The Case for a Stalemate With Iran: America Can Win If It Stays the Course

Foreign Affairs | James F. Jeffrey

The United States and Israel remain locked in a six-month mutual maritime blockade with Iran over the Strait of Hormuz, creating a strategic stalemate that Washington must maintain to gradually erode Tehran's economy. This operational deadlock has cost the American military 18 service members and between $37.5 billion and $100 billion.

The confrontation intensified after a June memorandum of understanding collapsed when Iranian forces failed to fully reopen the shipping corridor. Consequently, Tehran shifted to a crisis economy, but its year-over-year inflation spiked past 80 percent in August as oil exports plummeted. Time favors Washington. To prevent the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps from launching a retaliatory offensive against Gulf Arab infrastructure, the Trump administration must combine this containment strategy with credible threats of devastating military counterstrikes. This posture ensures Tehran cannot rebuild the strong regional position it enjoyed prior to the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack.

Comment

The current maritime deadlock in the Strait of Hormuz mirrors the operational limits of naval containment seen during the 1980s Tanker War. During that conflict, the United States Navy launched Operation Praying Mantis in 1988 to neutralise Iranian naval assets after the USS Samuel B. Roberts struck an Iranian mine. While that tactical strike successfully degraded the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy, it did not permanently eliminate Tehran's capacity for asymmetric maritime disruption. Today, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy relies on decentralised fast-attack craft and anti-ship cruise missiles to sustain a low-cost blockade.

This persistent threat structure forces a continuous deployment of Aegis-equipped destroyers and minesweepers to the Fifth Fleet's area of operations. Consequently, the prolonged commitment of these high-demand naval assets limits the Pentagon's capacity to redeploy critical surface combatants to the Indo-Pacific theatre. This resource diversion directly constrains the United States Pacific Fleet's ability to counter Chinese maritime expansion in the South China Sea.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If the Fifth Fleet's Aegis-equipped destroyers remain permanently committed to containment in the Strait of Hormuz, how can the United States Pacific Fleet offset the resulting surface combatant deficit to maintain its deterrence posture in the South China Sea?

The current trajectory indicates that offsetting this deficit will require a heavier reliance on land-based anti-ship capabilities, such as the U.S. Army's Mid-Range Capability missile systems deployed in the first island chain. Furthermore, the Pentagon is likely to depend more on allied contributions, particularly from the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, to fill the gap in surface patrol presence. This shift would transition the deterrence model from a unilateral naval presence to a highly integrated, multi-domain joint network.

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