Taiwan can be defended against a Chinese amphibious invasion, but the operational and strategic costs for the United States and its regional allies would be exceptionally high. While Admiral Samuel Paparo’s “hellscape” idea leverages cheap drones, loitering munitions, and unmanned surface vessels to disrupt Beijing's forces, these technologies also empower the adversary.
Geographic proximity gives China a massive home-field advantage, forcing American forces to operate within a highly lethal, contested environment. Consequently, any serious conflict would immediately engulf U.S. bases in Japan and Guam, threatening allied infrastructure with retaliatory strikes. Although the CSIS Taiwan invasion wargames indicate that allied forces could successfully maintain Taiwanese independence, the victory would result in the loss of dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and thousands of service members. To mitigate these risks, Washington must shift its strategy toward survivable denial, focusing on stockpiling mobile anti-ship missiles and mines to prevent a rapid fait accompli.
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