Southeast Asia’s swing states—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam—are experiencing a steady decline in public favorability toward China, dropping from an average of +33 in the 2000s to +20 in the 2020s. This shift threatens Beijing's long-term geopolitical influence as maritime disputes increasingly overshadow historical economic cooperation.
While deep supply chain integration and Belt and Road Initiative investments establish a durable economic floor, persistent territorial friction in the South China Sea acts as a primary driver of public skepticism. According to the Global Public Opinion on China dataset, the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff marked a critical turning point, causing regional favorability to plunge from +33 to +21. Consequently, future diplomatic alignment across the Association of Southeast Asian Nations will likely depend on how these autonomous governments balance localized social friction from Chinese-backed industrial projects against their ongoing reliance on northern trade networks.