Nick Childs
On Navy Day (31 July), the Kremlin announced President Vladimir Putin’s approval of a new Russian maritime doctrine. Released against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, this doctrine is noticeably more focused on the country's naval difficulties than its 2015 predecessor. Despite this, the new document still contains several of the previous doctrine’s themes and flaws, including a failure to address how Russia will deliver on its maritime ambitions.
Global Russia?The doctrine covers all aspects of Russia’s approach to the maritime domain, from security to economics and science. Compared to the 2015 doctrine, however, the 2022 update is more explicit about what Moscow perceives to be the main threats to its naval interests. The doctrine describes the ‘global naval ambitions’ of the United States, NATO activities close to Russia and at sea, an increase in foreign naval presence in the Arctic and efforts to weaken Russia’s control of the Northern Sea Route as the key challenges.
In terms of the regional priorities of Russian naval activities, there is a reordering compared to 2015, with the Atlantic dropping from first to third on the list. The first priority is now the Arctic, with the promise of strengthened capabilities for the Northern and Pacific fleets in response to threats in the region. This will only reinforce the perception in many capitals that competition and tensions in the Arctic will likely continue to rise. The Pacific follows the Arctic on the list of priorities, which is unsurprising given Russia's geographic footprint there and the increased interest in the region.
The new strategy also suggests an increased focus on the Indian Ocean, although it is unclear what this will entail. There is a reference to a Russian naval presence in the Gulf, and to partnerships and cooperation with India, Iran, Saudi Arabia and others. However, the vision of a significant naval presence in this region has been touted down the decades by Russia and previously the Soviet Union, without it ever being fully realised, and there is little indication of what might change that.
There are certainly capability enhancements in the pipeline for the Russian Navy, especially the Northern and Pacific fleets, although they have been a long time coming. The revised doctrine speaks of increased shipbuilding capacity and other infrastructure improvements in the Far East, but these will be challenging to deliver. Recent high-profile Russian naval activity in the Pacific has exposed some of the relative weaknesses of Russian naval capabilities – including the continued reliance on some elderly Soviet-era platforms – and perhaps also the limits of potential cooperation with China, which is strikingly absent from the new doctrine.
Putin’s naval gazingThis new doctrine reflects Putin's beliefs that maritime capacity is pivotal to Russia remaining a great power, which makes it consistent with other recent Russian naval strategy texts. But the significant gap between ambitions and capabilities has been a long-running problem for the Kremlin. As the doctrine itself hints, other powers are moving ahead with developing their capabilities, meaning Russia may be in danger of falling further behind.
The doctrine correctly identifies some of Russia’s maritime weaknesses, including a lack of overseas support infrastructure, a weak merchant fleet, and a shipbuilding industry that needs significant modernisation. However, there seems little prospect of dramatic change on any of these fronts.
Moreover, while there may be little detailed reflection of this in the new document, the Ukraine war has provided mixed messages about the true strength of Russian naval capabilities and their potential to support the doctrine. The fate of the Black Sea Fleet flagship Moskva was a timely reminder that the fleet’s inventory of large surface combatants consists mainly of elderly Soviet-era platforms that may be good for gunboat diplomacy but are not up to the requirements of intense modern maritime combat.
Likewise, the Russian Navy has been able to impose some level of sea denial and blockade on Ukraine, and perhaps even deterred foreign naval interference. But this has come at some cost to itself and has not played out entirely as planned. Moreover, it has been against an opponent that is weak at sea.
From an operational perspective, the Russian Navy’s employment of land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) appears to have been a relative success. However, whether they have delivered the desired effect of weakening Ukrainian resistance is another matter. Given how much stock is placed in LACMs as a new and potentially significant naval capability, this may cause Russian leaders to pause for thought. In his Navy Day speech, Putin heralded the imminent arrival of a hypersonic capability in the fleet, although just what that will amount to – at least initially – remains uncertain.
None of this should detract from the fact that Moscow still possesses some potent naval capabilities, not least its submarine force. However, the general performance of Russia’s military in Ukraine – including the navy – may cast doubts about the proficiency of even some of these most prized elements of the force. This reinforces the belief that the navy’s ability to support the doctrine and posture outlined in the document may fall somewhat short of what the authors envisaged.
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