No, we are not on the eve of World War III

Asia Times | Leon Hadar

The fifth-year war in Ukraine and tensions in the Taiwan Strait highlight the slow, fragmented unwinding of the postwar American-led order rather than a synchronized march toward World War III. Although these flashpoints fuel fears of global conflagration, Washington and Moscow consistently avoid direct military confrontation. This persistent restraint indicates that great powers are actively managing escalation thresholds despite heightened rhetoric.

Instead of a unified bipolar conflict, the international system is fracturing into localized, transactional disputes driven by unilateral actions. A prime example is the recent US-driven regime-change campaign in Venezuela. Frictions also persist in the Middle East, where a widening diplomatic rift over Palestinian statehood exposes the thinning of the Western security consensus. Guardrails are eroding. Consequently, the primary danger is not a planned global war, but rather the risk that a localized crisis in Ukraine or another volatile theater accidentally entangles a major power.

Comment

The erosion of the postwar security architecture directly impacts the credibility of formal security guarantees like the Taiwan Relations Act. Instead of relying on collective deterrence, states like Japan and Poland are expanding independent defence acquisitions to hedge against US overstretch. European capitals increasingly diverge from Washington's stance on long-range strikes within the war in Ukraine.

This transactional hedging contrasts with the rigid, interlocking alliances of the 1914 July Crisis, which automatically escalated localised Balkan friction into a continental war. Today, binding mechanisms are absent. This systemic deficit prevents a rapid chain reaction, keeping conflicts isolated even as the Minsk II agreement framework lies abandoned.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If regional powers continue to favour bilateral transactionalism over collective deterrence, how does the security guarantee embedded in the Taiwan Relations Act retain its deterrent value against unilateral revisionism?

The trajectory indicates that the Taiwan Relations Act will increasingly function as a bilateral framework for technology transfer and arms sales rather than a credible umbrella for collective deterrence. My assessment is that regional partners will view Washington's commitments through the lens of material capability rather than treaty text, accelerating independent defence acquisitions across the Indo-Pacific. This shift suggests that deterrence will depend on localised denial capabilities rather than the expectation of direct American intervention.

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