The United States Army must institutionalize small-unit deception tactics to increase survivability and regain tactical initiative on the transparent modern battlefield. Traditional efforts to hide are insufficient against pervasive drones and multi-domain sensors, a reality underscored by the Ukraine war where virtually no part of the front line remains unobserved.
Current Army doctrine, such as FM 3-13.4, only covers deception at brigade, division, and theater levels, leaving a critical gap for squad, platoon, and company operations. Small-unit deception aims to manipulate enemy perception at the lowest echelons, increasing fighting position survivability, wasting enemy resources, or gaining a decisive advantage in engagements. Examples include using realistic-looking IED decoys to halt convoys for over 12 hours, establishing decoy OPs with thermal signatures to bait artillery, and employing "ghost radios" with heated tents to trigger enemy collection cycles and waste one-way attack drones. This proactive layer is essential as individual soldiers are now visible at the highest levels.
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