Wake Up, Central Europe

Dariusz Kałan

April 4, 2014

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Several years ago, we Central Europeans started to undertake various programs in the post-Soviet and Western Balkan countries, teaching them democracy and market economics and, in a well-meaning manner, persuading them to follow the paths of transformation that had brought us, as we believed, nothing but material fulfillment, self-satisfaction and a sense of mission. Being so besotted with our post-1989 success, we thought that history had forgotten about us, that we had somehow escaped the guillotine that had been hanging over us for so many centuries.

We were wrong, though. Georgia should have opened our eyes. But in 2008, Central European countries were more divided than ever before. Heady from our recent accessions to the European Union, we were marking the last days of our welfare states with the music that we believed would never stop. At that very moment, we were not able to speak with one voice on Russian aggression in Georgia, and pretended that South Caucasus was somewhere on another planet—in a different universe, even—somewhere that had not been blessed by a post–Cold War awakening (and what a shame we thought that was). But, quite symbolically, neither was there any common position in the region on such issues as the U.S. missile-defense system. We thought we could play with the big boys all by ourselves.

So in the following years, we played with Russia as if it were a reasonable player. The first shock came in 2009, after the gas dispute with Ukraine, when our Russian partners brought their unpredictability and restlessness home to us directly. But still, this was only a small bump on the long road to good, pragmatic cooperation, we told ourselves. We thus continued inviting Russian state companies to our countries, foolishly believing in the popular sayings about capital having no nationality and economics being different from politics. We were shaking hands with Putin, who praised us for our smart bilateralism with Moscow.

On these foundations, we quite hastily built in ourselves the belief that we were finally being treated as partners, not as spheres of influence. Indeed, it gave us pleasure to see how gracefully we danced between East and West, being part of the big European family, doing business with Russia and educating the poor devils from post-Soviet countries. It was a level of self-satisfaction that we had never achieved before.

Restoring Energy Security After Crimea

Gonul Tol, Alex Vatanka 

April 4, 2014

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The crisis in Ukraine has rightly sparked concerns over a possible cut in Russian natural gas to Europe. Europe receives roughly 30 percent of its gas supplies from Russia, and more than half of the Russian natural gas delivered to Europe travels through Ukraine. This dependence needs to be remedied, and the sooner the better. As European leaders weigh the continent’s energy strategies to mitigate the potential long-term loss of Russian supplies, two countries—Turkey and Azerbaijan—stand out as important partners in Europe’s quest for energy security.

Turkey has long sought to become an energy hub for Caspian and Middle Eastern oil and gas to Europe. Azerbaijan, a secular, pro-U.S. country on the shores of the Caspian Sea, has significant hydrocarbon resources of its own. Its location also positions it as a natural conduit for oil and gas exports to Europe from landlocked but energy-rich Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The overlap in interests between Turkey and Azerbaijan—as exporting and transit countries—has already resulted in two strategic energy projects: the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) natural gas pipeline. Two key lessons from these pipeline projects are highly instructive.

The first lesson is that Russia’s grip on Europe’s energy market can be weakened. Secondly, strategic projects from regions on Russia’s periphery that aim to supply Europe with energy can only be achieved once solid American and European backing is in place. European leaders fully acknowledge this reality. After Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Britain’s Foreign Secretary William Hague was quick to point to Turkey and Azerbaijan as an important part of Europe’s future plans. Hague spoke specifically of the Southern Gas Corridor, an EU-initiated project to facilitate Caspian gas to Europe. However, the Europeans are not the only stakeholders in this debate.

Successive U.S. administrations have viewed European energy security as a U.S. national interest. Promoting the diversification of Europe’s natural gas supplies through the development of an East-West corridor of gas from the Caspian region to Europe has been a focal point of U.S. energy policy since the mid-1990s. The BTC and BTE pipelines were part of this strategy, and U.S. political support played an important role in their realization. However, despite U.S. support for supplying natural gas to Europe from the Caspian region and Central Asia, the amount of gas being transported is far from enough to counter Russian exports. Given the recent crisis in Crimea,the United States should renew its commitment to increasing reliable energy supplies to Europe.

In seeking such an end, Washington can also promote further Turkish-Azerbaijani energy collaboration by supporting the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP) project. TANAP is an important part of the Southern Gas Corridor, which intends to deliver natural gas from Azerbaijan through Georgia and Turkey to Europe. The pipeline is expected to carry 23 bcm in the second phase, in 2023, and 31 bcm in the third phase, in 2026. While the Southern Gas Corridor is vital for European consumers, it is crucial for Turkey in terms of energy security and economic development. Turkey aims to reduce its reliance on Russian and Iranian gas imports and increase the gas export volume from Azerbaijan in the long run, as Russian and Iranian gas is more expensive than that of Azerbaijan.

*** Three Nagging Myths About The U.S. “Pivot” To Asia

by Janine Davidson

April 4, 2014

U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel speaks during a meeting of defense ministers from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Honolulu, April 3, 2014 (Alex Wong/Courtesy Reuters). Since President Obama announced his intention to “rebalance” foreign policy attention toward the Asia-Pacific region, there has been much debate – and much misunderstanding – about the purpose and function of this shift. As elements of the rebalancebegin to fall into place, this conversation will only grow louder. 

As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans from 2009 to 2012, I was responsible for developing the military elements of this policy and recommending changes to our military posture to support the president’s strategy. Having left government almost two years ago, I’m still amused to note how misunderstood the strategy is. I’d like to clear up three of the most common misconceptions and myths about the policy: 

Myth #1: The So-Called “Pivot” 

The first misconception is a word itself – “pivot” – which implies that we’re pivoting awayfrom someplace in order to pay more attention to Asia. This is usually what worries our European allies the most. But in reality, no military units were moved from Europe to Asia because the U.S. is not pivoting away from our long-time allies. It is rebalancingits diplomatic, economic, and strategic focus following a decade of war. 

Since late 2001, militarily, troops, planes, ships and intelligence assets – those based in the continental United States, Europe, and Asia – had been overwhelmingly engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even Marine Corps units and some Army troops, traditionally stationed in Japan and Korea, have seen frequent rotations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed, two out of the four brigade combat teams stationed in Europe have been perpetually deployed to the warzones. 

China or America? Indians pick U.S.

http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2014/04/04/china-or-america-indians-pick-u-s/

By Bruce Stokes, Special to CNN

Editor’s note: Bruce Stokes is the director of global economic attitudes at the Pew Research Center. The views expressed are the writer’s own.

During the Cold War, the Indian government attempted to position itself between Moscow and Washington by claiming leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement. As Indians head to the polls over the next six weeks, their country again finds itself in a world with two preeminent powers: this time, China and the United States.

And the Indian public is fairly clear where its sympathies lie: with America. Of course, how such attitudes will influence the views of the next Indian government remains to be seen. But, for now at least, there appears to be no evidence of broad anti-Americanism on the sub-continent.

This might come as a surprise to some. After all, the favorable views of the United States came despite the fact that the Pew Research Center surveymeasuring sentiment was conducted in India in the immediate aftermath of the controversial December 2013 arrest and strip-search of India’s female deputy consul general in New York on charges of visa fraud. Yet by more than three-to-one (56 percent to 15 percent), Indians express a favorable rather than unfavorable view of the United States.

At the same time, Indians were somewhat skeptical about their massive neighbor China, a country that more than half of Indians view as a major threat to the country. Roughly a third of the public has a favorable view of Beijing, with only 13 percent holding a very favorable opinion. In contrast, about four-in-ten have an unfavorable opinion of the People’s Republic, including 22 percent who said they held a very unfavorable opinion.

Indians of all backgrounds have a more favorable view of the United States than of China, with more than half of both men and women saying they saw America in a positive light compared with around a third who see China that way. In addition, there was no generation gap with regard to views on the U.S. and on China – all age groups favored America. Almost three quarters of Indians with some college education or more have a positive view of Uncle Sam, compared with about four-in-ten with at least some college who see China in that light. Similarly, nearly two-thirds of high-income Indians favor the United States compared with about one-third who had a positive opinion of China.

Meanwhile, Indians are more than twice as likely to see America as a partner (36 percent) than as an enemy (16 percent), while more than a third (37 percent) of the Indian public considers China to be an enemy.

As Objects Go Online

The Promise (and Pitfalls) of the Internet of Things

By Neil Gershenfeld and JP Vasseur

FROM OUR MARCH/APRIL 2014 ISSUE

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A model presents a Samsung Galaxy Gear smartwatch at the IFA consumer electronics fair in Berlin, September 4, 2013. (Fabrizio Bensch / Courtesy Reuters)

Since 1969, when the first bit of data was transmitted over what would come to be known as the Internet, that global network has evolved from linking mainframe computers to connecting personal computers and now mobile devices. By 2010, the number of computers on the Internet had surpassed the number of people on earth.

Yet that impressive growth is about to be overshadowed as the things around us start going online as well, part of what is called “the Internet of Things.” Thanks to advances in circuits and software, it is now possible to make a Web server that fits on (or in) a fingertip for $1. When embedded in everyday objects, these small computers can send and receive information via the Internet so that a coffeemaker can turn on when a person gets out of bed and turn off when a cup is loaded into a dishwasher, a stoplight can communicate with roads to route cars around traffic, a building can operate more efficiently by knowing where people are and what they’re doing, and even the health of the whole planet can be monitored in real time by aggregating the data from all such devices.

Linking the digital and physical worlds in these ways will have profound implications for both. But this future won’t be realized unless the Internet of Things learns from the history of the Internet. The open standards and decentralized design of the Internet won out over competing proprietary systems and centralized control by offering fewer obstacles to innovation and growth. This battle has resurfaced with the proliferation of conflicting visions of how devices should communicate. The challenge is primarily organizational, rather then technological, a contest between command-and-control technology and distributed solutions. The Internet of Things demands the latter, and openness will eventually triumph.

THE CONNECTED LIFE

The Internet of Things is not just science fiction; it has already arrived. Some of the things currently networked together send data over the public Internet, and some communicate over secure private networks, but all share common protocols that allow them to interoperate to help solve profound problems.

Afghanistan's Coming Coup?

The Military Isn't Too Weak -- It's Too Strong

By Paul D. Miller

APRIL 2, 2014

Afghan National Army soldiers march during their graduation ceremony, Sept 2010. (ISAF Media)

In February 1989, the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan after ten years of brutal counterinsurgency warfare. International observers and Afghan rebels expected the swift collapse of the newly orphaned Afghan communist regime in Kabul, as did the regime itself. Looking to take advantage of the government’s weakness, the Afghan mujahideen temporarily put aside their differences and planned an ambitious assault on Jalalabad, the country's second most important Pashtun stronghold. In March, the rebels rallied a force of some 10,000 soldiers and marched on the city.

They failed spectacularly. Bolstered by Soviet arms, training, and advisers, the Afghan army and its allies easily outgunned, outmaneuvered, and outgeneraled the oncoming force. Although the mujahideen had mastered guerilla tactics and defensive maneuvers on their home turf, they proved incompetent at carrying out a conventional offensive; poor leadership and factional disputes undermined their fighting power. Three years later, the communist regime finally did collapse -- not because it was overrun by the superior fighting abilities of the Afghan rebels but because Russia stopped funding its security forces.

There is no shortage of experts who warn of the impending demise of the current Afghan government after the withdrawal of most NATO military forces at the end of this year. In 2012, the International Crisis Group, for example, warned of a possible “state collapse.” The military historian Tom Ricks wrote that Kabul’s fall was “all too likely.” Yet the case of 1989 suggests the opposite outcome: the Afghan government is likely to survive the withdrawal of international troops, just as the communist regime did, and it stands a good chance of surviving so long as international donors keep the Afghan army in the field. Although Afghans should expect some decrease in international aid, donors -- many fearful that state collapse in Afghanistan could trigger instability in Pakistan -- are unlikely to end their military assistance anytime soon.

The more appropriate historical analogy to Kabul today is not Kabul in 1992; it is Saigon in 1963, when the Vietnamese military overthrew the country’s civilian leadership. In the next five years and beyond, then, the greatest danger to democratic governance in Afghanistan is not the Taliban but the Afghan army itself. Since 2001, the net effect of the state-building mission in Afghanistan has been the emergence of a strong Afghan army and a weak Afghan state, creating an imbalance that should worry anyone with a cursory knowledge of history or political theory. Time and time again, the same recipe has led to countless military coups: highly professional military officers lose patience for corrupt civilian leaders and, educated to believe they are guardians of the state, seize control of the government to save it, often with public support. Coups may sound old-fashioned, but such was the pattern in Egypt and Mali as recently as 2012.

Running Low on Ammunition

Amit Cowshish

April 3, 2014

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A report appearing in the media1 suggests that the world’s second-largest army is fast running out of ammunition and that it should be possible to build up the war wastage reserve up to 100 per cent by 2019 provided the government is willing to spend INR 19,250 crore.

Why would the government not be willing to spend this amount? It works out to less than INR 4,000 crore per year over the next five years. Surely, the defence budget can accommodate this.

In fact, allocation of budget for buying ammunition does not require any specific approval of the government. As a part of the budgeting process, Services Headquarters are informed about the fund to be made available for the given year and they are perfectly at liberty to allocate as much amount as considered necessary for various purposes, including procurement of ammunition.

Then what is the problem? For one thing, the money required for topping up the ammunition reserves is possibly much more. Secondly, the overall allocation is probably not enough for Army to earmark more funds for buying ammunition. This has been happening year after year.

Most of the ammunition is purchased out of the ‘Stores’ budget, which is a part of the revenue allocation. More than 60 per cent of the revenue allocation of Army is consumed by pay and allowances, for which funds have to be provided in full. The amount left is inadequate for meeting the requirement under other budget heads, a lot of which is also mandatory, such as the expenditure on clothing, ration, fuel, etc. Consequently, the burden of inadequate allocation gets passed on to the areas where paucity of funds would not trigger any immediate crisis – procurement of ammunition being one such area.

The MoD is cognisant of this as would be evident from the following excerpt from a report of the Standing Committee on Defence2:

“1.23 When asked to state where compromises have been made or likely to be made due to the reduced budgetary allocation against the projections made by the three Services and other organisation/heads, the Ministry of Defence in their written replies stated:—

“Under the revenue segment, after providing for salary and other obligatory expenses the balance allocation is distributed to meet the requirement of stores (including ordnance), transportation (of personnel and stores), revenue works and maintenance, etc. These areas are likely to be impacted by the reduced allocation.” ”

But this is not the only reason why the stock of ammunition has gone down. One of the contributory reasons is the inability of the ordnance factories, which are the main – though not the only - source of supply of ammunition to Army, to meet the annual targets.

According to a report of the Comptroller & Auditor General of India3, ordnance factories have been lagging behind in their production programme for ammunition, weapons and vehicles, materials and components (See the Table 1 below).

Rome, Carthage and US-China Relations

JAMES HOLMES

With all this Thucydidesmania, it’s easy to forget the important lessons the Punic Wars might offer China and the US. 

By James R. Holmes

April 04, 2014

From a obnoxious perceptive Naval Diplomat correspondent comes this query: “why does it seem that Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War dominate the analogy market for U.S.-China relations, to the detriment of the Punic Wars?” He, she, or it goes on to note that the conflicts between Rome and Carthage feature “a lot of parallels, with an established power, a rising power, a zone of clear conflict, accidental escalations, and the like, not least of which was the role played by sea power.”

Gotcha! Come, let us speculate together. First of all, let’s not limit Thucydidesmania to U.S.-China relations, or to the present day. His History of the Peloponnesian War has long been classical antiquity’s go-to fount of wisdom, not just for China hands today but for pundits, learned statesmen, and warrior gods across the ages. For instance, Thomas Hobbes, best known as the author ofLeviathan (1651), was the first to translate Thucydides into English (1628). After spending so much time immersed in the bloodletting between Athens and Sparta, it’s small wonder Hobbes came to see the “life of man” as “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” A ray of sunshine, that Hobbes.

Nor was Thucydides just an English fad. In 1777, as the American Revolution raged, founding father (and future president) John Adams advised his son (and future president) John Quincy Adams to study war. Wrote the elder Adams, “There is no History, perhaps, better adapted to this useful purpose than that of Thucydides….” He urged John Quincy to make himself the “perfect master” of Thucydides’ History “in his own tongue.” For help he should consult the Hobbes translation found in the family library while searching out the “more elegant” translation from English clergyman William Smith.

Adams’s contemporaries — the likes of George Mason, Alexander Hamilton, and Benjamin Franklin — also studied Athens as they sought to fashion a political regime that allowed Athenian-style dynamism while keeping Athenian-style democratic excesses in check. Thucydides, then, is an indirect forefather of the American mixed regime. His ghost is smiling.

Nor was this just a founders’ thing for Americans. After World War II, General George C. Marshall, perhaps the greatest soldier-statesman of the 20th century, told an audience in Princeton, New Jersey that no one could comprehend the dilemmas besetting the postwar world “who has not reviewed in his mind the period of the Peloponnesian War and the Fall of Athens.” So it’s nothing new for Athens to ace out Rome as a source of political and strategic insight.

But this is largely an appeal to authority, isn’t it? If eminent people prefer Greek to Roman antiquity, that must be because Greek history is more interesting and enlightening. Right? Not necessarily. Methinks the storyteller, not the story, is what keeps seekers of wisdom coming back to the Peloponnesian War. As my able correspondent alludes, it’s not so much that Greek is richer than Roman history. It’s that there was no one with the stature of a Thucydides to retell the drama and deeds of Roman antiquity, and to extract the takeaways for readers.

Joint Professional Military Education

by Dan McCauley

Journal Article | April 3, 2014 

Joint Professional Military Education: Anticipating at the Speed of the Environment

Dan McCauley

A major change in the strategic environment that causes a fundamental shift in thinking or acting is called a strategic inflection point. The collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s was one such strategic inflection point that saw the United States emerge as a global hegemon. Under the leadership of the U.S., the last decade of the 20th Century was viewed as the beginning of an era in which capitalism would take root in areas of the world previously denied by communist ideology. It was assumed that Western financial prosperity, and along with it Western democratic ideals and values, would be embraced by nation-states, cultures, and peoples world-wide. 

This era, however, was one part reality and one part illusion, and subsequently short-lived. On the one hand, many areas of the world formerly under communist control did embrace capitalism and democracy, and have flourished economically. On the other hand, with the specter of communism gone, Western capitalism and its associated values were seen as the new threat to local and traditional cultures. With hindsight, this dissatisfaction with a U.S.-led globalization effort was evident through periodic acts of terrorism around the world. Most leaders, however, misjudged these key indicators as cautionary viewpoints were undermined by economic optimism.

Unfortunately, this economic optimism was fragile, and the events of September 11, 2001 marked a new strategic inflection point for the U.S. Global economic prosperity, if it were to continue, needed to have a security strategy that facilitated global stability and security. The U.S. took the lead as the global security provider, but has encountered a global environment marked by national pluralism, weak states, individual empowerment, and the proliferation of technology among a host of other conditions that were not resident in the previous Cold War paradigm. 

This new security environment requires a new security strategy, a new way of conducting security operations, and a new way of thinking. To develop the Joint leaders with the requisite values and strategic thinking competencies needed to keep pace with the changing environment, education and training programs and policies must change at the same rate. This essay advocates the implementation of an anticipatory management process and the development of issue management teams within the Joint Staff J-7, responsible for Joint force development, to identify, prioritize, and integrate educational and training issues that affect the Joint force. To support this recommendation, a brief discussion of the shortfalls within the current Professional Military Education (PME) Review Process is presented followed by an explanation of the anticipatory management process. Next an example is used to illustrate the anticipatory management process in the context of the PME system. Finally, recommendations for the Joint education and training community are presented. 

Conceptualizing Human Domain Management

by Norman T. Lihou and Marisol Nieves

Journal Article | April 4, 2014 

Conceptualizing Human Domain Management: Human Network Analysis and Engagement (HNAE) Operations

Norman T. Lihou and Marisol Nieves

SWJ Editor’s Note: This article is meant to foster dialogue regarding the definition, utility and application of Human Domain Management (HDM) and the principles of Human Network Analysis and Engagement (HNAE) Operations as a concept to be integrated throughout all phases of the planning process and ongoing course of action development.

Introduction

“We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking that created them.”

- Albert Einstein

Countries find themselves in a century where conventional military adversaries are no longer the only threat to their security. Nation state stability is now challenged by drug trafficking organizations, insurgencies, black market traders, criminal organizations, terrorists, cyber-threats, and human trafficking networks to name a few. Decision-makers, policy-makers and military commanders are faced with a myriad of problems that require the identification of emerging conditions, political understanding of local/regional problems, adoption of technology for lethal and non-lethal uses, and anticipating drivers of instability.

Transnational and international problem sets mean that nation states will have to apply a full range of their instruments of national power to find solutions. These instruments usually manifest themselves as Military, Information/Intelligence, Diplomatic, Legal, Infrastructure, Finance, and Economic efforts.

While the military is designed to defend national security and support allies in times of crises; non-traditional threats and hybrid environments mean that the military has to deal with issues that are better suited for the application of a variety of the state’s instruments of power. This expands the need to understand the operational environment past the conventional military threat into the realm of politics, military/security, economic, social, information and infrastructure layers. This information can frame a high-level understanding of the variables within the environment. However, it is the comprehension of how the multiple actors, networks and organizations fit within these systems, and the causal relationships within them, that will truly provide an in-depth understanding that extends past the typical intelligence realm to give the military commander a holistic view leading to better decision making for engagement strategies. As the purpose of “intelligence” shifts focus to challenges imposed by new threats, new forms of warfare, new technologies, and new methods for finding peaceful solutions; there is a need to extend our understanding of the Human Domain.

A threat may start as a local disenfranchised ethnic group demanding independence or a transnational criminal organization that grows in power and turns to terroristic activities to undermine the ability of the government to protect its citizens. These irregular enemies have one thing in common; they are all comprised of human actors who seek to unbalance nations to develop a permissive environment. However, these threat networks do not operate by themselves, they are connected to cells/sub-networks and external networks that could include a country's population, ethnic groups, charities, front companies, corrupt officials, compromised border security and complicit government officials.

The wisdom of abstaining

G Parthasarathy | April 4, 2014 11:53 pm

Jayalalithaa doesn’t mention the BJP in speeches but she is thought to be Modi’s friend. This feeling is expected to take the minority vote away from her.

Never in India’s history have relations with any neighbouring country been so dramatically influenced by the politics of a single state as our relations with Sri Lanka.

Unfortunately, public opinion in Tamil Nadu has not been adequately sensitised about the diplomatic complexities of developments in our neighbourhood, or of precisely what New Delhi is doing to address the needs and welfare of Tamils in Sri Lanka.

The Sri Lankan civil war ended when separatist leader Velupillai Prabhakaran was killed in 2009. It is universally accepted that both sides were guilty of human rights abuses during the last stages of the war — a fact acknowledged by Sri Lanka’s Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC).

India’s policy, thereafter, has been to work towards the Sri Lankans themselves implementing the LLRC recommendations. More importantly, apart from India, no government in the world has done anything substantive for the relief, rehabilitation and welfare of Sri Lankan Tamils.

Since 2010, India has doled out assistance estimated at $1.3 billion (Rs 8,000 crore) — its largest ever development assistance project — for the welfare of Sri Lankan Tamils. The projects include the construction of 50,000 homes and the supply of materials for around 43,000 war-damaged residences. There have also been major projects for the development of rail transport, port infrastructure in Kankesanthurai, a 500 MW thermal power station in Sampur and the upgrading of the Palaly airport.

DANGEROUS FOR SOUTH ASIA AND BANGLADESH

Saturday, 05 April 2014 | Hiranmay Karlekar |

Bangladesh will once again become a regional exporter of terrorism, as it was during the BNP-Jamaat coalition Government between 2001 and 2006, if the Jamaat calls the shots in any Government there

The Awami League will no doubt look back with satisfaction at the recovery it has made from the drubbing it took in the first two rounds of the Upazila (sub-district) elections in Bangladesh. Candidates backed by it won the chairman’s posts in 34 Upazilas against the Bangladesh Nationalist Party’s tally of 41, the fundamentalist Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami’s 12 and the Jatiya Party’s one, in the first phase of elections on February 19. It continued to fare poorly in the second phase held on February 27, at the end of which its tally stood at 78 against the BNP’s 93 and the Jamaat’s 20. It was just a whisker behind the BNP after the third phase held on March 15, after which its total of chairman's posts stood at 118 against the BNP’s 120 and the Jamaat’s 27, with the rest going to other parties. It surged ahead at the end of the fourth phase held on March 23, its tally going up to 171 against the BNP’s 144 and the Jamaat’s 32, with other parties getting eight. The fifth, and the final, phase saw it forge decisively ahead, winning won 225 posts of chairmen against the BNP’s 157 the Jamaat’s 35, with other parties winning 35, besides the Jatiya Party’s three.

The dramatic recovery notwithstanding, the Awami League needs to do some serious introspection. Candidates supported by it won in as many as 331 chairman’s posts in the Upazila elections held in 2009, when the BNP won in only 79 contests. Clearly, there has been a marked fall in the party’s popularity. In fact, it has been argued that it would have done worse than it has but for widespread rigging by its activists. It can no doubt be argued that not much be read into these charges because losers in the country’s elections, even the ones to the National Parliament, have regularly attributed their defeat to malpractices and violence. The BNP did it after the parliamentary election of December 2008, which the Awami League had swept, and the Awami League had done the same on earlier occasions.

Modi's Foreign Policy

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/modis-foreign-policy/

ByKanwal Sibal

IssueCourtesy: Economic Times| Date : 02 Apr , 2014

Modi has not yet expressed his thinking on India’s foreign relations. His focus and that of those opposing him or tracking his national rise has been on internal politics and development issues.

His sundry remarks that the External Affairs Ministry should focus on “trade treaties” rather than on strategic issues and the states should be given a greater role in promoting ties with select foreign countries need not be taken as his definitive thinking.

Modi can change our psychological equation with China, boosting in the process our relations with Asean and Japan.

Our most severe external challenges are driven not by economics but politics, relating to territory, terrorism, religious extremism, nuclear blackmail, constraining our strategic options and boxing us in the sub-continent while eroding our influence there. Loosening the Centre’s control over foreign policy will cause confusion in its conduct and open our polity to more manipulation by outside interests.

Modi’s critique that India has “failed to give leadership to the SAARC grouping on economic issues” stems from the oft-expressed view that we should link the smaller economies of our neighbours to our much larger economy and create dependency bonds that would act a cushion against their adversarial politics. Pakistan’s prevarications on MFN, Sri Lanka delaying the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement and Nepal still resisting cooperation on water resources reflect the limits of such a policy.

How much a Modi-led NDA will follow or depart from Vajpayee-led NDA’s foreign policy is an important question. Modi will not be working on a clean slate and any notable departure from Vajpayee’s legacy will be queried. The considerable continuity in our foreign policy under the NDA and UPA governments adds to the complexities.

Vajpayee called the US a “natural ally” and reached out to it strategically. The seeds of the India-US nuclear deal were laid during his time, US intervention in Afghanistan was supported and even the logic of US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty was acknowledged.

…UPA’s cardinal mistake in delinking dialogue from terrorism and equating ourselves with Pakistan as victims of terrorism needs correction.

Sam Bahadur!

April 03, 2014 

Field Marshall S H F J 'Sam' Manekshaw, India’s greatest military commander, would have turned 100 on April 3, 2014. To mark the occasion and to celebrate a brilliant mind, we reproduce some of the articles Rediff.com had published over a period of time on one of India’s most-loved soldiers.

S H F J -- 'Sam' -- Manekshaw is one of India's living legends.

The soldier who led India to its greatest military victory in the 1971 war turned 89 on Thursday. The Indian Army will commemorate its first Field Marshal's entry into his ninth decade with several events this coming year.

Lieutenant General Depinder Singh (retd), who served as military assistant to Manekshaw when he served as Chief of the Army Staff, has just published a riveting memoir of this most unusual man.

rediff.com is proud to publish an extract from Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, Soldiering with Dignity.

The man eventually destined to be free India's first Field Marshal was born on 3rd April 1914 at Amritsar. How did a Parsi couple settle for the holy city of the Sikhs? I once asked him and was told that in 1899, his father recently qualified as a doctor and just married, could make no professional headway in Bombay, and was advised to try his luck at Lahore in the Punjab. With his young wife, he set off by train for Lahore. The long dusty and hot journey took five days and by the end of it, his young wife, who had never left the comforts and civilization of Bombay, was in hysterics and cried to go back. Poor Dr Manekshaw did all he could to comfort her, but as the train steamed into Amritsar, with her first sight of the Sikhs the young bride screamed her lungs out and refused to go any further. So they left the train at Amritsar, and there they stayed for forty-five years.

The Manekshaws had six children, four boys and two girls, and Sam was the fifth child. Sam had his schooling at Nainital's Sherwood College. After completing his schooling, he should have gone to England to pursue higher studies; this was the promise made to him by his father but, fortunately for the Indian Army, Dr Manekshaw felt that this particular son was far too young to be on his own in a foreign country, even with his two elder brothers already studying there. So he was admitted to the Hindu Sabha College, Amritsar. If he had gone abroad, he often reminisces, he would have become a doctor. 'What doctor?' I queried, and was told 'Gynaecologist.'

After a stint in Hindu College, he applied for and was accepted for entry into the first batch of the newly opened Indian Military Academy at Dehradun for training Indians for commissioned rank in the British Indian Army. He received his commission on 4th February 1934 and, after an attachment as was the practice then with a British Infantry Battalion, the 2nd Battalion the Royal Scots, he joined the 4th Battalion, 12 Frontier Force Regiment, commonly called the 54th

Sikhs.

'Here's my pistol, now come on shoot me'

June 27, 2008 

Field Marshall S H F J 'Sam' Manekshaw, India’s greatest military commander, would have turned 100 on April 3, 2014. To mark the occasion and to celebrate a brilliant mind, we reproduce some of the articles Rediff.com had published over a period of time on one of India’s most-loved soldiers.

As a young major in 1947, Eustace D'Souza first read about Major Sam Manekshaw when reading about the Burma campaign in World War II. Manekshaw was shot in the stomach when he and his company were holding the Sittang bridge. For that act of valour, he was given the Military Cross on the field of battle; his commanding British officer did not expert the flamboyant Parsi officer to survive. But survive Sam did, leading the Indian Army to an incredible military victory in the 1971 war.

Commissioned in the Indian Army in 1943, Major General D'Souza (retd), now 87, has fought four wars and had several interactions with Field Marshal Manekshaw. He spoke about the man who was an outstanding leader of men. A first person account of a great soldier who passed into the ages shortly after midnight June 27:

Till yesterday Sam Manekshaw was the oldest living field marshal in the world.

I first met Sam Manekshaw when I was facing the Chinese in Nathu La, commanding a brigade. It was in 1964-1965. The Chinese were across a little strip and my brigade held them when they first moved up with 2,000 troops, we held fast, we didn't panic like in '62.

Sam came to visit us as he was very pleased, and then he came again to request me to stay on as brigade commander. I told him, 'Sir I have a family too, I have been away from my family for four years -- three in high altitude.' He recommended me to the National Defence College and I went there.

He was very perceptive. When he came to visit me at Nathu La at 13,600 ft, I was a brigadier then with 5,000 troops under me. He said, 'Souzie -- he used to call me that --what do you do for your young officers, they must be absolutely cheesed off here.'

He went back to Calcutta and sent back a packet of girly magazines. He said this is for your young officers. He had wanted to see how I lived and saw a portable record player with lots of LPs -- and I am a Western classical music fan. He went back and sent a parcel with a LP record of the famous American singer Marian Anderson.

He was fearless. When he was a major with the Sikh company in Burma, they had a promotion meeting for the appointment of lance naik to naik.

He didn't approve of one name because he said he was a rascal. That man sent word to Sam saying, 'I would kill you.' So Sam Manekshaw told his senior subedar -- 'Unko march karna hai'.

He was marched before Sam and he asked him -- 'You are going to kill me? Here's my pistol, now come on shoot me.' That man was so taken aback that he marched out meekly. Sam appointed him as batman. That was the sort of man he was.

Afghanistan or Talibanistan?

April 2, 2014 

Afghan National Army soldiers learn to medevac casualties at Camp Shorabak in Helmand Province on Feb. 19, 2014. For many, this was the first time they had been aboard a helicopter. (U.S. Marine Corps)

Will the country see relative stability and freedom after 2014?

Col. Robert M. Cassidy

This year will see a set of key events in Afghanistan: variables of pivotal magnitude that may well determine whether it succeeds as a state or succumbs to another Taliban takeover.

If Afghanistan succeeds and endures, the struggle will have ultimately been the good war of the last 12-plus years: in terms of the justification for going to war, in the way the coalition ultimately prosecuted it, and in the context that the international community will have fulfilled a post-war moral commitment to the Afghan allies we supported and fought alongside.

The value of the political object, the morality of the war, and the perception of victory or defeat comprise the most compelling logic of the contest of wills there. There are impediments that increase the risk of failure, yet also momentum that favors success. And there is history, and the history of wars in Afghanistan does not suggest that catastrophic failure is inevitable – if the coalition continues to support Afghanistan after 2014.

The political object, and its perceived value, guide war. The value of the political object of the Afghan War – dismantling, defeating, and denying al-Qaeda sanctuary – derives from the horrific consequences of the 9/11 raids. The political object, when achieved and sustained, will prevent this from happening again. However, the perceived value of the object has diminished in the eyes of the supporting polities because of the costs and duration of this war. In other words, the political and domestic will to persevere have waned.

The Taliban, al-Qaeda, and Islamist zealots of similar cloth have endured significant disruption, displacement and dismantling of their capacity to carry on, yet their will to continue has not relented. This is because of the fanatical religious creed that animates these enemies, and because of the physical and materiel sanctuary and support they benefit from in Pakistan’s border areas. Generous funding from Saudi Arabia and other gulf states also helps. For the likes of the Quetta Shura and the Haqqanis, their mantra is ‘Islam or death.’ For Western polities, it is, ‘bring the troops home.’

Pakistani security elites believe they can counter their existential nemesis, India, by supporting the Taliban and using the Haqqanis to foment insurgency in Afghanistan. Although this notion of strategic depth is a figment of these elites’ febrile and fertile imaginations, their cost-benefit strategic calculus is not likely to change unless there is a huge shift in how the U.S. and the West confront Pakistani duplicity. In other words, in the minds of the Pakistani security leadership that decides strategy, the benefits of supporting and protracting the insurgency in Afghanistan outweigh the costs.

Starkly, there are still two potential, but not inevitable, outcomes: a revived Talibanistan or a strengthened Afghanistan. Giving up potential victory by quitting the field precipitously might see the Taliban eventually overwhelm and undermine the Afghan government and its security forces. And, if the Taliban were to revive an Islamist emirate in Afghanistan, there is every reason to forecast a future with more attacks against the West, planned and prepared, with increasing scope and intensity, from Afghanistan’s and Pakistan’s tribal areas.

A better outcome, turning the stalemate of the previous decade into a semblance of victory, would see a resilient and durable Afghan state, with the government, the security forces and the population aligned against a marginalized Taliban. Success would see an Afghanistan that does not fragment and endures as a state inhospitable to al-Qaeda, the Quetta Shura Taliban and other extremists. The bar is not high and the international community does not aim to make Afghanistan into Austria. There will still be violence, poverty and underdevelopment, but an Afghanistan with its people, security forces and government cooperating in modest harmony equates to victory in this context.

India-Pakistan: Talking in Different Tongues

Aditi Malhotra

Senior Research Fellow at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS)

Published

April 2nd, 2014

India and Pakistan, since their partition have remained embroiled in a seemingly unending acrimonious relationship. This remains so, despite periodic efforts undertaken at the governmental and the non-governmental levels. The overt introduction of nuclear weapons in 1998 added a new dimension to the Indo-Pakistan relations, which continues to evolve till date. Glancing at the contemporary academic or think tank discourse on the issue, it becomes evident that while both the countries seem to be looking at the same picture, their interpretations seem very different. While this is natural for any two countries with varying national security interests or priorities, there is a need to ponder over what is exactly different in the way New Delhi and Islamabad perceive the role of nuclear weapons and its relation with the spectrums of conflict.

Pakistan’s asymmetry with the Indian military was a pressing issue for its decision-makers. To address the conventional gap, Islamabad chose to take the sub-conventional route by employing state-funded non-state actors and bleeding India by a thousand cuts. It is worth noting that sub-conventional activities (terrorism) in Kashmir were initiated and carried out by Pakistan-based and supported terror groups against the nuclear backdrop. To understand this better, let us look at the figure below with Triangle 1 (which denotes India’s focus) and Triangle 2 (which denotes Pakistan’s focus). The Triangles are divided into Sub-conventional (Level 1), Conventional (Level 2) and Nuclear (Level 3) Conflicts.

Diagrammatically, Pakistan opted for actions at the sub-conventional level (Level 1) in the triangle to address a gap in conventional capability (Level 2). Over time, Pakistan remained unsatisfied with its success in Level 1 and was consternated by its widening military and economic gap with India. New Delhi’s response to Pakistan’s sub-conventional activities was confined to counter-terrorism (CT) operations and in extreme cases (such as attack on Indian Parliament in 2001) resorted to the use of conventional strength (as denoted by the arrows in the diagram). This implies that New Delhi responded to Pakistani challenges at Level 1 through CT operations and at times by action at Level 2. The Triangles also depict how India separates the nuclear level of conflict from non-nuclear levels of conflict. On the other hand, Pakistan has tried to blur the distinctions between all the levels of conflict.

Needless to say, the South Asian geopolitical scenario changed drastically with overt nuclearisation in the sub-continent. Since then, a major divergence has always been the way India and Pakistan have viewed nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. India views its nuclear weapons as political weapons, i.e. that they are not war-fighting weapons but considered a capability to deter any nuclear attack on India (threat perception from China acting as an important motivating factor). India separates the Level 3 from Level 1 and 2.

Contrastingly, Pakistan considers its nuclear weapons as possessing the capability to deter a conventional war with India, while continuing with sub-conventional operations. Pakistan’s continuous support of terror groups to attack India, in turn results in a conventional response from India. India attempts to deter Pakistan’s sub-conventional activities by threatening a strong conventional response. Pakistan hopes to deter Indian conventional response by threatening to take the war to the nuclear level. Consequently, Pakistan removes the distinctions between all the three levels of conflicts by indirectly connecting Level 1 to Level 3.

To illustrate, the 2004 Indian Army Doctrine popularly referred to as the Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) is Indian Army’s attempt to reduce the time taken for mobilisation and undertake operations below Pakistan’s red lines. Even with the possession of nuclear weapons, India has stuck to the non-nuclear domains of conflict, starkly in contrast with Pakistan which prefers to do away with the distinction between non-nuclear and nuclear levels. Moreover, the introduction of HATF IX/tactical nuclear weapons as a response to CSD is yet another attempt by Pakistan to undo the distinctions between the conventional and nuclear conflict. HATF IX also makes one wonder if Islamabad has changed its earlier stance of First Use (which was strategic in nature) to First Strike (which is tactical in nature). Pakistan is threatening to lower its threshold for nuclear use which implies that it would escalate any conventional war to the nuclear level, thereby attempting to take away any space for conventional action by India.

With the spiraling evolution of actions and response, the lines between all forms of conflicts are seemingly getting blurred in the Indo-Pakistan context. This can be majorly attributed to India and Pakistan’s different interpretations of deterrence and nuclear deterrence. Without doubt, this poses a danger to the stability in the region. The analysis only goes to show that India and Pakistan are speaking in different tongues when it comes to nuclear issues. Although India released the Cabinet Committee on Security Affairs (CCS) approved nuclear doctrine in January 2003, Pakistan has offered no such precedent. There are also growing uncertainties about the technical capabilities of both the countries coupled with misinterpretations regarding their nuclear signaling. At this juncture, there is a strong need for greater interaction and transparency between Indian and Pakistani officials. The need of the hour is to establish platforms where both sides can address their concerns and address misperceptions on a timely basis. This will surely make a positive contribution to Indo-Pakistan deterrence stability.

SAUDI INSECURITIES WILL HAVE SOUTH ASIAN IMPLICATIONS – ANALYSIS

APRIL 3, 2014 

MONISH GULATI 

Source Link

By Monish Gulati

US President Barack Obama travelled to Saudi Arabia on March 28 for his first visit to the country since 2009 and met King Abdullah to “look him in the eyes” and explain that US-Saudi strategic interests remain very much aligned. The visit took place even as the Saudis wonder and worry about the larger US commitment in the region, specifically US willingness to stand by its traditional allies. The diverging nature of US-Saudi interests and the apprehension that their future foreign policy trajectories might take them further away has created this palpable air of uncertainty in the region. Saudi officials have warned of a “major shift” away from Washington.

Washington and Riyadh have had bitter disagreements over the US’ response to the Arab Spring uprisings, and policy towards Iran and Syria. Saudis believe it is a strategic imperative to effect a regime change in Syria to avert what they see as a threat of Iranian domination of Arab countries, a view not shared by Washington. Obama and the Saudi monarch discussed “tactical differences” in their approach to some of these issues.

Obama Visit

Obama and King Abdullah met for more than two hours at the king’s retreat at Rawdat Khuraim, northeast of the capital Riyadh. Obama reassured King Abdullah that the US remains committed to strengthening the moderate opposition in the Syrian civil war. But it is not yet clear whether there was an agreement on any significant expansion of the covert US programme to train and arm the Syrian opposition. While Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states desire greater military assistance to the Syrian rebels, the US is reluctant to provide arms that could end up in the hands of jihadists and extremists in Syria. The Obama administration is reportedly considering allowing shipments of shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles (MANPADS) to the Syrian rebels but concerns on their misuse persist.

Iran was another key topic of discussion between the president and the king. Obama assured that the US would not accept a bad nuclear deal with Iran. The White House statement after the talks reiterated the significance US places on its “strong relationship” with Saudi Arabia. The statement added that Washington and Riyadh were working together to address critical bilateral and regional issues, including “the crisis in Syria, preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, counterterrorism efforts to combat extremism, and supporting negotiations to achieve Middle East peace”.

Saudi Threat Perception

The Saudis see an Iranian effort to shift the balance of forces in the region in Tehran’s favour, and trying to encircle them with its elite Quds Force, active in Bahrain, Lebanon, through killing of Sunni Muslims in Syria, supporting the Shiite Muslim militias in Iraq, providing arms to the Houthi rebels in Yemen and fomenting unrest among Saudi Shiites. They also see the Egyptian military battling the Muslim Brotherhood and jihadi terrorists in the Sinai, as a threat to Saudi Arabia. It was not surprising that the Saudis offered to pay for the $2-3-billion arms package Egypt is seeking from the Russians. Saudi Arabia has also given the Lebanese army $3 billion in aid, and some of the money is likely to be spent on weapons from France. Saudi Arabia is seeking to bolster the Lebanese army to counter the Hezbollah, which is funded by Iran.

The Other Threat to Pakistan

By HUMA YUSUFAPRIL 2, 2014 

LAHORE, Pakistan — At a literature festival here not long ago, I bumped into a school friend who had recently relocated from Karachi, the southern port city where we both grew up. Karachi has all the buzz, and violence, of a megalopolis — more than 2,700 people were killed there in 2013 — and none of the greenery and historic charms of Lahore, the capital of Punjab Province. “I’m loving Lahore,” she told me. “I feel like I’ve moved to Switzerland after living in a war zone.”

The contrast is not as exaggerated as it sounds. In recent years, Punjab has suffered less than the rest of the country from the suicide attacks and bomb blasts that have killed some 49,000 people since 2001. There have been dramatic exceptions: terrorist attacks against the visiting Sri Lankan cricket team and at a major Sufi shrine in Lahore, at army headquarters in Rawalpindi, and at a five-star hotel and courts in the capital, Islamabad. Anti-India militant groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and anti-Shiite organizations like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi are based in Punjab and draw most of their recruits from the province. But these groups mostly stage their attacks elsewhere in Pakistan to maintain benign relations with the local authorities.

And so the perception that Punjab has suffered less from violence than the rest of the country prevails, creating much resentment. For non-Punjabis, the province’s relative stability is just the latest demonstration of how Punjabi elites rally to protect their own interests at the expense of their compatriots. And such interprovincial rivalries could be as great a challenge for the country’s stability as the Taliban.

It is commonly said that Punjab is synonymous with Pakistan, and vice versa, which seems to relegate the other provinces and autonomous regions to the status of outliers. Some of Punjab’s good fortune is an accident of geography: the name means “land of five rivers,” referring to the Indus River and the tributaries that flow through the province, making it the agricultural and industrial heartland of Pakistan. But politics matters even more.

Pakistan’s elites, political, bureaucratic and military have long hailed from Punjab and shaped the country’s policies to the province’s advantage. Until recently, Punjab received the lion’s share of national revenues simply by virtue of having the largest population; never mind its actual needs or contributions to the national budget. (The formula was finally revised in 2009, benefiting Sindh, Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces.) Also, the government and the military have long allotted prime agricultural land and urban real estate in other parts of Pakistan to Punjabi officers and senior bureaucrats.

Punjab itself is not a monolith. Some of the province’s southern districts are among the country’s poorest, and their inhabitants have grudges of their own against Lahore-based politicians. Water and energy shortages kept Punjab’s economic growth rate at 2.5 percent between 2007 and 2011, compared with 3.4 percent for the country overall. But this has done little to temper the impression among non-Punjabis that the province is booming while the rest of the country is burning.

4 Reasons Elections Won't Fix Afghanistan

AFGHANISTAN

Saturday’s election may be critical, but Afghanistan isn’t about to become a stable state anytime soon. 

By Michael Kugelman

April 03, 2014

Observers across the board—from think-tankers and diplomats (both current and retired) to journalists andelection monitors—are describing Afghanistan’s April 5 election as critical for stability.

And for good reason. A successful election would be a democratic milestone, as it would mark the first time Afghanistan has experienced a peaceful transfer of power. A legitimately elected new leadership, particularly one seen as effective and above all clean, could conceivably help convince Afghans that their government is a better alternative to the Taliban—and thereby weaken recruitment to the insurgency.

It would also bring to power a leader not named Hamid Karzai—and therefore someone who would likely sign a bilateral security agreement with Washington, ensuring that a residual international military presence remains in Afghanistan after this year.

And yet a successful election is far from assured. On March 10, the Taliban promised “to use all force” at its disposal “to disrupt these upcoming sham elections.” Supporters of the top two candidates—Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah—have been targeted. Recent days have brought attacks on two different Afghan election commission facilities. Turnout could be compromised in a big way—though to their credit, many Afghans vow to defy the Taliban and vote anyway.

Equally troubling is the growing potential for fraud and other electoral illegalities—especially after a March 21 deadly assault on Kabul’s Serena Hotel prompted many international election monitors to leave Afghanistan. Last week, Afghan election officers accused government employees of using state resources to help the campaign of Zalmai Rassoul—the man thought to be Karzai’s preferred candidate. There’s even been speculation that Karzai could postpone the election in order to pursue a peace deal with the Taliban.

This is all quite unsettling. Yet here’s an even more sobering thought: Even if none of these things were happening, there would still be reason to worry. And that’s because no matter how free, fair, credible, and legitimate the election ultimately is (or is not), Afghanistan has a long way to go before it becomes a more stable state. Here are four reasons why.

1. Afghan military forces continue to be a work in progress.

Pointing to decreased levels of violence in numerous areas controlled by Afghans, optimistic observers insist that Afghan security personnel “are doing better than almost anyone expected.” Still, their capacities remain limited. In Congressional testimony in February, top Pentagon officials conceded that while Afghan troops are earning tactical victories on the battlefield, they struggle to hold cleared territory and still need much help in areas like transport and intelligence.