Why Nuclear Energy Is Making a Global Comeback

Council on Foreign Relations | Roxy Ekberg

Geopolitical instability in Ukraine and Iran, alongside surging artificial intelligence power demands, is driving a global resurgence in nuclear energy generation. The United States, China, France, Russia, and South Korea currently produce over 70 percent of global nuclear capacity, while 417 operating reactors supply 9 percent of world electricity across 31 countries.

Security concerns and clean energy commitments prompted more than twenty nations to pledge to triple their nuclear capacity by 2050. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, total global nuclear generation capacity could reach 992 gigawatts under high-growth projections. Major technology infrastructure firms including Amazon, Google, Meta, and Microsoft are aggressively contracting continuous baseload power from nuclear facilities to fuel data center expansion. However, massive capital expenditure demands, long-term radioactive waste storage, combat zone vulnerabilities, and dual-use proliferation risks—highlighted by a July 2026 civil nuclear deal between Washington and Riyadh—remain persistent strategic challenges.

Comment

The July 2026 bilateral nuclear agreement between Washington and Riyadh demonstrates how civil atomic technology transfer is replacing traditional arms sales as the primary vehicle for long-term coalition building. By binding Saudi Arabia's electrical grid to Western technology standards and uranium supply chains over a thirty-year timeframe, the accord establishes institutional leverage that outlives individual diplomatic cycles. This structural integration deliberately counters Rosatom's global reactor export drive, which has used state-backed financing to secure decades-long energy influence across non-aligned states.

Bypassing the standard nonproliferation controls established in the 2009 U.S.-UAE civil nuclear agreement creates an immediate precedent for future technology transfers across the Middle East. Consequently, foreign supplier states will likely cite the Saudi baseline when negotiating nuclear export terms with South Korea's KEPCO or France's Framatome.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If Washington dilutes the nonproliferation standards established in the 2009 U.S.-UAE agreement to secure the Saudi civil nuclear deal, how does that shift alter the competitive position of state-backed exporters like Rosatom and KEPCO in non-aligned markets?

The available evidence points toward a significant reduction in Washington's capacity to enforce strict nonproliferation benchmarks across foreign nuclear sales. While state-backed vendors like Rosatom already offer turn-key financing without political conditions, lowering U.S. transfer thresholds allows competitors such as KEPCO and Framatome to demand similar flexibility in export contracts. My assessment is that this trend will accelerate the commercialisation of dual-use fuel cycle technologies throughout the Middle East and South Asia.

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