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May 6, 2014
Sean Kay [2]
When the process of enlarging the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) began in the mid-1990s there was considerable discussion at the elite level in Washington, D.C. However, the American public was not broadly engaged and the [3]process [3] was framed before the U.S. Senate as a benign spreading of democracy and stability building. Hard discussions of security guarantees, costs, and potential risks were not generally aired or were downplayed by advocates. Yet recently, Secretary of State John Kerry[4]said [4] that, in the context of the Russia-Ukraine crisis: “NATO territory is inviolable. We will defend every piece of it.” Interestingly, that is a greater commitment than even the [5]NATO treaty [5]makes—as it obliges allies to consider an attack on one as if it were an attack on all, and to consult on appropriate responses with “such actions as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” Consequently, Americans might reasonably be wondering just how all this came about.
Today, early [6]opponents [6] of NATO enlargement understandably claim vindication as they have long [7]predicted [7] an eventual backlash from Russia. Supporters [8] of NATO enlargement also feel vindicated, because they have long seen the process as an idealist vision of a new Europe—at least for those countries that joined the alliance. Some [9]advocates [9] even argue that Russia should understand its interests as having benefited from the policy.
NATO is faced with a serious crisis—would the [10]American public [10] or the European allies really risk war with a nuclear Russia to defend the Baltic countries? New NATO allies in particular are asking this question and thus seeking [11]reassurances [11] because NATO’s policy for defense is one of reinforcement in a crisis, not permanent forward deterrence as it was during the Cold War. It could be said that if the question of collective defense now has to be asked, then the general approach of NATO enlargement (which was always [12]premised [12] on not building new dividing lines in Europe) was not exactly a shining success. Still, these countries are NATO members today and America and its allies are sending appropriate messages of [13]reassurance [13]with small, but symbolic, rotational exercises on their territory.
The NATO members further from the eastern frontier also understand that there is a need to avoid handing unnecessary additional pretexts to the narrative of Vladimir Putin that his illegal actions are somehow justified by NATO enlargement. They are not. However, they rightly appear to conclude that how NATO is seen in Russia is also a real part of this crisis. Enlargement advocate’s failure to understand that does not bode well for a successful “de-escalation” which is the [14]stated [14] U.S. and NATO goal towards Russia and Ukraine. This will be a difficult turn for enlargement advocates to make as they have been [15]driving the NATO agenda [15] for two decades in Washington, D.C. and Brussels and will not be keen to close the “open door”.
Cobra King. U.S. Navy photo