Buzzkill: How to defend Europe against drones

European Council on Foreign Relations | Ulrike Franke

European airspaces face mounting disruption from small explosive-laden drones targeting critical civil infrastructure and military incursions along the 4,000km eastern flank. In September 2025, Poland invoked NATO’s Article 4 after 20 Russian military drones crossed its border, prompting NATO to launch Operation Eastern Sentry. Meanwhile, member states along the flank, including Romania—which shot down three suspected Russian drones in July 2026—struggle against recurring airspace violations amidst restrictive legal frameworks.

In response, national projects and the European Drone Defence Initiative seek to bolster border security, though western member states remain reluctant to provide joint funding. Concurrently, unidentified uncrewed platforms target Western European nuclear plants, LNG terminals, and military bases, including Schwesing airbase during Ukrainian Patriot system training. To counter this dual-spectrum threat, the European Union must integrate eastern flank operational lessons, standardize legal rules of engagement, expand intelligence sharing, and establish a unified, continent-wide common operating picture protecting critical national infrastructure.

Comment

The statutory restrictions preventing Romanian F-16 crews from engaging intruding drones over Galati illustrate a structural gap between peacetime aviation law and military air defence mandates. Hostile operators exploit these statutory constraints along the 4,000km eastern flank, using uncrewed platforms to map NATO radar coverage. This friction allows low-cost aerial probes to routinely bypass response protocols without triggering a collective defense response under Article 5.

Consequently, the forward air posture maintained under Operation Eastern Sentry remains structurally constrained during peacetime incursions. Restricting interceptor engagements near civilian centers like Galati forces reliance on ground-based air defence assets that lack continuous coverage across the border.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If statutory restrictions continue to prevent Romanian F-16s from intercepting low-altitude drones over populated areas like Galati, how does NATO prevent hostile reconnaissance from degrading the operational readiness of Operation Eastern Sentry?

The available evidence points toward a shifting burden onto localized ground-based air defence and electronic warfare systems capable of soft-kill interceptions. Until peacetime rules of engagement adapt to continuous grey-zone incursions, forward-deployed fighters like the F-16 will remain largely confined to tracking missions rather than kinetic interception. This trajectory indicates hostile forces will persist in using low-cost uncrewed platforms to exhaust response protocols without risking open military escalation.

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