How Alliances Survive

Foreign Affairs  |  Kurt M. Campbell, Rush Doshi

The 1984 deployment of Pershing II intermediate-range nuclear missiles to Western Europe by the Reagan administration triggered massive public protests and intense transatlantic friction among NATO partners. Senior French, German, and Italian officials confronted NATO Secretary-General Peter Carrington over perceived American high-handedness, yet ultimately accepted Washington's leadership out of structural necessity.

This historical episode illustrates the enduring pattern of alliance durability, where shared strategic imperatives regularly override deep operational disputes and political friction. Former national security officials Kurt M. Campbell and Rush Doshi examine how contemporary alliance structures face similar tests amid evolving global geopolitical competition. While critics frequently forecast the disintegration of Western security pacts, historical precedent demonstrates that American security guarantees remain essential for managing systemic threats. Ultimately, the survival and adaptation of collective defense frameworks depend on managing political friction, balancing burden-sharing demands, and reinforcing joint deterrence capabilities across critical theaters.

Comment

The political strains following the 1984 Pershing II missile deployments demonstrate how internal coalition friction frequently accompanies extended nuclear deterrence commitments. As NATO Secretary-General Peter Carrington observed during the Cold War controversy, allied dependence on American extended deterrence creates a structural asymmetry that forces junior partners to accommodate unilateral strategic shifts. This dynamic reveals that alliance cohesion relies less on seamless policy consensus than on the absence of credible defense alternatives for frontline states.

The institutional persistence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization after the 1979 double-track decision underscores how shared threat perception mitigates recurring burden-sharing disputes. Rather than inducing coalition fracture, high-stakes operational disagreements often produce institutional adaptations that solidify multilateral command integration. Consequently, NATO deterrence posture continues to rely on integrated military structures controlled by SACEUR rather than absolute political harmony among member states.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If extended nuclear deterrence requires periodic unilateral posture adjustments by Washington, which factor ultimately limits European autonomous defense initiatives — the high capital expenditure of independent strategic triad development or the absence of a unified command structure like SACEUR?

The historical trajectory suggests that the fundamental barrier remains political rather than financial. While European states possess the aggregate industrial capacity to fund sovereign strategic capabilities, replacing the established operational command mechanisms under SACEUR requires a degree of unified political authority that member states have consistently proven unwilling to delegate.

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