Large-Scale Combat Operations Mean Everything, Which Means Nothing

RealClearDefense  |  Michael Carvelli

The United States Army is converting twenty-one Brigade Combat Teams into Mobile Brigade Combat Teams by the end of fiscal year 2026 under its sweeping Transformation Initiative to deter China in the Indo-Pacific. This generational restructuring merges major commands, integrates platoon-level counter-unmanned aerial systems, and expands long-range precision fires to build a leaner, more lethal force.

However, the service's reliance on the broad doctrinal category of large-scale combat operations, or LSCO, lacks the falsifiable operational focus that historically characterized successful frameworks like the Cold War-era AirLand Battle. Unlike that legacy concept, which targeted specific Soviet echelons in Europe, the current framework fails to define a singular adversary, terrain, or clear theory of victory. Consequently, the military risks strategic ambiguity as it simultaneously manages active Middle East air defense campaigns under Operation Epic Fury, Western Hemisphere homeland defense, and Pacific deterrence without a public, testable operational concept to guide force design.

Comment

The US Army's struggle to reconcile the broad doctrinal category of large-scale combat operations with theatre-specific realities offers a vital lesson for Indian military planners embarking on theatreisation. New Delhi's ongoing creation of integrated theatre commands must avoid the trap of adopting generic joint doctrines that fail to define specific operational problems or falsifiable theories of victory against China and Pakistan. Furthermore, while the American debate focuses heavily on the Indo-Pacific's maritime and aerial dimensions, India's primary challenge remains a continental, high-altitude threat along the Line of Actual Control, requiring a highly tailored doctrinal framework that cannot be copy-pasted from Western models.

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