How Islands Shape Maritime Control in the Strait of Hormuz

Oxford Geopolitica  |  Bruno Ferreira Chaves Cortez

Iranian military forces leverage two strategic island groups in the Strait of Hormuz to maintain a resilient anti-access/area-denial posture despite sustained U.S. and allied strikes. The First Insular Sentinel, comprising Qeshm and Larak islands near Oman's Musandam Peninsula, houses Peykaap II-class missile boats, Tirada-2S electronic warfare jamming systems, and Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 rocket platforms.

Farther west, the Second Insular Sentinel—consisting of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb—serves as a forward operational network featuring fortified coastal berms, observation garrisons, and extensive underground tunnel complexes. As these islands have been progressively transformed into heavily militarised outposts, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps units store anti-ship cruise missiles, naval mines, and drones inside hardened subterranean facilities. Following March 2026 military strikes against Qeshm, where Forbes reported that artillery was deployed, this geographic depth preserves Tehran’s capability to disrupt commercial navigation and project asymmetric sea-denial across Persian Gulf maritime chokepoints.

Comment

Decentralising anti-ship missile launchers into subterranean bunker networks on Abu Musa and Greater Tunb institutionalises a doctrine of distributed sea denial along narrow chokepoints. Integrating mobile Tirada-2S electronic warfare vehicles with Peykaap II missile boats along the Khuran Strait provides non-kinetic coverage that degrades satellite-guided navigation prior to kinetic engagement. This insular fortification strategy shifts the operational burden from countering surface combatants onto conducting high-risk amphibious clearance against heavily dug-in garrisons.