims through financial resilience building, and deepening security and defence cooperation with the region);
• Building a Sino-centric multipolar world order with China’s interests and values at the centre (by expanding MENA states’ membership in existing multilateral forums and organisations and thereby bolstering China’s position and influence in these spaces);
• Establishing China’s position as a moral leader of the Global South, particularly through symbolic and rhetorical support; and
• Showcasing the success of the China model to both domestic and global audiences.

How The Dalai Lama Saw The True Nature Of Chinese Communism

Helen Raleigh

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Steve Stone, a cybersecurity expert, recently recounted an incident that left a lasting impression on him. He found that every Chinese hacker he traced was simultaneously targeting a specific hospital. It turned out these hackers were after the medical information of a particular patient: His Holiness the Dalai Lama, the spiritual leader of Tibet. This incident underscores the extraordinary lengths to which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is willing to go to spy on the Dalai Lama.

Why does the CCP fixate on the Dalai Lama? The answer can be found in his new book, Voice for the Voiceless: Over Seven Decades of Struggle with China for My Land and My People. In this compelling work, he shares his personal experiences and insights into the ongoing Tibetan struggle against China.

The book opens with a vivid recounting of the Dalai Lama’s extraordinary life journey. At just 2 years old, his life as a regular toddler abruptly shifted when Tibetan officials recognized him as the reincarnation of the 13th Dalai Lama. When he turned 15 in 1950, Communist China invaded Tibet, thrusting the tremendous responsibility of protecting his people onto the shoulders of a teenager.

The official narrative of Communist China describes the period from 1950 to 1951 as the PLA’s “peaceful liberation” of Tibet. In stark contrast, the Dalai Lama and many Tibetans view this era as a “blatant land grab of an independent nation by force.”

Ukraine Makes Drone Warfare History—Again – Analysis

Can Kasapoğlu

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1. Ukrainian Naval Drones Shoot Down Russian Combat Aircraft

On May 2 near the Russian port of Novorossiysk, a Ukrainian Magura V7 naval drone shot down at least one Russian Su-30 fighter jet using modified AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles.

This marks the first time in the history of warfare that unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) have intercepted manned fighter jets. Visuals from the engagement initially indicatedthat one Su-30 had been struck. But General Kyrylo Budanov, the head of Ukraine’s defense intelligence services, subsequently announced that Ukraine’s forces had downed two aircraft.

Beyond its historic significance, this encounter matters for three reasons. First, it demonstrates the effectiveness of Ukraine’s asymmetric naval warfare capabilities—especially its robotic warfare systems, naval mines, and coastal anti-ship missiles—against Russian forces, namely Russia’s once-formidable Black Sea Fleet.

Second, Ukraine’s successful interception of Russian fighter aircraft showcases a significant shift in the dynamics of naval warfare and reinforces the utility of unmanned systems in modern combat. With limited resources, Ukraine has turned its USVs into effective naval air defense assets.

In Memoriam: Joseph S. Nye Jr.

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CSIS President and CEO John J. Hamre today released the following statement on the passing of Joseph S. Nye Jr.:

“Joe Nye was a titan in both academic and policy circles. Joe was most famous for coining the term ‘soft power.’ By that he meant America’s inspirational powers, and how much stronger they were compared to hard power. Even then, Joe understood the crucial role that military power plays, having served as assistant secretary of defense and chairman of the National Intelligence Council. Joe was a member of the CSIS Board of Trustees for over 23 years. He and the late Richard Armitage jointly authored a famous series of policy monographs concerning Japan and U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation. These six monographs mapped the transformation of the alliance and have resulted in Japan now playing a leading role in Asia in all spheres. We deeply mourn his passing, but we celebrate a remarkably successful life, where Joe’s intellect benefitted us all.”

Military Leaders Must Have Courage

S.L. Nelson

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Marine officer Stuart Scheller became infamous for his criticism of military leadership during the botched Afghanistan withdrawal. He now occupies a new role under Defense Secretary Hegseth and has recently asked: How can the United States military build a screening system (competition) to assess the performance of key leaders?

Two follow-on articles will address how leaders should be assessed as they vie for promotion: specifically, in intellectual and emotional intelligence domains. However, the Department of Defense must begin by promoting and evaluating leaders who possess—or are willing to develop—personal courage.

What Is Courage?

Fortuitously, history’s most famous military thinker, Clausewitz, offers a theory of courage:

“Courage is of two kinds: first, physical courage, or courage in the presence of danger to the person; and next, moral courage, or courage before responsibility—whether it be before the judgment seat of external authority or of the inner power, the conscience.”

Incidentally, Scheller provides an example of both kinds of courage. He is a proven combat leader. But more importantly, he exhibited moral courage—courage stemming from his conscience—which he then wielded to hold those in positions of power accountable. For this so-called public insubordination, he was court-martialed, culminating in his resignation.

The Reward of Empathetic Leadership

Lieutenant Haofeng Liu, U.S. Marine Corps

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The U.S. Marine Corps recently added empathy as its 15th leadership trait. A lot of rumbling followed the news. I heard Marines asking, “What role does empathy play in a society of warfighters like Marine Corps? We’re trained to kill people, not to listen to their feelings.”

That line of protest misunderstands what empathy is, and why it is such a valuable trait for leaders in the Marine Corps.

A Matter of Understanding

Many of the stories that instructors and senior officers told during Marine officer training at The Basic School centered around their first leadership challenges. I spent a significant amount of time wondering what my first such challenge as a lieutenant would be, when it would arise, and how I would deal with it.

I did not have to wait long.

Less than two weeks after I checked into my first unit, I was in Twentynine Palms participating in an integrated training exercise. One of my Marines was new to the unit, but I was already receiving reports of his general disrespect and selfishness, and his bad attitude toward his non-commissioned officers. I brushed it aside at first, thinking this was an expression of the growing pains he was experiencing while trying to integrate with a new unit. But the reports kept coming in, and I soon was forced to confront my first big decision as a second lieutenant: How do I deal with this Marine?

Army names newly combined futures and training command

Jen Judson

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The U.S. Army will consolidate its Futures Command with its Training and Doctrine Command under a new command called the Army’s Transformation and Training Command, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George said during a House Appropriations defense subcommittee posture hearing Wednesday.

The naming comes a week after the service announced sweeping changes to its command structure and formations, with the intention to transform the force while scrapping programs that don’t meet current threats or its vision of overmatching those threats in the future.

The new command’s headquarters will be in Austin, Texas, George said, which is where Army Futures Command is headquartered now.

AFC, a four-star command, was established during President Donald Trump’s first administration under then-Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Milley, whom Trump has sought to disgrace since returning to office, including by having Milley’s joint chiefs chairman portrait removed from the Pentagon hallway where it originally hung.

Milley proposed the four-star command he dubbed Army Futures Command as a new way forward, breaking free of the bureaucracy and silos that had hampered the Army’s previous major modernization efforts.

The U.S.-U.K. deal shows the trade war is here to stay

Neil Irwin & Courtenay Brown

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Markets cheered the new trade pact between the U.S. and U.K. on Thursday.But the details show that trade war relief will only go so far, even as the de-escalation road map becomes clearer.

The big picture: The first significant trade accord of this Trump term affirms that the president is in dealmaking mode and wants to steer around the kinds of economic risks generated by his original announcement of large-scale reciprocal tariffs.

• But U.K. imports will continue to carry a 10% tariff, up from a pre-Trump average of 1.3%. The president referred to that as the "lowest end" import tax.
• The British were perhaps the best positioned among major economies to reach a quick deal with the Trump administration.
• Things get harder from here, with bigger trading partners — China, Canada, and the European Union — facing deeper mutual hostility, bigger trade imbalances, and more complex disputes.

Between the lines: The U.K. deal offers something of a template — perhaps even a best case — of what other countries might achieve in rapid-fire talks with the U.S. government.

• The U.S. runs a trade surplus with the U.K., has deep geopolitical ties, and the British government has moved gingerly around any talk of retaliation.
• As Evercore ISI's Sarah Bianchi wrote, "if the UK isn't getting down to zero, it is very unlikely that anyone is."

Losing Taiwan Would End US Hegemony – Losing Eastern Ukraine Would Not

Rebecca Munson & Tony Cothron

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“No one should question the resolve of the United States of America to defend our interests in the Indo-Pacific and beyond” said Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth in March. But Beijing is certainly questioning U.S. resolve as the West vacillates over how to resolve Ukraine.

Fears are growing that the second Trump presidency will disengage from NATO and Europe. Some Europeans equate the risk of U.S. withdrawal from European security commitments to a Russian nuclear strike. And even amid concerns that Trump is dismantling the U.S.-led world order, an explicitly Europe-first approach is gaining traction, contending that other U.S. national security problems “can only be dealt with effectively once the Atlantic foundation of Washington’s global strength is secure”.

Yet, the reality is that Europe’s economic interests are tied to Asia. Any serious U.S. partnership with Europe necessitates serious U.S. engagement in Asia. Europe must recognize that its own economic stability and long-term security are at stake if Asia becomes wholly dominated by the CCP.

Leo XIV: A New Kind of Pope for a New Kind of Catholic Church

Andrew Latham

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The election of the first American pope, Leo XIV, is rightly seen as historic. But the real story is not his passport. It is how he positions the Church in relation to the world it now faces—and how that posture differs, in subtle but consequential ways, from the approaches of his three predecessors. Where John Paul II evangelized across continents, Benedict XVI defended doctrinal coherence, and Francis prioritized pastoral outreach and institutional reform, this pope signals something quieter but no less important: a recalibration of the Church’s bearing in an age of global fragmentation.

To understand this pope’s emerging stance, we need to locate it within the longer arc of recent papal history. John Paul II was a man of the Cold War. He understood—viscerally and politically—what was at stake in the ideological conflict between liberal democracy and Soviet totalitarianism. His papacy reflected that moment: global, confident, insistent that Catholicism could speak powerfully into the contest over the soul of modernity. Benedict XVI inherited that legacy but shifted the emphasis inward. Confronted with growing secularization and relativism, he focused on defending the integrity of faith, often against the grain of cultural trends. His was a papacy of ideas—brilliant, theologically rich, but often perceived as aloof.

UK-US trade deal a 'huge relief', minister says, as businesses call for more clarity

Matt Spivey and Andrew Humphrey

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Mixed reaction to UK-US deal

We've been getting more reaction to yesterday's announcement of a agreement over tariffs on some goods traded between the countries, so let's bring you up-to-date with the latest.

What is the deal?

Simply put this is a tariff agreement that amends the levies the president placed earlier this year:

• Tariffs on cars exported to the US will be reduced from 27.5% to 10% - this will apply to a quota of 100,000 UK cars, almost the total the UK exported last year
• The 25% tariffs on UK steel and aluminium imported by the US are to be scrapped
• For agriculture, there will be"reciprocal market access" on beef which means that UK farmers will be given a quota for 13,000 metric tonnes of beef to be exported to the US, and the US granted the same
• A secure supply chain for pharmaceutical products will also be created, with final details to be written up in the coming weeks
• The US will have preferential access to high-quality UK aerospace components

Aside from this, the reciprocal tariff rate of 10% on the UK, which was announced in March, remains in place.

However, it’s important to remember that nothing is finalised. There are still months of negotiations and legal paperwork ahead.

America’s Most Dangerous Dependence

Heidi Crebo-Rediker

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In the run-up to World War II, the United States had become dangerously overdependent on foreign imports of critical minerals and metals—even though officials had warned about the supply chain’s vulnerabilities for a decade. Congress passed an act creating the National Defense Stockpile in 1939. But when the United States went to war a year later, the scale and urgency of its immediate defense needs still vastly exceeded its domestic mining and production facilities as well as its new stockpile.

President Franklin Roosevelt had to rush to shift control of the stockpile to a newly created agency—the Metals Reserve Company, run by civilian industrialists—that scoured the globe to buy or barter for whatever it could from wherever it could at whatever cost. To sustain the war economy, government agencies and private industry also expanded U.S. domestic mining and refining operations, engineered synthetic material substitutes, and funded technological advances to improve mines’ efficiency and productivity. Although the United States went on to decisively win the war, the country’s lack of preparedness led to excess emergency spending as it struggled to outbid the Axis powers for critical materials and costly delays in ramping up the production of tanks, aircraft, and munitions. Washington had to rely on risky and untested foreign sources for minerals and metals and use shipping routes vulnerable to attack.

Why Peace Talks Fail in Ukraine

Samuel Charap and Sergey Radchenko

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It has been nearly three months since U.S. President Donald Trump launched a major effort to bring the war in Ukraine to an end. The diplomatic exchanges that followed have yet to produce meaningful results. In Russian President Vladimir Putin, Trump faces a crafty, experienced adversary who hopes to capitalize on the American president’s impatience with the war to coerce Ukraine into signing away what the Russians have failed to win by force on the battlefield.

There is no reason to think that Trump will acquiesce to Putin’s list of demands. In fact, he has repeatedly voiced frustration with the lack of progress in the talks and has threatened to walk away, as Russia continues to creep forward, inch by bloody inch, in a long war of attrition with no end in sight.

Amid all the recent proposals and counterproposals, threats and counterthreats, reexamining the last real attempt to bring this war to a negotiated end can help inform the current effort. In 2024 in Foreign Affairs, we delved into the history of the talks that began in the war’s first weeks and which, by the end of March 2022, had produced the so-called Istanbul Communiqué, a framework for a settlement. The core bargain in the framework would have entailed Ukraine embracing permanent neutrality, foreclosing its possible membership in NATO, in return for ironclad security guarantees. The sides failed to finalize the deal in the subsequent months, and the war has now entered its fourth year.

Five Questions: Jim Mitre on Artificial General Intelligence and National Security

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What do you see as the most plausible scenario for how AI develops over the next five years?

To be honest, I don't know. What we hear from a lot of the technologists working at the forefront of AI is that we might be on the threshold of some significantly more capable model, which they refer to as artificial general intelligence. This is plausible. It may happen—and because it would be of such high consequence if it does, it's prudent to think through what that would mean.

There are people in the tech world who are worried about how capable these models are becoming and sounding the alarm for the U.S. government to grapple with the implications. But they're a little out of their depth once they start weighing in on what that means for national security. On the other hand, there are a lot of people in the national security community who aren't up to speed on where this technology might be going. We wanted to just level-set everybody, to say, 'Look, from our perspective, AGI presents five hard problems for U.S. national security. Any sensible strategy needs to think through the implications and not over-optimize for any one.'

What would be an example of that?

There have been calls for the U.S. government to launch a Manhattan Project–like effort to achieve artificial general intelligence. And if you're focused on ensuring the U.S. has the lead in this technology, that makes perfect sense. But that might spur the Chinese to race us there, which would aggravate global instability. Some people have also called for a moratorium on developing these technologies until we're certain we can control them. That takes care of one problem—a rogue AI getting out of the box. But then you risk enabling China or some other country to race ahead and maybe even weaponize this technology.

Uninhabited integration: the internal-carriage challenge

Jack Mitchell-Divers

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Boeing Australia is planning by the turn of the year to carry out a live firing test of an air-to-air missile (AAM) from the internal weapon bay of its MQ-28 Ghost Bat collaborative combat aircraft (CCA). Missile release from an internal bay is far from a novelty, as demonstrated by the Lockheed Martin F-22A Raptor and F-35 Lighting II aircraft, but when it comes to an uninhabited system, this is a new design task.

The MQ-28 is a developmental uninhabited combat air system being used to explore the capabilities and requirements for an air vehicle in this class. In keeping with other CCA designs, it is significantly smaller than a crewed fighter aircraft, increasing the challenge of weapon integration and release.

Design driversThe CCAs in development are generally smaller platforms and feature a reduced maximum take-off weight compared to that of a crewed tactical combat aircraft. Substituting the cockpit for autonomy systems and avionics reduces size but does not yield a significant reduction in weight. The objective to limit the aircraft’s signature also means that weapons are primarily restricted to internal carriage, placing limitations on the platform’s volume and weight due to the need to accommodate a payload bay. Combined with a relatively bigger fuel fraction for desired loiter times and endurance, this crucially leaves little remaining for payload. As a result, there is a high dependence for overall weapon-system performance on a well-designed payload bay, or bays – getting the most out of limited loadouts.

Operational Myopia

Col. Daniel Sukman, U.S. Army

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The joint force lacks a unified theory of success for the strategic level to war. Recent conceptual work in the joint community is producing a joint warfighting concept and joint concept for competing, which respectively focus on battle and actions before the onset of crisis and conflict. Moreover, each service is developing theories of victory independent of each other and independent of the joint community. Conceptual production from the services includes multidomain operations and distributed maritime operations, both of which center on battles at the operational level of war; while this is necessary, it is not sufficient. Without a unified and overarching strategic approach to war, the joint force is accepting the same risk as Napoleon Bonaparte in the early nineteenth century, the Germans (twice) in the first half of the twentieth century, and to an extent, the same risk the United States took in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Current State of Strategic Concepts

In 2012, the joint staff produced the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO). This concept provided a strategic vision for the military to become a globally integrated joint force. Under the guidance of then–Chairman Gen. Martin Dempsey, the CCJO recognized that the future of war would encapsulate enemies and adversaries who operate across combatant command boundaries and in all five domains (air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace).1 The joint staff continued with the publication of the 2019 CCJO, which maintained the central idea of global integration to guide the joint force in a strategic approach. The 2019 CCJO, while still the apex of joint concepts, is insufficient, as operational-level concepts such as the Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC), the Army’s multidomain operations conceptual work, and the Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030 are now past the substance of the 2019 CCJO.

Leadership, Lethality, and (Data) Literacy: Three Keys to Prepare the Army for the Data-Driven, AI-Enabled Future of War

Charlie Phelps

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In the dead of night, deep behind enemy lines, a US Army Special Forces team prepared for a mission that could turn the tide of conflict: neutralize an enemy command post orchestrating a series of destructive missile strikes on coalition forces. The landscape was a labyrinth of obstacles—rough terrain, dense vegetation, and a well-entrenched adversary. Yet, the team was armed with more than just weapons. Two scouts from a local resistance organization guided their patrol. The scouts’ first encounter with Green Berets was ten years ago during a peacetime training exchange. The team also wielded a powerful asset: an AI-driven data system providing real-time intelligence from an array of sources—satellites, drones, and cyber channels automated to offer protection to the small patrol. As they navigated the hostile terrain, their wrist displays flickered with crucial updates. The AI had pinpointed an approaching enemy patrol, undetected by traditional sensors operating independently of one another. With a few taps, the team leader accessed a dynamic map showing the patrol’s precise location and movement pattern. Adjusting their approach, the soldiers avoided detection and pressed on toward their target. Upon reaching the objective, the team broadcasted a piece of malware that disrupted the command post’s electromagnetic spectrum masking, allowing for target designation by low earth orbit assets. Moments later, a pinpointed ground-based hypersonic missile, guided by AI-processed data, obliterated the command post. The mission’s success was a testament not only to the operators’ skill but also to their technology-enabled mastery of data and employment of AI-enabled systems.

This scenario highlights a crucial reality of contemporary warfare: data and artificial intelligence are not merely supplementary tools but essential elements for achieving success in large-scale combat operations and multidomain operations. The US Army’s Field Manual 3-0 underscores the importance of integrating data and AI across multiple domains—land, air, sea, cyber, and space—to secure victory. Data literacy has emerged as a fundamental competency for Army leaders, enabling them to leverage these advancements effectively and stay ahead in the complex and dynamic operational environments of modern warfare.