The US Army lost against Ukraine but would Australia do any better?

Lowy Institute  |  Mick Ryan

The US Army's 3rd Armoured Brigade Combat Team was systematically destroyed by Ukraine's 412th Brigade, known as Nemesis, during tactical exercises in Germany. Operating under Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces, Nemesis utilized reconnaissance and explosive-carrying drones to rapidly locate and eliminate heavy armored vehicles. This exercise failure exposes systemic vulnerabilities in Western force structures against persistent overhead surveillance and uncrewed strike networks.

Australian defense planners face identical operational risks in the Pacific, where the People's Liberation Army deploys dense sensor-strike webs across island chains. Despite issuing the 2026 National Defence Strategy, Canberra continues to prioritize expensive, low-quantity platforms over massed uncrewed capabilities. Short-range tactical drones now inflict major battlefield casualties, yet the Australian Army lacks dedicated unmanned formations and foundational counter-drone training. Dispersal is vital. Without rapid organizational reforms to establish autonomous warfare brigades and integrate organic drone platoons down to unit levels, Australian forward-deployed forces risk rapid neutralization during high-intensity conflict.

Comment

The defeat of the 3rd Armoured Brigade Combat Team by Ukraine's 412th Brigade demonstrates that traditional combined arms doctrine fails when tactical signature management is absent. Heavy armoured formations optimized for mechanized breaches remain acutely exposed to low-cost uncrewed aerial reconnaissance that eliminates the element of operational surprise. When thermal and visual signatures cannot be suppressed at the forward edge, armoured maneuver collapses into high-attrition static defence.

This tactical friction stems directly from the structural separation between sensor networks and field command nodes. The Nemesis brigade exploited this gap by coupling real-time aerial tracking with immediate precision strike loops, bypassing traditional artillery request channels. In low-intensity environments, centralised fire direction centers functioned reliably, but against distributed uncrewed strike units like those fielded by Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces, standard NATO command trees prove too sluggish to protect heavy ground vehicles.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If heavy ground formations like the 3rd Armoured Brigade Combat Team remain vulnerable to persistent aerial sensor webs, which architectural shift provides greater battlefield survivability — decentralised command authority for organic counter-drone fires or comprehensive electromagnetic signature suppression?

The pattern of exercise losses against Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces suggests that electronic signature reduction alone offers temporary mitigation rather than systemic protection. The available evidence points toward organic, battalion-level electronic warfare and rapid-interdiction kill chains as the decisive factor in countering distributed uncrewed threats.

Share your assessment in the comments below.

To read in details click here