The United States' extended nuclear deterrence system, which historically protected allies in Asia and Europe, is increasingly perceived as a bluff due to shifting geopolitical realities and a recalibration of U.S. foreign policy. During the Cold War, the high stakes made Washington's threat of nuclear war credible, even at catastrophic risk to itself, to prevent allied conquest.
However, with regional conflicts replacing existential threats and the "America first" policy prioritizing core U.S. interests, the credibility of risking American cities for faraway allies has eroded. Allies like South Korea, Latvia, and Poland are justifiably concerned, leading to calls for new security arrangements. Washington must accept it can no longer be a credible nuclear guarantor for all partners and should support allies, including South Korea, in developing autonomous deterrence postures, potentially through nuclear sharing agreements or even acquiring their own nuclear weapons, despite proliferation concerns. This shift is crucial to prevent adversaries from being emboldened and to avoid a rush to independent nuclear programs.
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