13 September 2026

Ukraine is quietly destroying Russia’s irreplaceable bombers

The Telegraph | Verity Bowman

Ukrainian long-range drone strikes are systematically targeting Russia's strategic bomber fleet at remote airbases, inflicting irreversible damage on irreplaceable aircraft. By striking deep inside Russian territory, Kyiv's forces have successfully destroyed or severely damaged several Tupolev Tu-22M3 and Tu-95MS bombers, directly undermining Moscow's long-range cruise missile launch capacity.

These airframes represent a finite, legacy Soviet-era resource that the Russian defense industrial base cannot replicate due to closed production lines. Consequently, the Kremlin has been forced to relocate its remaining strategic aviation assets to distant facilities like Olenya Air Base in the Arctic Circle. This relocation dramatically increases flight transit times. The resulting operational strain accelerates the wear and tear on aging engines, compounding Russia's sustainment crisis and permanently degrading its long-term aerospace capabilities. This asymmetric campaign exposes severe gaps in Russian air defense networks while shifting the regional deterrence balance.

Comment

The relocation of Russia's Tupolev Tu-95MS fleet to Olenya Air Base in the Murmansk region imposes severe operational penalties. Flying combat sorties from the Kola Peninsula to launch positions near the Caspian Sea triples flight duration compared to Engels-2. This extended transit rapidly consumes the remaining fatigue life of legacy Kuznetsov NK-12 turboprop engines.

Downstream, these prolonged flight profiles compress maintenance cycles. Technicians are increasingly forced to cannibalise grounded airframes for spare parts. Consequently, the Russian Aerospace Forces face a structural contraction in daily sortie generation, limiting the frequency of Kh-101 cruise missile salvos launched from these Tupolev platforms.

Strategic Question for Discussion
If the relocation of Tupolev Tu-95MS bombers to Olenya Air Base permanently increases transit wear, at what point does the operational cost of launching Kh-101 cruise missiles outweigh their tactical utility in Ukraine?
The trajectory indicates that the threshold will be reached when the available pool of functional Kuznetsov NK-12 engines drops below critical operational reserves. At that stage, Moscow will likely be forced to ration its remaining Tupolev airframes for high-value strategic deterrence missions rather than routine theater-level bombardment. My assessment is that this pivot will significantly reduce the volume of sustained Russian cruise missile strikes, forcing a heavier reliance on cheaper, ground-launched systems.
Share your assessment in the comments below.