Despite delays, China could gain ground in the space race

ASPI Strategist  |  Raji Rajagopalan

Though official statements cited unfulfilled criteria, China indefinitely postponed its Chang’e-7 lunar mission scheduled for launch aboard a Long March 5 rocket to the Shackleton crater near the Moon's south pole. The uncrewed expedition, comprising an orbiter, lander, rover, and hopping probe, aims to locate water ice critical for converting into life support supplies and rocket propellant.

This technological reconnaissance serves as a precursor for the joint Sino-Russian International Lunar Research Station initiative, which seeks to establish a permanent presence and exploit extraterrestrial resources. By integrating scientific instruments from six partner nations including Egypt, Italy, and Thailand, Beijing is deploying space diplomacy to legitimize its lunar governance framework. With NASA experiencing operational delays to its VIPER rover and Artemis landing schedules, China retains a potential first-mover advantage to dictate resource mapping protocols and establish lunar norm-setting outside the explicit boundaries of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.

Comment

The non-binding nature of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 leaves a critical legal vacuum regarding the extraction of off-world resources. While Article II strictly prohibits national appropriation of celestial bodies by claim of sovereignty, it does not explicitly ban physical operational safety zones around active mining apparatus. Consequently, establishing an early physical footprint at key topographic features—such as the rim of Shackleton Crater—allows site operators to assert functional exclusivity under the pretext of preventing harmful interference.

This regulatory friction directly mirrors the jurisdictional ambiguity surrounding the U.S.-led Artemis Accords, which similarly attempt to codify safety zones without violating treaty commitments. By establishing operational precedents at polar ice deposits before an international consensus emerges, initial occupants set regulatory standards through custom rather than multilateral treaty negotiation. The resulting operational landscape risks bifurcating lunar governance into competing regulatory frameworks anchored by the International Lunar Research Station on one side and the Artemis Accords on the other.

Strategic Question for Discussion

How can international space law reconcile Article II of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 with operational safety zones established around concentrated resource deposits at Shackleton Crater?

The trajectory indicates that formal amendments to the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 are politically improbable due to diverging geopolitical interests among major spacefaring states. Instead, operational norms surrounding Shackleton Crater will likely be established de facto through bilateral arrangements like the Artemis Accords and practical precedent on the lunar surface. This dynamic shifts the governance mechanism from treaty negotiation to physical presence and state practice.

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