China’s Taiwan Tryst and The 2027 Question

Takshashila Institution | Anushka Saxena

China's People's Liberation Army is focusing on building up its overall capabilities, rather than sticking to a set timeline for a cross-strait invasion ahead of its 2027 centenary. This approach, which differs from earlier American intelligence warnings, centers on using different levels of pressure to make Taiwan surrender without risking a large-scale amphibious attack.

Challenges like keeping troops supplied, getting semiconductors, and having enough ports make a long-term cross-strait attack difficult. As a result, the military is focusing on joint blockades, strikes, and law-enforcement actions instead. The main challenge is still logistics. Recent military exercises from 2022 to 2025 show a mix of naval blockades and Coast Guard inspections to avoid direct fighting. If there is a crisis over Taiwan, China could put pressure on the Line of Actual Control, but might also offer India early border deals to keep it neutral.

Comment

If Beijing puts forward an 'Early Harvest' border deal along the Line of Actual Control, it would be a strategic move to keep India neutral during a Taiwan Strait conflict. By offering small territorial concessions, China's military hopes to avoid fighting on two fronts. This plan takes advantage of India's usual preference for settling borders directly, aiming to separate India from any US-led maritime alliances in the Indo-Pacific. In this way, calm on the Himalayan border would help China's Eastern Theatre Command focus on maritime blockades.

This plan depends on the PLA keeping its forces ready at high altitudes while also offering to pull back at tense spots like Depsang or Demchok. With this two-pronged approach, Beijing can quickly switch from diplomacy to pressure if India steps up its naval presence in the Malacca Strait. In the end, the strategy's success depends on whether China's diplomatic efforts can limit the Indian Navy's actions in the Andaman Sea.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If Beijing offers a rapid settlement at Depsang and Demchok during a Taiwan crisis, how can New Delhi balance the immediate relief on the Line of Actual Control against its long-term maritime commitments in the Andaman Sea?

The evidence shows that New Delhi would probably view any quick Chinese offers at Depsang and Demchok with suspicion, choosing to focus on long-term maritime security instead of short-term peace in the Himalayas. I believe the Indian Navy would keep up, or even increase, its patrols in the Andaman Sea to prevent the PLA Navy from entering the Indian Ocean. So, offers on land are unlikely to separate India's maritime strategy from its Quad partners during a Taiwan crisis.

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