The United States military, despite its global capability, consistently fails to effectively utilize kinetic power for broader strategic aims, exemplified by the White House's air campaign in Iran, which did not achieve regime change, and prior interventions in Afghanistan, Libya, and Iraq. These failures stem from an unwillingness to confront the core strategic challenge of linking military force to desired political effects.
This persistence is attributed to American exceptionalism, fostering a dictatorial posture and aversion to compromise, and the appeal of unilateral military action to U.S. presidents. Solutions include lowering expectations by compartmentalizing military and political effects, or, more realistically, developing sound strategies that clearly articulate plausible causal chains between military actions and political outcomes. This demands rigorous vetting, deep historical and political knowledge, and understanding adversary reactions. Given the lack of a uniform strategy curriculum and reported disinterest in rigorous vetting, the national security education system and the U.S. military's professional military education system are crucial levers to instill a causation-centric approach. Political goals necessitate negotiation and compromise, not solely force.
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