Imagining an Insurgency in Post-Revolutionary Iran

Center for Strategic and International Studies | Andrew Faulhaber

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is preparing a decentralized, protracted insurgency to defeat any potential United States military occupation of Iran. By mobilizing armed citizens as young as 12, the IRGC plans to transition rapidly from conventional defense to asymmetric warfare, leveraging mountainous terrain and urban centers to preserve its forces.

This defensive doctrine relies on a decentralized mosaic strategy that delegates command authority to lower-ranking regional leaders. Tehran alone presents a massive pacification challenge. Stabilizing the capital would require 375,000 to 600,000 counterinsurgents, far exceeding the 160,000 troops deployed to Iraq in 2007. To exhaust American political will, the IRGC would employ its Quds Force and regional proxies to strike critical logistics hubs like Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. Furthermore, maritime attacks using sea mines and fast boats in the Strait of Hormuz could disrupt global energy markets. Ultimately, the insurgents aim to wage a war of attrition to reinstate the Islamic Revolution.

Comment

The IRGC's reliance on a decentralised mosaic defence doctrine shifts the primary operational challenge from conventional defeat to localised containment. By delegating command authority to lower-ranking regional commanders, the Iranian military apparatus ensures continuity of operations despite the loss of senior leadership. This structural flattening mitigates the impact of high-value targeting campaigns, which historically disrupted centralised command structures in conflicts like Iraq. Consequently, U.S. forces would face a fragmented network of autonomous Basij and IRGC cells rather than a single, cohesive adversary.

This decentralised command mechanism functions by pre-positioning localised stockpiles of mobile missiles, sea mines, and small arms within regional sectors. Local commanders operate under broad strategic intent rather than direct tactical oversight, allowing Basij popular forces to execute independent, low-risk attrition attacks. This operational autonomy is designed to sustain disruption in critical maritime chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz even if central communications are completely severed.

Strategic Question for Discussion

How does the traditional U.S. counter-leadership targeting model adapt if the IRGC's decentralised mosaic defence successfully localises command authority during an occupation?

The pattern of decentralised command suggests that traditional decapitation strikes would yield diminishing returns against a mosaic defence. Instead, the available evidence points toward a trajectory where U.S. forces would be forced to transition from high-value targeting to resource-intensive, localised area-denial operations. Consequently, the efficacy of counter-leadership targeting becomes secondary to the physical interdiction of local Basij supply caches.

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