Pages

4 July 2014

*****Chinese Military Modernization and Force Development: Chinese and Outside Perspectives

JUL 2, 2014
The Burke Chair at CSIS has developed a new analysis of the trends in Chinese military strategy and forces entitledChinese Military Modernization and Force Development: Chinese and Outside Perspectives. This report provides a comprehensive update of previous Burke Chair studies and is available on the CSIS web site at

The goal behind this report is not to present the authors’ view of the balance, but rather to provide the basis for an unclassified dialogue on the military developments in China, including the size and structure of the country’s current and planned military forces. It draws on official US, Chinese, and other Asian official reporting, as well as the work of other scholars and the data bases developed by the IISS and Jane’s in an effort to compare different views of Chinese strategy and military developments, and is meant to provide US, Chinese, and other analysts with a better basis for understanding Western estimates of the changes in Chinese force strength and force quality.

The United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) face a critical need to improve their understanding of how each is developing its military power and how to avoid forms of military competition that could lead to rising tension or conflict between the two states. This report focuses on China’s military developments and modernization and how they are perceived in the UIS, the West, and Asia. It utilizes the unclassified data available in the West on the trends in Chinese military forces. It relies heavily on the data in the US Department of Defense (DoD) Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, particularly the 2013 and 2014 editions.

It relies heavily on the annual military balances compiled by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), though a range of sources are included. It should be noted that this report focuses on Chinese forces, and therefore presents only one side of the US and Chinese balance and the security situation in Asia. It also draws upon a Burke Chair report entitled The Evolving Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, looking at the bilateral US-Chinese balance in more detail.

Accordingly, it focuses on the actual changes taking place in Chinese forces, and it provides a detailed analysis detailed analysis of the trends in Chinese military forces since 1985, examining how the often-conflicting trends in outside sources interact with reporting on Chinese military spending and strategy. It also shows that important changes are taking place in US strategy and that these changes must be considered when evaluating Chinese actions.

The study makes it clear that US, other Asian, and other Western sources and analyses of Chinese military developments are not an adequate basis for US and Chinese dialogue without Chinese review, commentary, or more Chinese transparency in providing data on Chinese strategy, military forces, and military spending. There is a critical need for focused military dialogue and for joint US and Chinese efforts to develop common data and perceptions on US and Chinese military strategy and net assessments of the overall trends in military balance and strategic situation in the Pacific region.

Moreover, this report shows that focusing on strategy and concepts in broad terms is no substitute for a detailed examination of specific changes in force strength, the extent to which concepts and strategy are actually being implemented, and how the shifts in US and Chinese forces actually compare.

The report examines a range of data regarding Chinese capabilities and force modernization, focusing on the most reliable sources. Using these sources, it analyzes the full range of China’s military capabilities as well as trends in their growth and composition. The data indicate that the PRC has engaged in a continuing military modernization program that is expanding the capabilities available to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Although the PLA has consistently reduced its Personnel since the 1980s, reductions in obsolete equipment and the procurement and deployment of modern systems in its land, air, naval, and missile forces have led to increases in the PLA’s overall military effectiveness, especially in the context of its “Local War under Conditions of Informatization” military doctrine.

Data alone, however, cannot provide a full narrative: this report places the observable data within the context of contemporary Chinese military thought and doctrine. Seen within the context of Chinese military doctrine, the modernization efforts in the PLA Army, Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery Force have enabled changes in operations and tactics as well as in force structure and weapon systems: these changes, in turn, have expanded PLA military capabilities and placed China on the road to becoming a modern military power.

The report contains numerous maps, figures, and tables. Its contents are shown below:


INTRODUCTION
THE NEED FOR FOCUSED MILITARY DIALOGUE
THE TRENDS IN CHINESE MILITARY MODERNIZATION
SETTING THE STAGE: AMERICA’S DEVELOPING STRATEGY IN ASIA
US Forces in the Pacific
Changes in US Strategy and Rebalancing to Asia
The New US Strategic Guidance in 2012
Secretary Hagel’s Summary in April 2014
An Uncertain Rebalancing and Not a “Pivot”
STRATEGY, REBALANCING, AND REALITY
The 2012 Strategic Guidance
Growing Strategic and Resources Uncertainties
The 2013 US Report on Chinese Military Power and the 2014 QDR
Secretary Hagel’s Statements in April 2014
President Obama’s New Statements on Strategy: The West Point Speech
The 2014 PACOM Posture Statement
THE BROADER PACIFIC FRAMEWORK: THE 2014 SHANGRI-LA DIALOGUE

CHAPTER 1: ASSESSING CHINA’S ARMED FORCES
Figure 1.1: China white papers, issued biennially: Total Personnel
Figure 1.2: China the Center for Strategic and International Studies
Figure 1.3: China the Center for Strategic and International Studies
Figure 1.4: China the Center for Strategic and International Studies
CHINA’S DEFENSE WHITE PAPERS
US DEFENSE WHITE PAPERS ON CHINA’S STRATEGY AND FORCES
Figure 1.5: East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zones
THE STRATEGIC FORCES DRIVING CHINESE MILITARY MODERNIZATION
CHINA’S DECLARED STRATEGIC GOALS
“DEFENSIVE” FORCE MODERNIZATION AND TRANSFORMATION VERSUS “OFFENSIVE” FORCE MODERNIZATION AND TRANSFORMATION
CHINESE VIEW OF THE US ‘REBALANCE’
REGIONAL VIEWS OF THE US ‘REBALANCE’
THE GROWING CHINESE-RUSSIAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

CHAPTER 2: UNDERLYING RESOURCES FOR CHINA’S SECURITY CAPABILITIES
IS BECOMING AN ECONOMIC SUPERPOWER A PRELUDE TO BECOMING A MILITARY SUPERPOWER?
Figure 2.1: IMF Estimate of Comparative Rise in China's GDP (nominal) - Part I
(Billions $USD in Current Dollars/Prices) 
Figure 2.1: IMF Estimate of Comparative Rise in China's GDP (nominal)- Part II
(Billions $USD in Current Dollars/Prices)
Figure 2.2: China's Rise in Per Capita GDP - Part I 
(Current $USD) 
Figure 2.2: China's Rise in Per Capita GDP - Part II
(Current $USD) 70
Figure 2.3: China's GDP Growth - Part I
(Percent Change in Constant Prices) 
Figure 2.3: China's GDP Growth - Part II
(Percent Change in Constant Prices)
Figure 2.4: China's Rise in GDP (PPP) - Part I
(Billion of Current International Dollars) 
Figure 2.4: China's Rise in GDP (PPP) - Part II
(Billions of Current International Dollars) 
Figure 2.5: China & USA Defense Spending as a Percentage of GDP
ECONOMIC TRENDS SHAPING MILITARY SPENDING
Positive Trends 
Economic Uncertainties
Figure 2.6: July 2013 IMF Assessment of China’s Demographic Changes
Figure 2.7: July 2013 IMF Assessment of China
Figure 2.8: July 2013 IMF Assessment of China's Financial Sector
Figure 2.9: July 2013 IMF Assessment of China's Economic Growth and Inequality
Figure 2.10: Different Estimates of Chinese GDP Growth Rates (Market Prices): 2000-2018 
Figure 2.11: China's GDP (PPP) (Billions of Current International Dollars)
Chinese Economic Growth Relative to Increases in Military Spending
Figure 2.12: Comparing Percentage of GDP spent on Military Expenditures – Part I
Figure 2.12: Comparing Percentage of GDP spent on Military Expenditures – Part II 
Figure 2.13: Chinese GDP Growth and Defense Spending 
ECONOMIC FACTORS THAT MAY IMPACT CHINA’S MILITARY SPENDING, STRATEGY AND MODERNIZATION 
Figure 2.4: Estimates of Chinese Inflation Rates (CPI % increase)
FDI and Current Account Balance 
DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS
SOCIETAL TRENDS AND ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 
Figure 2.15: Chinese Population Projection (in millions) 
Figure 2.16: Chinese Population Growth Indicators 
Figure 2.17: Chinese Births vs. Deaths over Time 
Figure 2.18: The Impact of Population, Control, Age and Shifts in Gender on China’s Work Force – Part I 
ADAPTED FROM THE THE K2P BLOG: POSTS TAGGED ‘CHINESE GOVERNMENT’ CHINA RELAXES HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL ONE-CHILD POLICY, NOVEMBER 15, 2013HTTP://KTWOP.COM/TAG/CHINESE-GOVERNMENT/
Figure 2.18: The Impact of Population, Control, Age and Shifts in Gender on China’s Work Force – Part II

CHAPTER 3: CHINESE ESTIMATES OF MILITARY SPENDING 
CHINESE STATEMENTS ON MILITARY SPENDING 
Figure 3.1: Official PRC Defense Budget Allocation for 2009 (in RMB billion) 
Figure 3.2: Relative Burden of the PRC Defense Budget on State Finances: PRC vs. ROC Estimate 
US ANALYSES OF CHINESE DEFENSE BUDGETS 
Figure 3.3: Historical PRC Defense Budget Compared to US Estimates of Total Defense Spending 
Figure 3.4: Historical US Defense Expenditures
OTHER OUTSIDE ASSESSMENTS OF CHINESE MILITARY SPENDING 
Figure 3.6: Chinese Military Budget Trends versus IISS and SIPRI Estimates, 2003-2013 
Figure 3.7: PRC Defense Spending-related Comparative Statistics, 1980-2011 
Figure 3.8: PRC Official Defense Budget Annual Data, 2002-2012
Figure 3.9: Change in China, ew S. Erikson, “Demystif 
A LACK OF TRANSPARENCY AND ESTIMATION PROBLEMS 
THE CHINESE RESPONSE

CHAPTER 4: CHINESE STRATEGY AND PLA MILITARY DOCTRINE
CHINESE STRATEGIC DOCTRINE
Active Defense 
Local War under Conditions of Informatization
People’s War 
CHINESE CAMPAIGN DOCTRINE 
Integrated Joint Operations 
Information Warfare
Chinese Cyberwarfare 
Integrated Firepower Operations 
Mobility 
Comprehensive Support
SERVICE STRATEGY 
The Nine-Dash Line
Figure 4.1 China’s New Map of Greater China: June 2014 
Chinese Actions to Establish Control within the First Island Chain 
Figure 4.2: DoD Representation of the First and Second Island Chains 
THE US VIEW
Japanese and South Korean Perspectives on the Balance 
Figure 4.3: Japanese Ministry of Defense Summary of the Military Balance 
Figure 4.4: South Korean Ministry of Defense Summary of the Military Strength of the Major Northeast Asian Powers 

CHAPTER 5: CHINESE MILITARY ORGANIZATION
PLA MILITARY ORGANIZATION
Figure 5.1: China’s Political Structure as Implemented
Figure 5.2: The Party Central Military Commission (CMC) 
ORGANIZATION OF THE PLA 
Figure 5.3: High Command Structure of the PLA (as of 2013) 
OPERATIONAL COMMAND LEVELS 
PLA Army (PLAA) 
PLA Navy (PLAN) 
PLA Air Force (PLAAF) 
PLA Second Artillery Force (SAF) 
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CHINESE SECURITY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES 
Ministry of State Security (MSS)
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) 
People’s Armed Police Force (PAPF) 

CHAPTER 6: FORCE CHANGES AND TRENDS IN TOTAL PERSONNEL
SHIFTS IN TOTAL PERSONNEL 
Figure 6.1: Trends in PLA Personnel 
PERSONNEL SHARE BY SERVICE AND FORCE ELEMENT 
Figure 6.2: Shifts in Percentage of Total Personnel by Service: 1985-2014 
Figure 6.3: Active and Reserve Personnel by Service in the PLA: 2014 
SHIFTS IN THE PLA’S PERSONNEL SYSTEM 
Rebalancing the Personnel System 
Recruiting High-Level Human Capital into the PLA 
Creating Opportunities for Increased Qualification
Greater Compensation for PLA Personnel 
SHIFTS IN RESERVE AND MILITIA FORCE STRUCTURE 
PLA Reserve Forces
PLA Militia Forces
SHIFTS IN THE PERSONNEL OF THE CHINESE SECURITY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES 
Ministry of State Security (MSS) 
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) 
People’s Armed Police Force (PAPF) 
Figure 6.4: Historical Trends in Absolute PLA and PAPF Personnel

CHAPTER 7: BROAD PATTERNS IN PLA MODERNIZATION AND THE ROLE OF ARMS AND TECHNOLOGY IMPORTS AND EXPORTS
UNCERTAIN PATTERNS OF CHANGE 
Shifts in PLA Training Practices 
Joint Operations 
Amphibious Operations 
Focus on C4ISR and Information Technology 
ARMS TRADE AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: THE ROLE OF IMPORTS
ARMS TRADE AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: THE ROLE OF EXPORTS 
Figure 7.1: Worldwide Arms Transfer Agreements, 2004-2011 and Suppliers’ Share with Developing World (in millions of current 2011 US dollars) 
Figure 7.2: Worldwide Arms Deliveries, 2004-2011 and Suppliers’ Share with Developing World (in millions of current 2011 US dollars)
Figure 7.3: Percentage of Each Supplier’s Agreements Value by Region, 2004-2011
Figure 7.4: Percentage of Total Agreements Value by Supplier to Regions, 2004-2011 
Figure 7.5: Worldwide Arms Deliveries, 2004-2011and Suppliers’ Share with Developing World (in millions of current 2011 US dollars) 
Figure 7.6: Arms Deliveries to Developing Nations, by Supplier, 2004-2011 (in millions of current US dollars)
Figure 7.7: Arms Deliveries to Developing Nations, by Supplier, 2004-2011
Figure: 7.8: Percentage of Supplier Deliveries Value by Region, 2004-2011 
Figure 7.9: Numbers of Weapons Delivered by Suppliers to Developing Nations
Figure 7.10: Numbers of Weapons Delivered by Suppliers to Asia and the Pacific 
Figure 7.11: Numbers of Weapons Delivered by Suppliers to Near East 
Figure 7.12: Numbers of Weapons Delivered by Suppliers to Africa 
Figure 7.13: Value of Russian Arms Exports to China, 1992-2012 (US$ millions)
Figure 7.14: Percentage of Overall PRC Arms Imports from Russia, 1992-2012
ARMS TRADE AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: THE ROLE OF ESPIONAGE

CHAPTER 8: THE PLA ARMY 
THE US OFFICIAL VIEW
THE JAPANESE OFFICIAL VIEW 
OVERALL TRENDS IN PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT
Figure 8.1: Deployment of PLAA Group Armies 
Figure 8.2: PLAA Force Strength in 2014
SHIFTS IN FORCE STRUCTURE
Figure 8.3: PLA Ground Forces Force Structure, 1985-2014 
Figure 8.3: PLA Ground Forces Force Structure, 1985-2014 
Figure 8.3: PLA Ground Forces Force Structure, 1985-2014 
Figure 8.3: PLA Ground Forces Force Structure, 1985-2014 
SHIFTS IN PERSONNEL 
Figure 8.4: Historical Trends in total PLAA Personnel, 1985-2014 
TRENDS IN MAJOR EQUIPMENT STRENGTH 
Figure 8.5: Summary Trends in PLA Major Weapon System Inventory, 1985-2014
Figure 8.6: Historical PLAA Equipment Inventory of Major Weapon Systems, 1985-2014 
EQUIPMENT MODERNIZATION
Figure 8.7: Historical Trends in the PLAA’s Modern Major Weapon Inventory, 1985-2014 
Figure 8.8: Pace of PLAA Modernization – Percent of Modern Weapon Systems, 2000-2014 
SHIFTS IN UNIT TRAINING 
THE PLAA AND POWER PROJECTION
THE PLAA IN COMPARISON TO REGIONAL MILITARIES AND THE US
Figure 8.9: PLA Forces in Comparison to Regional Countries and the US 
Figure 8.10: PLAA Ground Forces Equipment in Comparison to Regional Countries and the US
Figure 8.11: PLAA Artillery in Comparison to Regional Countries and the US

CHAPTER 9: THE PLA NAVY 
THE US OFFICIAL VIEW
THE JAPANESE OFFICIAL VIEW 
PLAN SERVICE STRATEGY 
Figure 9.1: Size of the PLAN in 2014 
Figure 9.2: DoD Representation of the First and Second Island Chains 
Figure 9.3: Competing Sovereignty Claims in the South China Sea (2012) 
Figure 9.4: Competing Sovereignty Claims (2014)
Figure 9.5: China’s Dependence on Maritime Lines of Communication and Efforts to Reduce Dependence 
Figure 9.6: China’s Import Transit Routes
SHIFTS IN FORCE STRUCTURE, EQUIPMENT COMPOSITION, AND PERSONNEL 
SHIFT IN FORCE STRUCTURE 
Figure 9.7: Size and Deployments of China’s Fleets (as of 2012)
Figure 9. 8: Force Structure of the PLA Navy 1985-2014-Part I 
Figure 9. 8: Force Structure of the PLA Navy 1985-2014-Part II 
Figure 9. 8: Force Structure of the PLA Navy 1985-2014-Part III 
Figure 9. 8: Force Structure of the PLA Navy 1985-2014-Part IV 
Figure 9. 8: Force Structure of the PLA Navy 1985-2014-Part V 
Figure 9. 8: Force Structure of the PLA Navy 1985-2014-Part VI
Figure 9. 8: Force Structure of the PLA Navy 1985-2014-Part VII 
Figure 9.9: Trends in PLAN Combatants Holdings 
SHIFT IN EQUIPMENT COMPOSITION AND MODERNIZATION 
Submarines 
Figure 9.10: PLAN Progress in Submarine Technology
Major Combatant Holdings
Figure 9.11: PLAN Major Combatant Holdings 
Figure 9.12: Relative PLAN Major Combatant Holdings 
SHIFTS IN PERSONNEL 
Figure 9.13: PLAN Personnel Trends 
THE PLAN AND POWER PROJECTION 
The Chinese View 
Figure 9.14: Geographic Expansion in PLAN Military Exercises Locations 
The US View 
The Japanese View 
The US Reaction and the Air Sea Battle 

CHAPTER 10: PLA AIR FORCE 
THE US OFFICIAL VIEW 
Figure 10.1: The Size of the PLAAF in 2014
PLAAF STRATEGY 
SHIFT IN FORCE STRUCTURE, EQUIPMENT COMPOSITION, AND PERSONNEL 
SHIFT IN FORCE STRUCTURE 
Figure 10.2: Deployment of China’s Air Forces 
Figure 10.3: Force Structure of the PLA Air Force, 1985-2014 – Part I 
Figure 10.3: Force Structure of the PLA Air Force, 1985-2014 – Part II 
Figure 10.3: Force Structure of the PLA Air Force, 1985-2014 – Part III 
Figure 10.3: Force Structure of the PLA Air Force, 1985-2014 – Part IV 
Figure 10.3: Force Structure of the PLA Air Force, 1985-2014 – Part V 
Figure 10.3: Force Structure of the PLA Air Force, 1985-2014 – Part VI 
Figure 10.3: Force Structure of the PLA Air Force, 1985-2014 – Part VII 
THE PACE OF MODERNIZATION 
Figure 10.4: Historical PLAAF Force Structure, 1985-2014, Part I 
Figure 10.: Historical PLAAF Force Structure, 1985-2014, Part II 
Figure 10.5: Historical Trend PLAAF Numbers by Key Missions Area, 1985-2014
Figure 10.6: Historical Relative Trends in the PLAAF’s Force Structure By Percent of Total Force
SHIFTS IN EQUIPMENT COMPOSITION
Key Aspects of Equipment Modernization 
Stealth 
Other Advanced Fighters and Carrier Aircraft 
UAVs, Drones, and More Advanced IS&R 
Figure 10.7: Total Versus Modern Aircraft in the PLAAF
Figure 10.8: Modern Versus Total PLAAF Aircraft by Major Mission Type 
Figure 10.9: Percentage of Modern PLAAF Aircraft 
SHIFTS IN PERSONNEL 
Figure 10.10: Historical PLAAF Personnel Trends 
EXPANSION OF CHINESE AIR POWER PROJECTION CAPABILITIES, US FORCED ENTRY, AND THE OUTER ISLAND CHAIN 
THE PLAAF AND POWER PROJECTION 

CHAPTER 11: PLA MISSILE FORCES – THE SECOND ARTILLERY FORCE 
Figure 11.1: The Size of the China’s Missile Forces in 2012 
THE US OFFICIAL VIEW 
Missile Developments 
Space Developments 
SAF STRATEGY 
SHIFTS IN FORCE STRUCTURE, EQUIPMENT COMPOSITION, AND PERSONNEL 
TRENDS IN TOTAL MISSILE FORCES 
Figure 11.2: Historical Quantitative Data on the SAF- Part I 
Figure 11.2: Historical Quantitative Data on the SAF- Part II 
Figure 11.3: Historical Size and Composition of the SAF Arsenal 
Figure 11.4: The SAF’s Changing Force Structure, 1985-2013 (Percent) 
Figure 11.5: The Expanding Range of China’s Theater Missile Forces – Part I 
Figure 11.5: The Expanding Range of China’s Theater Missile Forces – Part II 
Figure 11.6: Year-on-Year Missile Launcher Strength, 2005-2012 
Figure 11.7: Year-on-Year Missile Inventory, 2005-2012 
SHIFTS IN EQUIPMENT COMPOSITION 
SRBMs 
Figure 11.8: NAISC Estimate of the Regional Balance of Short-range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) 
Figure 11.9: RAND Data on PRC SRBMs and the “Notional SRBM” Model (2009) 
Figure 11.10: SRBMs Needed to Obtain Given Probabilities of Neutralizing a Single Runway 
Cruise Missiles 
Figure 11.13: NASIC Estimate of the Regional Balance of Land Attack Cruise Missiles 
MRBMs 
Figure 11.14: NASIC Estimate of the Regional Balance of MRBMs and IRBMs 
Figure 11.15: Development of Ballistic and Cruise Missile Launchers, 1985-2014
ICBMs and SLBMs 
Figure 11.16: NASIC Estimate of the Regional Balance of ICBMs and SLBMs 
Figure 11.17: Percentage of Modern ICBMs in the SAF’s Arsenal, 1985-2012 
Figure 11.18: The Expanding Range of China’s ICBM and Longer-Range Forces – Part I 
Figure 11.18: The Expanding Range of China’s ICBM and Longer-Range Forces – Part II 
Figure 11.18: The Expanding Range of China’s ICBM and Longer-Range Forces – Part III 
Chinese Missile Defense Capabilities 
Chinese Counterspace Capabilities 
Space
Anti-Access/Area Denial Sea-based Space Programs 
Anti-Access/Area Denial Land-based Space Programs 
IMPROVED PERSONNEL 
PROGRESS IN POWER PROJECTION 
Appendix to Chapter 11: NASIC Data on SAF Ballistic Missiles 

CHAPTER 12: CHINA’S NUCLEAR FORCES AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE 
Figure 12.1: Chinese, US and Russian Nuclear Forces 
Figure 12.1: Chinese, US and Russian Nuclear Forces 
Figure 12.1: Chinese, US and Russian Nuclear Forces
Figure 12.2: Comparative Estimate of Global Holdings of Nuclear Weapons 
THE REGIONAL NUCLEAR BALANCE 
China 
The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) Estimate
The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) Estimate 
The Global Security Estimate 
The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Estimate
The United States 
North and South Korea 
India and Pakistan 
CHINA’S EVOLVING NUCLEAR FORCES 
Chinese Biological and Chemical Weapons 
Role of Chinese Tunnel Facilities 

CHAPTER 13: CHINESE MILITARY MODERNIZATION AND THE TAIWAN STRAIT MILITARY BALANCE 
THE US PERSPECTIVE 
TAIWANESE AND JAPANESE PERSPECTIVES 
Figure 13.1: The Balance in the Taiwan Straits in 2014 – Part I 
Figure 13.2: Taiwanese (ROC) Ministry of Defense Summary of the PRC-ROC Military Balance 
Figure 13.3: Japanese Ministry of Defense Summary of the PRC-ROC Military Balance
HISTORICAL TRENDS IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT MILITARY BALANCE 380
Figure 13.4: A Summary of Trends in the PLA 
Figure 13.5: Trends in PLA Forces Deployed in the Vicinity of the Taiwan Strait 
Figure 13.6: Trends in the ROC Armed Forces 
The Naval Balance
Figure 13.7: Absolute Trends in PLAN Deployments to the East and South Sea Fleets 
Figure 13.8: Absolute Trends in ROC Naval Forces 
Figure 13.9: Relative Increases in PLAN Deployments to the East and South Sea Fleets since 2005 (percentage increase) 
Figure 13.10: Increases in ROC Naval Deployments since 2005 (percentage increase)
The Air and Missile Balance 
Figure 13.11: Absolute Trends in PLAAF Forces Deployed Near the Taiwan Strait 
Figure 13.12: Absolute Trends in the ROCAF Aircraft Inventory 
Figure 13.13: Relative Changes in PLAAF Force Deployments to the Taiwan Strait, since 2005 (percentage increase) 
Figure 13.14: Changes in ROCAF Force Numbers, since 2005 (percentage increase) 
Figure 13.15: Japanese Ministry of Defense Summary of the Trends in the Balance of Modern PRC-ROC Fighter Aircraft 
Figure 13.16: Department of Defense Estimate of PLA SAM and SRBM Coverage 
The Ground Force Balance 
Figure 13.17: A Comparison of Personnel Trends in PLAA and ROC Army in the Taiwan Strait Region 
Figure 13.18: A Comparison of Trends in PLAA and ROC Equipment Holdings in the Taiwan Strait Region
Figure 13.19: A Comparison of Relative Trends in PRC and ROC Artillery Forces (percentage increase over 2005 levels) 
Figure 13.20: PRC Force Deployment near Taiwan - Part I
Figure 13.20: PRC Force Deployment near Taiwan – Part II 

CHAPTER 14: US AND CHINESE STRATEGIC COMPETITION OR COOPERATION: THE IOR AND PACIFIC AS A CASE STUDY 
CHANGES IN US STRATEGY AND REBALANCING TO ASIA 
Figure 14.2 Chinese Claims and the Nine Dash Line – Part I 
Figure 14.2 Chinese Claims and the Nine Dash Line - – Part II 
Figure 14.2 Chinese Claims and the Nine Dashed Line _– Part III 
(EEZs Overlapping Zone Enclosed by Map of Nine Dashed Line)
Figure 14.2 Chinese Claims and the Nine Dashed Line – Part IV 
(EEZs in South China Sea and East China Sea) 
Figure 14.3 Chinese Claims and the Nine Dashed – Part V
Locations of 2001, 2002, and 2009 U.S.-Chinese Incidents at Sea and In Air) 
Figure 14.4 China’s New Map of Greater China: June 2014 
THE POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT IN THE PACIFIC AND IOR
Tensions between China and Asia States
Impact on US and Chinese Relations

No comments:

Post a Comment