18 August 2026

How to Broker Peace in Ukraine

Foreign Affairs  |  Matt Waldman, Samuel Charap

Diplomatic efforts initiated by the United States since early 2025 across Abu Dhabi, Berlin, Geneva, Istanbul, Paris, and Riyadh have failed to halt the Russo-Ukrainian War despite continuous shuttle diplomacy between Moscow and Miami. Persistent long-range strikes across Ukraine and Russia underscore that uncoordinated mediation activity cannot overcome deep-seated strategic impasses without structured negotiation design.

Historical mediation precedents demonstrate that conflict termination requires a disciplined, institutionalized negotiation architecture rather than ad hoc diplomatic meetings. Effective peace frameworks depend on establishing clear mediation protocols, aligning coercive leverage with diplomatic incentives, and managing fundamental security dilemmas between belligerents. Without institutionalizing a sustained mediation process that addresses core territorial and security guarantees, ongoing diplomatic interventions remain vulnerable to tactical exploitation on the battlefield. Synthesizing decades of international mediation experience offers Washington a viable pathway to structure durable ceasefires, manage escalation risks, and establish long-term regional stability across Eastern Europe.

Comment

Ad hoc diplomatic shuttling without structural enforcement mechanisms historically mirrors the flawed initial negotiation phases preceding the 1995 Dayton Accords. In that conflict, American mediators eventually succeeded only after integrating NATO's Implementation Force into the peace architecture to enforce local disengagement zones. Applied to current European security negotiations, diplomatic shuttling lacking equivalent operational oversight leaves Russian forces and Ukrainian defenders with incentivised reasons to conduct major strike campaigns to alter negotiation leverage.

This structural dynamic closely parallels the prolonged bargaining during the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement, where frontline duels continued until a formal Military Armistice Commission established verified buffer lines. Without introducing similar verification mechanisms, high-level diplomatic meetings in Istanbul or Geneva serve as operational pauses rather than catalysts for conflict termination. Consequently, negotiation frameworks that omit defined monitoring bodies like the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission fail to decouple frontline combat intensity from diplomatic bargaining.

Strategic Question for Discussion
Which carries more weight when attempting to halt high-intensity combat — establishing an operational enforcement body modelled on the 1995 Dayton Accords NATO Implementation Force, or securing preliminary territorial compromises between Moscow and Kyiv prior to formal summits?
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