Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea and the Shifting Paradigms of Modern Warfare
Introduction
The character of warfare is changing rapidly. The engines for this rapid change are emerging technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Drones), Cyber, the Internet of Things (IoT), Big Data, 5G technology, Quantum Computing, Synthetic Biology, 3D printing, etc. The drivers of these emerging technologies have been designed for consumer products. The commodified versions of the technology are now being used to create new, highly effective and cheap weapons systems, with far-reaching consequences for today's warfare.
Innovations like ubiquitous sensing, meshing of civilian and military sensors, decentralised command and control, the abundant use of drones of all sizes and types across all domains, increased automation of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and battlespace management, information operations and battles of narratives have emerged.
Technology is a great leveller. Terrorists and Insurgents, Violent Non-State Actors, smaller organisations and countries pick up these technologies very fast. They are tech-savvy, networked organisations, nimble on their feet, taking asymmetric advantage of their way of warfare.
Traditional military superpowers, characterised by rigid, hierarchical command structures and capital-intensive platforms, struggle to adapt at the pace of this technological diffusion. While industrialised nations maintain long-term institutional advantages due to their expansive resource pools and defence industrial bases, VNSAs frequently capture the initiative. This dynamic forces conventional militaries into a continuous reactive, defensive operational posture.
Hamas has used targeted cyberattacks and Israel has employed AI in its air campaign in Gaza. The integration of advanced technologies into military strategies has revolutionised the way conflicts are waged, presenting both opportunities and risks on a global scale.
The effective use of drones has been seen in all the recent conflicts. Drones are cheap, deadly and ubiquitous. Drones have become vital for surveillance, reconnaissance and targeted strikes. Drones are shaping and reshaping the battlefield. These low-cost, high-tech eyes and weapons redefine wars, bringing both safer missions and a level playing field. They are changing warfare, but they are not magic wands. The real advantage lies not in possessing them, but in understanding how, when and why to unleash their potential.
Recent conflicts clearly demonstrate this shifting balance:
The 2019 Abqaiq-Khurais Attacks. On September 14, 2019, Yemen's Houthi rebels utilised a coordinated salvo of ten low-cost loitering munitions and land-attack cruise missiles to strike Saudi Aramco's primary oil processing facilities. This attack bypassed sophisticated air defence architectures, temporarily disrupting over half of Saudi Arabia's crude oil production and demonstrating that inexpensive autonomous platforms can penetrate dense, state-level defensive grids.1
The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. This conflict underscored the operational impact of unmanned systems. The Azerbaijani military combined Turkish-manufactured Bayraktar TB2 and Israeli-made loitering munitions to systematically neutralise Armenia's legacy Soviet-era armoured formations, fixed air defence radars and fortified trench networks, forcing a rapid conventional capitulation.2
The Russia-Ukraine War. This theatre represents the full-scale industrialisation of small drone warfare. Both sides utilise thousands of commercial First-Person View (FPV) reconnaissance and strike drones weekly. These systems have rendered traditional battlefield manoeuvres transparent, disrupted heavy armour operations and enabled long-range loitering munitions to challenge deep strategic infrastructure.3
The 2023 Gaza Conflict. The structural dynamics of these changes were further highlighted when Hamas utilised simple consumer drones armed with drop munitions to turn off Israel's automated border monitoring towers, remote-controlled machine gun stations and Merkava tanks. This tactical disruption facilitated their initial penetration of the highly fortified Gaza border perimeter.4
Since the start of the Israel-Hamas war, Yemen-based, Iran-backed Houthis have conducted numerous incidents of maritime aggression involving firing over 100 missiles and drones at commercial vessels, illegally seizing them and harassing U.S. Navy and coalition ships in Middle Eastern waters. The approximately 27 incidents of Houthi maritime aggression in December alone surpassed the 20 incidents throughout the rest of 2023 combined. This has created a huge commotion in global maritime trade.
Throughout human history, the capacity to control the seas and commerce was available only to rich countries that could allocate a substantial share of their national income to build a strong navy. The Houthis have now enacted a de facto naval blockade — without possessing a navy. Though the Houthis do not have a traditional fleet, they could still challenge the mighty U.S. Navy's sea control using unconventional fleets of armed unmanned surface vessels, fast attack craft, naval mines, drones, helicopters and anti-ship cruise missiles. This would force the U.S. Navy to overstretch its resources to protect a long sea line of communication. How does a strong conventional Navy deal with this kind of threat that does not have a navy?
Predictably, the larger navies have responded on expected lines. The U.S. military has launched Operation Sea Guardian to protect shipping in the Red Sea. Since Christmas Eve, the force has shot down 12 attack drones and five missiles launched by the Houthis. But counterfire from Western navies in response to Houthi attacks doesn't yield the sort of sailing environment shipping lines need.
The current conflict in the Red Sea raises many interesting questions about concepts of operations, force structure, weapon profiles, etc. Is it time to reassess what a conventional military force can and cannot achieve on this battlefield? This new environment gives a strong "home advantage" to the terrorists and Non-State Actors. Navies have been the favoured tool for power projection in far-off regions of the world. But if vessels can be so easily and cheaply threatened by weaponry like drones, cruise and ballistic missiles, their utility may be far less than in the past.
If the threats in the Red Sea were expected, the task force would have comprised mostly of Littoral Combat ships – small, nimble, modular, networked and flexible. What we have now are bigger, stronger and more expensive destroyers and frigates.
The signal one gets is that if the most powerful and expensive Navy in the history of the world can't guarantee freedom of the seas, nobody else will either. If some Houthi rebels can shut down an important trade route, then, in principle, anybody else can do the same. The successful deployment of asymmetric maritime interdiction by the Houthis risks creating a contagion effect, providing a tactical blueprint for localised insurgencies globally to disrupt parallel maritime choke points. The cost of shipping is rising out of control.
These are some of the issues which require deliberate, detailed analysis.
This paper examines how relatively weak, Iran-backed Houthi militants have leveraged low-cost drones, missiles and asymmetric tactics to disrupt global maritime trade in the Red Sea, challenging naval supremacy and highlighting shifts in modern warfare. By analysing Bab el-Mandeb dynamics, US/UK responses and escalation risks, it assesses the implications for international security, trade and great-power competition.
This study adopts a qualitative case-study methodology based on open-source material, including official government statements, military briefings, UN reports, maritime security advisories, think-tank assessments and media reporting. It analyses the Houthi campaign as a case study of asymmetric maritime warfare and examines its implications for naval strategy and modern military doctrine.
Importance of Bab el-Mandeb Strait5
Bab al-Mandab, also known as the "Gate of Tears," is a narrow strait connecting the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, serving as a crucial link between Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. It spans approximately 20 miles at its narrowest point, bordered by Djibouti to the west and Yemen to the east. This strait is a vital maritime route, facilitating the movement of vessels between Europe and Asia.
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, situated between Djibouti and Yemen, marks the southern entry point to the Red Sea and is strategically important for connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, it limits shipping traffic to two narrow channels for both inbound and outbound shipments.6
Geographically, the strait spans approximately 18 to 20 miles at its narrowest point, bordered by Djibouti on the African coast to the west and Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula to the east. Perim Island (Jabal al-Tair) divides the waterway into two primary navigation channels:
- The Eastern Channel (Bab Iskender). Measures roughly 2 miles wide with a shallow maximum depth of 98 feet, making it less suitable for deep-draft commercial mega-vessels.
- The Western Channel. Spans approximately 16 miles wide with a maximum depth of 1,017 feet, hosting the primary inbound and outbound shipping lanes. These lanes are constrained by international routing protocols into two narrow, two-mile-wide transit corridors.
This tight geographic concentration leaves commercial ships highly vulnerable to shore-based interdiction.
The Shift in Maritime Traffic and Island Governance
Between 2021 and 2023, the strategic balance of traffic passing through the Bab el-Mandeb shifted significantly, largely driven by the fallout from Western sanctions imposed on Russian petroleum exports following the invasion of Ukraine. To replace lost European markets, Russia redirected its crude oil exports south through the Suez Canal and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait toward buyers in India and China. By mid-2023, Russian shipments accounted for nearly 74% of all southbound oil traffic transiting the canal corridor. Concurrently, Middle Eastern producers, notably Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), diverted substantial portions of their export volumes northward through the strait to Europe to backfill the continent's severed energy pipelines.
Control over the physical features flanking this chokepoint has shifted back and forth throughout the Yemeni Civil War. Since the outbreak of hostilities in 2015, Yemen's militarised coastal islands have served as key platforms for power projection. Between 2015 and 2017, Houthi forces used these islands to launch anti-ship missiles at regional vessels. In late 2017, military forces backed by the UAE executed a series of amphibious and littoral operations that seized control of the Bab el-Mandeb coastal perimeter and Perim Island, pushing Houthi units inland.
However, this did not eliminate the Houthis' maritime threat. Driven from the immediate bottleneck of the strait, the group shifted its operational focus northward along the Southern Red Sea littoral. They retained control over the strategic governorate and port city of Hodeida, alongside the secondary maritime terminals of al-Salif and Ras Isa. From this extended coastal baseline, the Houthis maintained a direct line of sight over the shipping lanes of the Southern Red Sea, preserving their ability to launch long-range asymmetric strikes into the maritime corridor.
On November 19, 2023, the Houthis seized the car carrier Galaxy Leader, which was transporting automobiles from India to Turkey. A Japanese company operates the ship, flies a Bahamian flag, but is owned by Ray Shipping, a British company that an Israeli businessman partially owns. The Galaxy Leader was diverted to the Houthi-controlled Hodeida port. This is an example of the international nature of modern commercial ships, making it extremely difficult to identify a specific ship's nationality. Commercial ships are practically a non-national means of transportation, serving the international community in general for global trade.
The closure of the Bab el-Mandeb could impact tanker routes from the Persian Gulf, diverting them around the southern tip of Africa, thus increasing transit time and costs. Additionally, European and North African southbound oil flows would no longer have the most direct route to Asian markets via the Suez Canal and Bab el-Mandeb.
Houthi Background and Evolution of its Capabilities7
The Houthis are an armed group from a sub-sect of Yemen's Shia Muslim minority, the Zaidis. They take their name from the movement's founder, Hussein al-Houthi. The group was formed in the 1990s when a group then calling itself Ansar Allah ("Supporters of God") started to resist Saudi preaching of Wahabism and to assert Zaidi identity and religious practice across Yemen. Zaidism is a variant of Shiism local to northern Yemen and parts of southern Saudi Arabia. There are important doctrinal differences between mainstream Shiism and Zaidi Islam.
They started resisting the corruption of the then-president, Ali Abdullah Saleh. As the movement started opposing the corruption of Saleh's regime and his partnership with the United States in the global war on terror, it added Yemeni supporters beyond the Zaidi community. President Saleh, backed by a coalition of Arab countries led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, tried to eliminate the Houthis in 2003. Beginning in 2004, Saleh's government launched six brutal rounds of fighting, killing the group's charismatic leader, Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi. These military efforts failed to root out the movement. The Houthis repelled them.
When the Arab Spring came to Yemen in 2011, Saleh was eventually forced to step down. The Houthis took over Yemen's capital, Sanaa, in September 2014 and tried to extend their influence south, grabbing control of most of the country. The Houthis have been fighting a civil war since 2014 against Yemen's government.
The 2014 rise of Houthis triggered alarm in neighbouring countries, especially Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The Houthis also began to receive support from Iran and their proxy Hezbollah adversaries to the Saudis and Emiratis. In 2015, a coalition led by those two countries and supported by the United States, the United Kingdom and France intervened militarily, launching airstrikes to support other military organisations that backed Hadi's government.
The airstrikes only aggravated the war rather than restoring peace. It resulted in what the United Nations has called the world's worst humanitarian crisis. Between 2015 and 2022, due to airstrikes by the Saudi-led coalition, supported by U.S. intelligence-sharing, over and a half million Yemenis were displaced and more than 21 million, or two-thirds of Yemen's population, remain in need of humanitarian assistance and protection.
According to the UN, the official government of Yemen is the Presidential Leadership Council, to which President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi transferred his powers in April 2022. However, the government is based in the Saudi capital, Riyadh, after Hadi fled there in 2015.
Most of the Yemeni population lives in areas under Houthi control. They control most of northwest Yemen as well as Sanaa and the north of Yemen. The Houthi rebels control the Red Sea coastline. The group collects taxes and also prints money.
Since seizing the Yemeni capital of Sana'a in September 2014, the Houthis have systematically developed and refined their political and military capabilities. They have evolved from a highly capable guerrilla group to a near-state-level organisation and are now capable of projecting power within the region. The Houthis are financially self-sufficient, earning revenue through taxation, customs charges, service fees and smuggling operations. They're seeking international recognition as a legitimate military and political force in Yemen. The Houthis fight under the slogan "God is Great; death to America; death to Israel; damn the Jews; victory for Islam".
The Houthis are part of Iran's Axis of Resistance, the network of state and non-state actors, including Hamas and Hezbollah, that Iran has leveraged to spread its influence across the region and encircle its opponents like Israel and Saudi Arabia. The Houthis are also belligerent toward the U.S. for the latter's support of Saudi Arabia and the UAE for interfering in Yemen's ongoing civil war. The Houthis overthrew an internationally recognised government; violated human rights; used child soldiers and imposed their version of "Fiver" Shi'a Islam on the Yemeni population, persecuting those who resisted. During the height of the civil war, the group also contributed to Yemen's humanitarian disaster by blocking ports through which international aid was intended to flow and firing missiles and drones on Saudi and Emirati population centres with the sole intention of terrorising civilians.
The popularity of the Houthis has eroded in recent years. They have been unable to deliver economic growth to the poorest country in the Middle East and North Africa. The Houthis are also brutally repressive, torturing and executing journalists, arresting and detaining peaceful protesters and restricting the rights of women and girls. Many Yemenis increasingly see the Houthis as driven by a desire to establish a totalitarian religious state that protects Zaidi elites' power.
In September 2023, protests against the Houthis for failing to pay public-sector salaries were followed by arrests. However, the Houthi leadership recognised it had a problem. In September 2023, they announced they were preparing a "radical change" to their government to deal with corruption and economic problems. The Israel-Hamas war gave them a chance to gain legitimacy.
The attacks on Red Sea shipping and the high-profile hijacking of the Galaxy Leader provided domestic and international dividends for the Houthis. Domestic support for the Houthis has increased, as support for the Houthis from Yemen's well-armed northern tribes has been strengthened.
The Mechanism of Strategic Leverage8
Adept at asymmetric warfare, the Houthis understand the importance of leverage. Their ability to strike targets in Saudi Arabia and the UAE has brought the Saudis to the negotiating table. The Houthis want to increase their leverage with the Saudis. The Saudis would prefer not to re-engage in open, direct and protracted military confrontation with the Houthis.
Both the UAE and Saudi Arabia are working to upgrade, expand and network their air defences. In the case of a mass launch of drones and missiles in a swarm attack from Yemen, many targets would be struck. Neither the UAE nor Saudi Arabia can afford to have high-profile sites struck by the Houthis' drones or missiles. More significantly, the world cannot afford for vital energy infrastructure to be targeted.9
During the civil war, the group recognised that while it could not match the conventional airpower or technological resources of the Saudi-led coalition, it could inflict significant financial costs on its adversaries. By launching long-range drone and missile salvos at critical infrastructure targets deep inside Saudi Arabia and the UAE—such as the 2019 Abqaiq refinery strikes and the 2022 attacks on Abu Dhabi—the Houthis shifted the strategic calculus of the conflict. This performance demonstrated that continuing the war would expose billions of dollars in Gulf infrastructure to persistent risk, prompting Saudi Arabia to negotiate an exit from the conflict in Oman.1011
Beyond kinetic capabilities, the Houthis have successfully used ecological and structural vulnerabilities as leverage against the international community. For years, the group controlled access to the FSO Safer (later renamed the Yemen), a decaying, single-hulled floating storage and offloading oil tanker permanently moored off the coast of Hodeida. Holding over 1.1 million barrels of light crude, the deteriorating vessel functioned as an environmental weapon. The Houthis repeatedly denied UN inspectors maintenance access, using the threat of a massive oil spill that could cripple regional shipping lanes and ruin local fishing ecosystems to extract political recognition and deter attacks on Hodeida.12
Internal Fragility and the Gaza Incentive
Despite their external power projection, the Houthis face significant domestic vulnerabilities. Their governance model is highly repressive, characterised by the arbitrary detention of critics, the suppression of journalists, the use of child soldiers and the enforcement of conservative religious restrictions. Economically, they have struggled to manage the territories under their control, which are plagued by systemic poverty, high unemployment, collapsing infrastructure and unpaid public-sector salaries.
By mid-2023, public frustration was mounting. In September 2023, large-scale protests broke out across Sana'a and other urban centres demanding economic reforms and the payment of long-overdue state wages. The Houthi leadership responded with a wave of arrests while acknowledging the political risk by announcing an upcoming "radical change" to reorganise their administrative ministries.
The outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war on October 7, 2023, provided the Houthi leadership with an opportunity to manage this internal unrest. By launching long-range attacks against southern Israel and initiating an aggressive maritime campaign in the Red Sea, the Houthis shifted domestic attention away from economic governance toward a popular pan-Islamic cause: defending the Palestinian population in Gaza against Israeli military operations.
This strategy yielded significant political dividends for the movement:
- Domestic Consolidation. The campaign successfully mobilised Yemen's highly armed, independent northern tribal confederations, allowing the Houthis to recruit thousands of new fighters and secure additional tribal levies.
- Marginalisation of Local Rivals. Political opponents in Yemen—including the internationally recognised Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) and southern secessionist factions—found themselves in a difficult position. They could not openly condemn the Houthis' maritime attacks without appearing to oppose the Palestinian cause, which enjoys broad public support across the country.
- Regional Standing. Within the broader Middle East, the Houthis emerged as one of the most active members of Iran's "Axis of Resistance," executing direct kinetic actions to support Hamas while larger actors like Lebanese Hezbollah maintained a more calculated escalatory stance.
Operational Chronology and the Mechanics of the Maritime Campaign14
The Houthi maritime campaign unfolded through a sequence of calculated escalations designed to test international reactions, disrupt trade and maximise political leverage.15
Phase I: Initial Long-Range Strike Attempts
In late October 2023, the Houthis initially attempted to project power by launching salvos of long-range land-attack cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and delta-wing loitering munitions northward toward the southern Israeli port city of Eilat. A dense allied defence network largely neutralised these early efforts. U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyers operating in the Northern Red Sea, such as the USS Carney, intercepted multiple salvos using SM-2 and SM-6 surface-to-air missiles. Concurrently, Israel's Arrow-2 and Arrow-3 exo-atmospheric ballistic missile defence systems, alongside fighter aircraft from the Israeli Air Force and the French Navy, intercepted incoming targets over the Gulf of Aqaba.
Phase II: The Capture of the Galaxy Leader
Recognising the limits of their long-range land strikes, the Houthis shifted their strategy toward direct interdiction within the Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint. On November 19, 2023, they executed a high-profile heliborne assault against the commercial car carrier Galaxy Leader as it transited international waters in the Southern Red Sea.
Using a Mil Mi-17 transport helicopter painted with Yemeni and Palestinian flags, armed Houthi commandos executed a vertical-insertion boarding manoeuvre onto the vessel's upper deck while it was underway. The team quickly breached the bridge, held the crew at gunpoint and deactivated the vessel's Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponder. The ship was then escorted into the Houthi-controlled port of al-Salif near Hodeida.
The capture of the Galaxy Leader highlighted the complex, internationalised structure of modern commercial shipping, which complicates maritime security operations:
- Flag of Convenience. The vessel was registered and flagged under Bahamian maritime law.
- Operational Management. The ship was operated by a Japanese logistics corporation (Nippon Yusen Kaisha).
- Corporate Ownership. The asset was owned by Ray Shipping, a corporate entity registered in the United Kingdom.
- Ultimate Beneficial Ownership. The parent firm was partially controlled by a prominent Israeli businessman, which provided the Houthis with their stated justification for the seizure.
- Crew Composition. The 25 crew members on board held citizenships across multiple nations, including the Philippines, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Romania and Mexico, with no Israeli nationals on the vessel.
Following its capture, the Galaxy Leader was turned into a domestic propaganda attraction. Moored just off the coast of Yemen, the ship became a destination for local tour boats, where armed tribal groups and visiting civilians filmed propaganda videos, danced on the decks and broadcasted messages celebrating the successful defiance of Western maritime power.
Phase III: Distributed Missile and UAV Attrition
Following the seizure of the Galaxy Leader, the Houthis expanded their campaign into an open interdiction effort against all merchant shipping in the region. Between late November and the end of December 2023, the frequency and scale of attacks accelerated rapidly. In December alone, the Houthis launched approximately 27 distinct kinetic operations against commercial vessels, surpassing their total maritime incidents from the first eleven months of the year combined.
The group used an array of low-cost anti-ship weaponry supplied by Iran or assembled locally using imported components:
- Loitering Munitions / One-Way Attack Drones. Deployed systems like the Qasef-1 and Qasef-2K (based on Iran's Ababil architecture) alongside the longer-range, delta-wing Samad-3 drone. These platforms carry small explosive payloads and use GPS coordinates or basic optical sensors to target ship superstructures.
- Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs). Employed systems such as the Al-Mandab-1 and Al-Mandab-2 (derived from Chinese C-802 designs) alongside the liquid-fueled Quds-Z0 cruise missile, which features an electro-optical/infrared seeker for terminal guidance against maritime targets.16
- Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs). Marked the first operational deployment of ASBMs in naval history, utilising the Khalij Fars and Asif families (derived from Iran's Fateh-110 ballistic missile platform). These missiles use optical or radar seekers to lock onto large surface targets during their high-velocity terminal descent phase.
- Unmanned Surface Vessels (USVs). Deployed low-profile, remote-controlled speedboats packed with high explosives, such as the Toophan series. Directed via line-of-sight radio links or satellite feeds, these vessels target the vulnerable hull lines of merchant ships.
The Houthis established an integrated targeting framework to support these operations. Initial tracking data was gathered using commercial open-source web applications, maritime transponder databases and shore-based marine radars deployed along high-altitude coastal bluffs. This organic data was supplemented by real-time intelligence from Behshad, an Iranian electronic intelligence and cargo vessel stationed in the Red Sea. The Behshad monitored international naval movements and provided tactical tracking data directly to Houthi command nodes, enabling them to identify and target vessels with minimal radar signatures or those attempting to transit with deactivated AIS transponders.
Implications of the Houthi Attacks on Global Maritime Trade17
The Red Sea is home to one of the most important maritime trade routes in the world. The Houthis' attacks have had far-reaching consequences. Almost 90 per cent of the oil that flows through the Bab el-Mandeb comes from the Persian Gulf and is destined for Europe and Africa. The other 10 per cent is oil from the Horn of Africa. The Houthis had initially said they were attacking Israeli and Israel-bound ships in a show of support for Hamas. However, the group's attacks have targeted a wide variety of merchant tankers. At least 44 countries are connected to vessels attacked by the Houthis and the attacks have disrupted wider international trade.
Europe stands to lose the most from current energy price disruptions. The Suez Canal route has become crucial since European countries stopped buying Russian oil. Most of these countries have replaced a great deal of the Russian petroleum they had been importing with crude oil and products from the Middle East. The fastest route to Europe from the Middle East is through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, even though the Suez Canal cannot accommodate some of the very largest crude oil ships, known as Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs).
As it seeks to shift away from Russian energy, it is increasingly relying on LNG. Most of the LNG flowing through the Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal is headed for Europe. The good news for them is that Qatari LNG supplies to Europe continue to pass through the Red Sea and Suez Canal without any diversions. European underground gas storage facilities were 97.89 per cent full and the winter so far has been mild.
Supply chains for other sectors have also experienced disruptions. Given that the Red Sea is used to transport commodities and other resources between major markets, traffic disruptions here can have serious economic consequences. This is especially the case at the moment because a severe drought has reduced traffic via the Panama Canal, causing U.S. grain shipments destined for Asia to take lengthy detours through the Suez Canal and southern Africa. The number of vessels passing through the Panama Canal daily has fallen by nearly 40 per cent, resulting in significantly longer wait times – and longer journeys – which directly influence freight costs and product pricing.
The Panama Canal Authority said on December 15, 2023, that it would increase daily transit through the canal from 22 to 24 vessels in January due to higher rainfall and water levels. But even this figure is well below normal volumes. Rerouting through the southern tip of Africa is also costly.18
Effect on Russia. The Red Sea is also a transit route for approximately 80 per cent of Russia's petroleum destined for Asian markets and eight per cent of the global liquefied natural gas trade. In the first 11 months of 2023, 42 per cent of Russian-loaded crude and products went through the Red Sea. However, none of the attacks in December 2023 targeted Russian shipments. Russia will benefit from higher oil prices, which are likely to result from higher transport costs. The price of carrying oil through the Red Sea has increased.
Effect on African Countries. For Egypt, revenue from the Suez Canal is a major source of income. Egypt is already in the midst of a financial crisis, which is suffering from a debt crisis made worse by trade disruptions with Israel due to the war in Gaza. The effects on the Egyptian economy are more severe as shipping through the Suez Canal contributes nearly $9.4 billion to the Egyptian economy. Israel will be far less affected as only about 5% of its trade passes through its Red Sea port, Eilat. Israelis would face supply chain delays and price hikes. With ships spending as little time as possible in the Red Sea, countries such as Sudan and Eritrea, whose only ports are located on the Red Sea, will find it difficult to get ships to call at their ports.
Effect on Global Trade. As major international shipping firms—including Maersk, MSC, Hapag-Lloyd and CMA CGM—faced persistent missile and drone attacks, they suspended all transit operations through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Instead, they began rerouting their cargo fleets around the Cape of Good Hope at the southern tip of Africa. This structural shift changed the economics of international maritime transit:
- Transit Time Extensions. Rerouting around the African continent adds 3,000 to 4,000 nautical miles to a standard voyage, extending transit times between East Asian ports and Western European distribution hubs by 10 to 14 days.
- Operating Cost Increases. The extended journeys require additional fuel costs, with large container mega-vessels consuming an extra $1 million in bunker fuel per round trip.
- Container Displacements. The extended transit loops tie up significant global shipping capacity, creating systemic container shortages at Asian manufacturing hubs and causing backlogs at major European ports.
- Insurance Premium Inflation. For vessels continuing to run the Red Sea corridor, war-risk insurance premiums rose from less than 0.07% of total hull value in early October to over 0.5% to 0.7% by late December 2023, adding hundreds of thousands of dollars in operational costs per transit.
- Freight Rate Surges. The combination of capacity constraints and increased operational costs caused spot freight rates on the Shanghai-to-Rotterdam container route to triple, rising from roughly $1,000 per forty-foot equivalent unit (FEU) to over $4,000.
Is the impact of Houthi attacks significant? While the current crisis caused by the Houthis is critical, it may not escalate into a full-fledged economic crisis. The events in the Red Sea, however, could lead to price hikes. Chris McMahon contends that the closure of chokepoints has no real impact on global trade, global shipping, or the globalised economy, as shipping would transit through the alternate route.19
After all, the Suez Canal has been closed several times. In 1956, the Suez Canal was shut down for six months after Egyptian forces sank several ships along the canal in retaliation for a British-French invasion of the nationalised canal zone. Britain and France experienced acute but short-lived disruptions to their oil supplies. The oil industry's long-term response was to develop the VLCC to maximise the amount of oil that could be shipped around Africa.
The Suez Canal was closed for eight years between 1967 and 1975. As a result, the cost of shipping around the Cape of Good Hope was much higher than the Suez route, but it posed no serious economic hardship for global consumers. Rerouting the Red Sea trade would affect global trade costs, but not catastrophically.
More recently, the Suez Canal was blocked for six days in March 2021, when the container ship Ever Given became stuck, causing losses of nearly $10 billion a day in international trade. There will be an increase in costs, but the market will adjust.
The shipping industry is more efficient and resilient now than they were several years ago. It can circumvent serious problems. Disruptions from pandemic shutdowns and sanctions on Russia have prepared them to handle the logistics of rerouting or reloading ships to minimise disruption.
The point is, should a force like the Houthis be allowed to continue terrorising global commerce. In contrast, maritime conventions protecting the safe passage of commercial vessels are one of the oldest and most universally recognised international law concepts? Freedom of navigation rights are also enshrined in the United Nations 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, which has been ratified by 169 parties.20
The Escalation Ladder and the U.S. Response21,22
Operation Prosperity Guardian. From Mid November 2023 onwards, the Houthis started increasing attacks in the Red Sea. The U.S. and its coalition partners kept on warning the Houthis to stop the attacks. The Houthis continued to push the envelope further in the escalation ladder. It had to culminate in the US-UK strikes against Houthi rebels in Yemen.
The U.S. needed to respond militarily. It had warned the Houthis repeatedly over the last several months not to attack international shipping, as these were intolerable. Rather than backing down, the Houthis had gotten bolder. President Joe Biden said that the U.S. administration needed to demonstrate both to the Houthis and to the other maligned actors in the region that such behaviour is not acceptable and will prompt an American response.
On 19 October 2023, one of the U.S. Navy destroyers, USS Carney, intercepted four cruise missiles and 15 drones launched by the Houthis directed against Israel. On 19 November 2023, the Houthis turned their attention to commercial shipping, seizing a cargo ship, the Galaxy Leader and diverting it to the port of Hodeidah. On 3 December 2023, USS Carney, along with some commercial ships, was attacked in international waters with anti-ship ballistic missiles fired from Yemen. Three commercial ships were struck, while Carney shot down three drones.
On 15 December 2023, the Houthis issued a threat against one ship, targeted another with a drone and fired two ballistic missiles at the MV Palatium III, hitting the vessel. This marked the first-ever use of an anti-ship ballistic missile. All the involved ships carried the Liberian flag.
The initial international response to the Houthis' maritime threat focused on defensive operations. On 18 December 2023, U.S. Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin announced the launch of Operation Prosperity Guardian (OPG), an international maritime security coalition operating under the pre-existing Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) framework and led by Combined Task Force 153 (CTF-153).
The stated objective of the coalition was to reassure international shipping lines, protect freedom of navigation and provide a coordinated defensive shield across the Southern Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden.
The Problem of Political Hesitancy. Although more than twenty nations officially joined the coalition, the operation suffered from political divisions tied to the broader geopolitical dynamics of the Israel-Hamas war. Many European partners were hesitant to place their naval forces under direct U.S. operational command or to align themselves with an initiative that could be seen as supporting Israel's military operations in Gaza. Consequently, nations like France, Italy and Spain refused to transfer command of their warships to the U.S. Navy, opting instead to deploy their vessels independently under national command structures or through European Union frameworks such as Operation Aspides. Furthermore, key regional partners—such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE—declined to participate publicly, fearing internal political backlash and a potential breakdown of their fragile, ongoing diplomatic talks with the Houthi movement.
On 3 January 2024, in a joint statement, the UK, U.S., Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, South Korea and Singapore had warned that "The Houthis will bear the responsibility for the consequences should they continue to threaten lives, the global economy, or the free flow of commerce in the region's critical waterways." While not describing the statement as a red line, Biden and his team recognised the language would essentially bind them to a more forceful response should the Houthi attacks continue, which many officials privately believed they would.
Houthi forces launched Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs) against the Maersk Hangzhou container vessel in the last days of 2023. Following the interception of the missiles by the USS Gravely and the USS Laboon, Houthi speedboats engaged the container vessel, closing to within meters of the ship. In response, the U.S. Navy's helicopters destroyed at least three Houthi platforms, causing the death of ten militia fighters.
The 26th attack on commercial shipping lanes in the Red Sea since 19 November took place on 10 January 2024. A Security Council resolution, sponsored by the U.S. and Japan, demanded that 'the Houthis immediately cease all such attacks, which impede global commerce and undermine navigational rights and freedoms as well as regional peace and security.' It allowed member states, in accordance with international law, 'to defend their vessels from attack, including those that undermine navigational rights and freedoms.' Eleven nations voted for it, though Russia, China, Mozambique and Algeria abstained.
On 11 January 2024, the 27th attack occurred when an anti-ship ballistic missile was fired close to a commercial ship, although it only hit the water. The U.S. Navy had shot down 21 missiles and drones fired by the Houthis. This was the fiercest response from the U.S. since the attacks began. This attack was the final straw, though preparations had been ongoing. The U.S. and UK had to retaliate against the Houthis' brazen attacks.
U.S.–U.K. Military Response
In the wee hours of the morning of 12 January 2024, the United States, in partnership with the United Kingdom, launched a series of cruise missiles and airstrikes against the Houthis in Yemen. The strikes were from fighter jets and Tomahawk missiles. More than a dozen Houthi targets were attacked by missiles fired from air, surface and sub-surface platforms, which were chosen for their ability to degrade the Houthis' war-waging capabilities.
Weapon platforms used. The bulk of the firepower came from U.S. fighter jets. The U.S. has an aircraft carrier in the Red Sea and air bases in the region. The U.S. deployed 22 fixed-wing aircraft, including F18s from the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower.
The USS Philippine Sea guided missile cruiser and two Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers, the USS Gravely and the USS Mason, took part in the operation. The USS Florida, a guided-missile submarine that entered the Red Sea on 23 November, was part of the attack. The strikes, in two waves, aimed at targets in 28 different locations across Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen.
Munitions. The strikes involved more than 150 precision-guided munitions "of various types", including air-launched missiles by F/A-18 Super Hornets based on the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower. Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles, which are GPS-guided and can be programmed to fly evasively, were fired from the Navy destroyers USS Gravely and USS Mason, the Navy cruiser USS Philippine Sea and a U.S. submarine. Precision-guided munitions were used to destroy targets and minimise collateral damage.
Target. Lt. Gen. Douglas Sims, director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said strikes were largely in low-populated areas and the number of those killed would not be high. He said the strikes hit weapons, radar and targeting sites, including in remote mountain areas. Precision weapons hit 60 targets in 16 locations. The targets were not 'symbolic.' They were carefully chosen to make it very difficult for the Houthis to continue with their anti-shipping campaign. Attacks were carried out against the sensors that enabled the Houthis to identify and track targets, missiles and drones and factories that produce them and storage.
Strikes were reported in the Yemen capital Sanaa, which is controlled by the rebels, the Houthi Red Sea port of Hodeidah, Dhamar and the group's north-western stronghold of Saada. A senior U.S. military official said he could not provide an exact percentage of Houthi assets destroyed in the strikes, but that it was "significant."
According to Al-Masirah, a Houthi-run news channel, Hodeida International Airport, Taiz International Airport, al-Dailami Air Base (which shares the runway with Sanaa International Airport), an airport near Hajjah and a camp east of Saada were hit. According to the Houthis' military spokesman, there were 72 strikes in total. The Houthis' deputy information minister, Nasr al-Din Amir, reported no material losses or casualties from the latest strikes and said the targeted site was already defunct.
U.K.'s involvement. The aircraft, four RAF Typhoon FGR4s supported by a Voyager air refuelling tanker, flew from RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus at roughly 7.30 pm UK time on 12 January 2024 and dropped their payload on the Yemeni sites at about 11.30 pm. They had returned to Cyprus by 3 am.
They used Paveway IV guided bombs to conduct precision strikes on two Houthi facilities, a site in Bani in north-western Yemen used by the Houthis to launch reconnaissance and attack drones and an airfield in Abbs used to launch cruise missiles and drones. Several buildings supposedly involved in drone operations were targeted by the aircraft.
James Heappey, UK junior armed forces minister, told the BBC that at least 14 targets were successfully hit.
The flight path of RAF aircraft is likely to overfly Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, or Egypt. Were they informed and permission taken?
According to The Independent,23 UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak phoned Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi on Thursday evening to request clearance for the Typhoons to fly over the eastern Mediterranean. The crew then flew west of Israel before descending the Red Sea and carrying out strikes on the Houthi positions in western Yemen.
The spokesperson for the Cyprus Foreign Ministry, Theodoros Gotsis, emphasised that the Cypriot government maintains ongoing communication with the UK and adheres to the Treaty of Establishment guidelines on the use of British military bases. Gotsis urged an immediate halt to activities endangering free and secure navigation, citing Cyprus's substantial maritime presence in the area. Expressing concern, the Cyprus Peace Council asserted that British involvement in Yemen's airstrikes was transforming Cyprus into a military base. In response, they announced their intention to stage a demonstration outside RAF Akrotiri.
Tactical Degradation vs Operational Resilience24
The Pentagon's initial battle damage assessments indicated that the precision strikes successfully destroyed several targeted Houthi assets, including air-surveillance radars, shore-based command posts, drone maintenance workshops and underground missile storage facilities. However, subsequent intelligence estimates by U.S. Central Command suggested that the Houthis retained nearly 75% of their total strike capacity after the opening waves.
The group's operational resilience stems from several structural factors:
- Mobile and Dispersed Force Posture. Over a decade of fighting the Saudi-led coalition, the Houthis adapted to persistent air threats by decentralising their military infrastructure. They eliminated large, static supply depots and instead distributed their missile inventories across highly mobile, truck-mounted Transporter Erector Launchers (TELs). These systems can be hidden within remote mountain caves, civilian farming networks, or urban warehouses, making them difficult for Western satellite intelligence to detect before launch.
- Underground Infrastructure Networks. The Houthis built extensive underground tunnel networks throughout Yemen's northern volcanic highlands. These fortified facilities house complete assembly lines for drones and missiles, allowing them to construct, maintain and store their systems away from allied air surveillance and precision strikes.
- Continuous Supply Pipelines. Despite international naval embargoes and intercept initiatives, the maritime smuggling networks linking Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force to Yemen remained operational. Critical high-technology components, including miniaturised inertial guidance chips, satellite receivers, solid-fuel rocket boosters and optical tracking lenses, continue to be delivered via small wooden dhow fleets navigating the Arabian Sea littoral.
Immediate Houthi Retaliation and Counter-Strikes
The Houthis' retaliatory action did not take long. The Houthis responded quickly to the air attacks, expanding their target list to include all American and British commercial vessels and military warships operating in the region:
- The USS Laboon Engagement. On 14 January 2024, Houthi coastal units fired an anti-ship cruise missile at the U.S. Navy destroyer USS Laboon operating in the Southern Red Sea. The incoming missile was intercepted and neutralised by a U.S. Navy fighter aircraft before it could strike the vessel.
- The Gibraltar Eagle Strike. On 15 January 2024, the Houthis launched a salvo of three anti-ship ballistic missiles from land batteries. While two missiles fell short into the sea, the third struck the Gibraltar Eagle, a bulk carrier owned by an American corporation and flagged under the Marshall Islands as it transited the Gulf of Aden. The impact caused a localised fire in the cargo hold but did not result in casualties, allowing the vessel to remain seaworthy and exit the danger zone.
- The Genco Picardy Attack. On 17 January 2024, the US-owned bulk carrier Genco Picardy was targeted and struck by a Houthi one-way attack drone in the Gulf of Aden. The vessel sustained moderate hull damage but continued its transit, with an Indian Navy guided-missile destroyer arriving shortly afterwards to provide technical and explosive ordnance disposal assistance.
The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) agency said that a vessel was hit from above by a missile 95 nautical miles southeast of Aden. The British Maritime Security firm Ambrey said three missiles were reportedly launched by the Houthis, with two not reaching the sea and the third striking the bulk carrier. It said that the impact reportedly caused a fire in a hold, but that the bulker remained seaworthy with no injuries on board.
Structural Dilemmas and Strategic Options for Western Policy
The crisis in the Red Sea left the United States and its international partners facing a difficult strategic dilemma. They must find a balance between establishing credible deterrence and preventing unwanted regional escalation. If the Western coalition fails to respond decisively to Houthi attacks, it risks projecting weakness, which could encourage further challenges to maritime transit corridors by other regional states or non-state actors.
Conversely, if the coalition escalates its kinetic campaign too aggressively, it could provoke a broader regional conflict that draws in Iran and destabilises regional energy infrastructure, running counter to the U.S. goal of reducing its military footprint in the Middle East to focus resources on strategic competition with China in the Indo-Pacific region.
To manage this crisis, defence planners have outlined five distinct strategic options, which can be implemented independently or in combination:
Option 1: Expanded Kinetic Degradation of Proxies
This approach involves expanding air operations beyond limited strikes toward a sustained air campaign designed to systematically dismantle the military capabilities of Iran-aligned militias across Iraq, Syria and Yemen. Rather than executing reactive, tit-for-tat strikes after an attack occurs, allied forces would conduct continuous precision strikes over an extended period (typically 5 to 7 days) to destroy fixed infrastructure.
- Target Sets. Focuses on aircraft hangars, drone assembly facilities, ammunition factories, fuel depots, command-and-control bunkers and mobile radar stations.
- Operational Goal. Aims to inflict severe structural damage that reduces the adversary's ability to launch future attacks, followed by systematic battle damage assessments to target remaining assets.
Option 2: Direct Kinetic Engagement Against Iran
This strategy, supported primarily by conservative U.S. lawmakers and retired military officials, calls for direct military strikes against targets inside Iran. Proponents argue that because the Houthis' campaign relies on Iranian funding, intelligence and weapons, the international community must hold Tehran directly accountable to establish effective deterrence.
- Target Sets. Focuses on asset networks linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), such as naval training bases, coastal surveillance sites, missile test facilities and port infrastructure used to export weapons.
- Operational Goal. Designed to signal that support for proxy forces will result in direct costs to Iran's domestic infrastructure, combined with more restrictive energy sanctions to reduce state revenues.
Option 3: Cyber and Information Operations (Non-Kinetic Disruption)
This option uses non-kinetic cyber tools to disrupt the operational frameworks supporting the Houthi campaign.
- Target Sets. Targets the digital infrastructure used by Houthi command networks, including military communication links, automated logistics software and shore-based radar processing systems. It also includes cyber operations against Iranian intelligence vessels, like the Behshad, to disrupt the transfer of tracking data to Yemen.
- Operational Goal. Aims to reduce the accuracy of Houthi missile and drone launches without causing collateral damage or producing the high-profile media images that often enhance the group's political standing.
Option 4: Cyber Counter-Offensives Against Iranian Leadership Elements
This approach focuses cyber operations directly on the leadership and financial structures of the IRGC and the Quds Force inside Iran.
- Target Sets. Targets the secure banking networks, electronic financial records and communications infrastructure used by Iranian military commanders to coordinate regional proxy operations.
- Operational Goal. Designed to disrupt the transfer of funds and logistical support to regional affiliates like the Houthis, creating internal friction within Iran's command structure while maintaining deniability.
Option 5: Reinforcing Regional Alliances and Security Frameworks
This strategy focuses on long-term diplomatic and defensive measures to support allied states in the Middle East—including Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and regional partner forces like Kurdish and Arab factions in Syria.
- Measures. Involves deploying additional air defence assets (such as Patriot and THAAD missile batteries), increasing the frequency of joint military exercises and expanding intelligence-sharing networks.
- Operational Goal. Designed to reassure regional partners of the U.S. commitment to security, improve defensive capabilities against drone and missile swarms and establish a more resilient, integrated regional defence network.
Decoding the Tower 22 Attack in Jordan25
The Tower 22 attack on 28 January 2024 marked a significant escalation in the security crisis that has engulfed the Middle East since the outbreak of the Israel–Hamas war in October 2023. A one-way attack drone struck the small U.S. military outpost known as Tower 22, located in northeastern Jordan near the borders with Syria and Iraq. The attack killed three U.S. Army Reservists and injured more than 40 American service personnel, making it the deadliest strike against U.S. forces in the region since the Gaza conflict began.26 The incident highlighted the increasing effectiveness of inexpensive drone technology in the hands of non-state actors and exposed vulnerabilities in U.S. air-defence systems.
The Red Sea attacks and Tower 22 are not two separate crises but two fronts of one regional escalation, driven by a common sponsor, a common weapon of choice and a common vulnerability in Western air defence. Treating them as a single, networked campaign offers a correct basis for assessing deterrence options and the risk of wider escalation involving Iran.
The Tower 22 attack executed by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq via a low-cost, low-signature Shahed-101 loitering munition highlights the expanding reach of Iran's "Axis of Resistance" — a deliberately decentralised network where formally separate groups (Houthis, Kataib Hezbollah, Lebanese Hezbollah) and their ability to strike U.S. and allied positions beyond traditional battlefields. The Houthis' maritime operations in the Red Sea demonstrated how non-state actors can disrupt global trade and project power through asymmetric means. Tower 22, by contrast, underscored the vulnerability of forward-deployed U.S. forces to precision drone and rocket attacks from Iraqi militias. Iran's network leverages proxies to impose costs, stretch defences and create escalation dilemmas without direct attribution.
Tactically, Tower 22 was struck by a one-way attack drone, the same low-cost asymmetric tool the Houthis have used extensively against shipping in the Red Sea. Both cases expose the same vulnerability — inadequate defences against cheap drones, including the IFF failure that led the Tower 22 drone to be mistaken for a returning U.S. asset. The incident underscored how inexpensive drones and missiles enabled geographically dispersed non-state actors to threaten both military bases and critical maritime routes.
Tower 22 is a small but strategically important installation situated in the Rukban desert region. Located only 10 kilometres from the Iraqi border and near southeastern Syria, the outpost occupies a critical node along regional transportation routes. The outpost primarily supports U.S. military operations directed against the remnants of the Islamic State (ISIS). It serves as a logistics and resupply hub for the nearby Al-Tanf garrison in southeastern Syria, where American personnel cooperate with local Syrian partners in counterterrorism operations. The installation also facilitates the movement of U.S. special operations forces into Syria and supports the training and advising of Jordanian security forces.27
The base originally began as a Jordanian border outpost, but its role expanded after the United States increased its military presence in Syria in 2015. Official acknowledgement of the installation had been limited and Jordan initially denied that the attack had occurred on its territory. Despite its relatively small size, Tower 22 housed approximately 350 U.S. soldiers and airmen, including engineering, aviation, logistics and security personnel. Living conditions at the outpost were austere, with troops accommodated in temporary facilities rather than permanent structures.
The drone strike targeted these temporary living quarters. Many personnel were asleep when the attack occurred. The explosion killed three members of the Georgia-based 718th Engineer Company, assigned to Operation Inherent Resolve, the U.S.-led mission aimed at defeating ISIS. More than forty others sustained injuries ranging from minor wounds to traumatic brain injuries, while several required evacuation abroad for specialised medical treatment.
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for the attack, an umbrella organisation comprising several Iranian-backed Shia militias operating primarily in Iraq and Syria. This coalition includes Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Kataib Sayyed al-Shuhada and Ashab al-Kahf. Because claims are issued collectively, identifying the precise group responsible remains difficult. Nevertheless, suspicion focused particularly on Kataib Hezbollah, which has a history of conducting attacks against U.S. interests in the region.28
Iran rejected accusations of direct involvement, arguing that regional resistance movements operate independently and do not receive operational orders from Tehran. However, the attack reinforced broader concerns regarding Iran's support for armed proxy groups across the Middle East. Since the start of the Gaza conflict, Iranian-backed militias had launched more than 150 attacks against U.S. military facilities in Iraq and Syria. Until the Tower 22 incident, however, these attacks had not resulted in American fatalities.
One of the most significant questions arising from the incident concerned how the drone successfully penetrated U.S. defences. Investigations suggested that the attacking drone approached the base at the same time as an American drone returning from a mission. To avoid the risk of friendly fire, the automated response functions of the base's air-defence systems had reportedly been disabled. The hostile drone was described as flying "very low and very slow," reducing the available warning time and complicating identification efforts. Consequently, personnel at the installation had little opportunity to seek shelter before impact.
Notably, high-end systems like Patriot missile batteries were not deployed at this small outpost due to their high cost per engagement ($3–4 million per missile), which makes them impractical against massed or cheap drone swarms.
Reports indicated that two additional drones targeting nearby locations had been intercepted successfully, suggesting that the overall defensive network was not entirely ineffective. Nevertheless, the Tower 22 attack highlighted the challenges of distinguishing hostile drones from friendly aircraft in congested operational environments. It also underscored the reality that even sophisticated defence systems can fail under certain circumstances.29
The drone's identity attracted considerable attention. Preliminary assessments indicated that it may have been a variant of the Iranian-made Shahed series of one-way attack drones, systems that have also gained notoriety through their use by Russian forces in Ukraine. However, investigators also considered the possibility that the drone had been assembled locally using Iranian designs and components. Regardless of its precise origin, the incident demonstrated how relatively inexpensive unmanned systems can inflict substantial casualties and strategic consequences.
The attack highlighted a broader challenge confronting modern militaries: the growing threat posed by low-cost drones employed by non-state actors. Traditional air-defence systems, designed primarily to counter aircraft and ballistic missiles, are often poorly suited to address large numbers of small unmanned aerial systems. The use of expensive interceptors against inexpensive drones creates a cost-exchange dilemma, whereby defenders incur disproportionately high financial costs to defeat comparatively cheap threats. Consequently, military planners increasingly recognise the need to develop more sustainable counter-drone solutions, including electronic warfare systems, directed-energy weapons and specialised anti-drone capabilities.
This balancing act reflected the complex strategic environment confronting Washington. The United States maintains approximately 2,500 troops in Iraq, where they continue to support counterterrorism operations and train Iraqi security forces. Around 900 personnel remain in Syria, including many stationed at Al-Tanf. In Jordan, roughly 3,000 U.S. troops participate in training and advisory missions. Beyond these deployments, significant American military assets are based in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.
Any military response carried substantial risks. A limited retaliatory strike might fail to deter future attacks, while a more expansive campaign against Iranian-backed militias could trigger wider escalation. Direct strikes against Iranian territory risked provoking a broader regional conflict involving multiple actors.
Domestic political considerations further complicated decision-making. The Biden administration sought to avoid becoming entangled in another prolonged Middle Eastern conflict, particularly during an election year. Public support within the United States for deeper military involvement in Iraq and Syria remained limited.
Regional dynamics added another layer of complexity. Jordan, a close U.S. ally, faced internal sensitivities due to widespread public anger over the Gaza conflict and the country's substantial Palestinian population. An intensified American military response could put domestic pressure on Jordanian leaders. Simultaneously, the United States was already conducting operations against Houthi forces in Yemen, raising concerns about the cumulative risk of a broader confrontation involving Iran and the so-called "Axis of Resistance."
In response to the growing tensions, U.S. officials suggested that any retaliation would likely involve a tiered approach, consisting of multiple actions conducted over time. The objective was to degrade the capabilities of groups responsible for attacking American personnel while avoiding unnecessary escalation.
Ultimately, the Tower 22 attack represented more than an isolated tactical incident. It symbolised the evolving character of modern conflict, in which relatively inexpensive technologies enable non-state actors to challenge powerful militaries in unprecedented ways. The strike exposed operational vulnerabilities, intensified debates regarding the future of U.S. engagement in the Middle East and underscored the growing importance of effective counter-drone strategies. As policymakers weighed their response, the incident served as a reminder that localised confrontations can rapidly acquire broader strategic significance in an increasingly interconnected regional security environment.
Lessons Learned in the Red Sea
The conflict in the Red Sea, primarily contested between the Yemeni Houthi movement and Western naval coalitions led by the United States and the United Kingdom, has fundamentally shifted modern naval doctrine. Armed with a diverse arsenal of low-cost drones, anti-ship cruise missiles and anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), a non-state actor effectively disrupted a global maritime chokepoint and challenged the world's most advanced navies.
US-UK Aerial Attack on Yemen Houthis' Military Infrastructure
U.S.-UK Aerial strikes were precise and discrete with a limited aim. The objective was not to eliminate Yemeni leaders but to target their weapons systems, which threaten shipping. The Pentagon knew that it was impossible to eliminate the Houthis by remote bombing. The mountainous desert terrain and the Houthis' dispersed, decentralised nature ensure that only U.S. ground forces' direct intervention could neutralise the Houthis. Collateral damage was restricted. The Houthis have reported that five soldiers were killed and six were injured in the strikes. They knew the U.S. would not escalate because it does not want to put boots on the ground or further inflame regional tensions. The Houthis can muster about 35,000 uniformed troops at any time.
These raids did not compromise the Houthis' capabilities by striking dozens of radars, arms depots, command centres and missile launch stations. They have a virtually unlimited stock of light arms and access to inexpensive drones, quickly produced and supplied by Iran.
How much Houthi capabilities would have degraded is hard to quantify. Intelligence on Houthis' overall missile inventories is limited. The air strikes were unlikely to significantly impact the Houthis' military capabilities, especially their maritime operations. The Houthis knew the strike would come at any time. They operate several mobile launchers that "shoot and scoot" back into hiding. Targeting them was no small challenge.
The Houthis are used to sustaining heavy airstrikes. They have survived eight years of intense airstrikes by the Saudis and the Emiratis, aided by the Western powers, especially the U.S., with almost 400,000 people dying. They emerged stronger than before. With this experience behind them, they would have dispersed their capabilities to safer places so they could not be easily destroyed. They know that firing from unpredictable locations and constantly moving the weapons around are critical to surviving. This makes eliminating them very challenging.
The country is large enough. The Houthi leadership is well hidden, employing remarkable operational security measures. They display a level of ideological determination and ambition almost unique among Iran's partners in the axis of resistance.
The Houthis are savvier, more prepared and more equipped than they are given credit for. Their recklessness and willingness to escalate in the face of a challenge is significant and often underrated. The Houthis are armed with cheap drones, which the U.S. is capable of fighting with extremely costly missiles. They might be poor, but their war is less expensive than the U.S. They want chaos and the U.S. demands order. The order is challenging and costly.
However, degrading the Houthis' ability to target ships, such as by striking known radar systems and command-and-control nodes, could help reduce their capacity to launch attacks. Two U.S. officials claimed that somewhere between 20 per cent to 30 per cent of the Houthis' offensive capability was destroyed on the first night of the bombing. It is hard to believe these limited strikes would significantly reduce their capacity or will to fight.
The Houthis are vulnerable. They lack advanced intelligence and surveillance tools to provide targeting information for long-range anti-ship systems. They mainly rely on Iran for this capability. They are sensitive about specific targets, such as their leaders, drone and missile storage sites and irreplaceable helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft.
Tactically, the strikes were successful because they destroyed many targets and marginally affected the Houthis' military capacity. Strategically, the operation cannot be considered a success, as the Houthis did not halt their attacks.
There is a question mark over the extent to which the coalition's strikes would alter the Houthis' behaviour. The Houthis have survived a Saudi-led Arab coalition bombing campaign for years. Limited attacks by the U.S. and its Western allies will not crush the Houthis, no matter how painful or surgical the operations are. It is extremely tough to politically defeat or militarily destroy a deeply rooted, capable and resilient non-state actor such as the Houthis.
Stopping the Houthi missile and drone attacks on shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden would be highly resource-intensive for the military. Fusing the intelligence gathered from space-based infrared warning satellites, which detect the locations of anti-ship ballistic missiles and most cruise missile launches, with many other intelligence capabilities and documenting these patterns of operations would be critical to stopping launches before they occur. Doing this live would be a considerable challenge. It would require a far more elaborate surveillance and reconnaissance system, persistently deployed over large swaths of the Yemeni coastline and inland areas, than the existing on-the-ground system. This would need to be integrated with assets on standby, capable of time-sensitive strikes. They would need to hit the launchers before firing.30
Role of Iranian Intelligence-Gathering Vessels and Commercial AIS Manipulation
Role of Iranian intelligence-gathering vessels and commercial Automatic Identification System (AIS) manipulation in providing mid-course target updates to the Houthis.
Intelligence-Gathering Vessels (Behshad, Saviz)
Since 2016, the M/V Saviz and its successor, the M/V Behshad, ostensibly commercial cargo ships, have provided radar coverage (up to 100km range), satellite imagery tasking, signals intelligence (SIGINT) and communications relays to the Houthis.31
Function in Kill-Chain. These ships provide mid-course target updates by tracking merchant traffic and relaying positional data to Houthi shore batteries or mobile launch teams.
Iran and the Houthis routinely disguise speedboats as fishing or smuggling craft. Though their radar range is inferior to the Behshad's, their anonymity lets them loiter closer to shipping lanes and rely on direct visual observation. The kill-chain is not a single platform but a layered and substitutable network, a large-radar mothership for wide-area cueing, supplemented or replaced by small-boat visual confirmation closer to the target.
Operational Effect. This extends the Houthis' effective range, allowing them to signal missile or drone strikes against vessels far beyond their own coastal radar horizon. Without such Iranian platforms, Houthi targeting would be largely blind and opportunistic.32
Automatic Identification System (AIS) Manipulation
Commercial vessels broadcast AIS signals for collision avoidance and traffic management. AIS functions as a usable real-time targeting layer: a vessel's identity, course, speed and often cargo type are broadcast in the clear, allowing any actor with basic receiving equipment to cross-reference a "person of interest" vessel against its declared profile and project an intercept geometry without needing to shadow the target physically. By manipulating AIS data streams, either through spoofing false positions or selectively filtering real ones, Iran can obscure friendly traffic while highlighting adversary vessels.
Impact on Houthis. This manipulation provides the Houthis with a curated target picture. Instead of sifting through raw maritime traffic, they receive actionable coordinates, enabling more precise mid-course guidance for anti-ship missiles or one-way attack drones.
Integration into the Kill-Chain
- Detection. Iranian vessels monitor shipping lanes and identify high-value targets.
- Data Relay. Target coordinates are transmitted via encrypted channels to Houthi operators.
- Engagement. Houthis launch missiles or drones, which receive mid-course updates to refine their trajectories.
- Narrative Layer. Iranian and Houthi media outlets amplify the strike results, reinforcing deterrence and legitimacy narratives.
Comparison Between Houthi–Iran Outsourced Kill-Chain and Conventional Naval ISR-Strike Chain
| Dimension | Houthi–Iran Outsourced Kill-Chain | Conventional Naval ISR-Strike Chain |
|---|---|---|
| ISR Source | Iranian intelligence vessels (Behshad, Saviz), commercial AIS manipulation, proxy data feeds | Integrated naval ISR assets: satellites, maritime patrol aircraft, UAVs and shipborne radar |
| Data Fusion | Fragmented, externally supplied; Iran acts as sensor and fusion hub | Centralized, multi-domain fusion centers with real-time data integration |
| Command & Control | Delegated and encrypted relay from Iranian operators to Houthi launch cells | Hierarchical C2 with tactical autonomy and redundant communication networks |
| Targeting Process | Opportunistic, reliant on Iranian mid-course updates; limited indigenous verification | Continuous tracking, target validation and dynamic retasking through joint operations centres |
| Weapon Guidance | Mid-course corrections via Iranian relay; limited terminal guidance | Full-spectrum guidance (GPS, radar, EO/IR, datalink) with autonomous terminal homing |
| Operational Resilience | Vulnerable—loss of Iranian ISR assets cripples targeting capability | Redundant ISR layers ensure continuity even under electronic or kinetic attack |
| Legal/Doctrinal Framing | Hybrid and deniable; framed as resistance or asymmetric deterrence | Conventional, state-sanctioned, governed by ROE and international maritime law |
Strategic Implications for Modern Naval Warfare
The maritime crisis in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait serves as a clear case study in how the widespread availability of cheap commercial technologies is reshaping modern naval warfare. Over 200 ships have been attacked, with approximately 20% damaged, forcing permanent rerouting of 40% of Asia-Europe trade around the Cape of Good Hope.
The ability of a non-state insurgent group to sustain a de facto naval blockade against international commercial shipping highlights several critical insights for modern military planners.
Non-State Actor Force Projection
The Houthis represent a critical case study in the contemporary context of non-state actors' force projection. Despite the overwhelming presence and power of the U.S. Navy and allies in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, Houthis have managed to disrupt shipping lanes, damage advanced warships and force global commercial rerouting in more than 100 attacks since October 2023.
Understanding how the Houthis increased their conflict potential is crucial for anticipating future conflicts in which insurgent groups, militias, or transnational movements may adopt similar methods.33
The End of High-End Naval Monopolies
The deployment of anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles by the Houthis demonstrated that precision maritime interdiction is no longer the exclusive capability of advanced state navies. The democratisation of precision-guided munitions, paired with the low barrier to entry for uncrewed systems, means that any coastal state or well-funded insurgent group can contest strategic maritime corridors. Cheap technology has enabled non-state actors to challenge blue-water fleets in strategic littoral zones.
Mobile, land-based anti-ship missiles and inexpensive drones are revolutionising naval warfare as aircraft carriers did in the last century. Surface fighting ships, including carriers, can no longer claim absolute dominance over the seas. Unsinkable, shore-based missiles and drones capable of hitting targets hundreds or thousands of miles away can pose as much of a threat as surface warships.34
For 21st-century navies, the conflict serves as an urgent wake-up call to adapt to an era in which sheer numbers, cost efficiency and distributed operations matter just as much as technological sophistication.
The Asymmetric Cost Challenge
The reliance on multi-million-dollar air defence interceptors to counter low-cost autonomous drones creates an unsustainable economic imbalance for defending forces.
The cost-exchange dilemma arises when an attacker employs inexpensive weapons that force a defender to respond with much more costly systems. In the context of modern drone warfare, this means that cheap drones can impose disproportionate financial burdens on advanced militaries. The Houthis successfully weaponised cheap, readily available systems.
The Iranian-designed Shahed-136 loitering munition, used extensively by Russia in Ukraine and supplied to Iranian proxies, costs roughly $10,000 to $20,000 per unit, while their simplified cruise missiles rarely exceed $100,000. Similarly, many commercially adapted quadcopters used for reconnaissance or attacks may cost only a few thousand dollars.
The U.S. Navy achieved near-flawless tactical interception against Houthi drones and anti-ship missiles by using highly sophisticated, multi-million-dollar air defence interceptors, such as the Standard Missile-2 (SM-2) at $2.1M, SM-6 at $5.3M, SM-3 up to $28.7M, SM-6 and Aster-15/30 missiles. A Patriot PAC-3 interceptor costs approximately US$4–5 million per missile. Even the more economical AIM-9X Sidewinder costs over US$400,000 per shot.
The U.S. Navy's surface combatants, primarily Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers, were subjected to persistent, layered attacks involving unmanned aerial systems (UAS), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs).
While the Navy achieved tactical perfection, ensuring that no American warships were struck during the campaign, the cost of this defence was alarming.
Naval doctrine traditionally dictates launching two interceptors to defeat a single incoming threat to guarantee a high probability of kill. To neutralise approximately 380 Houthi threats over a 15-month period, the Navy expended a massive quantity of advanced munitions. This included 120 SM-2 missiles (costing approximately $2.1 million each), 80 SM-6 missiles (costing roughly $5.3 million each) and 20 highly advanced Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSM) and SM-3 interceptors, with the SM-3 variants costing between $9.6 million and nearly $28.7 million per unit.35
The expenditure of multi-million-dollar interceptors against drones that cost a fraction of that amount created an untenable cost-exchange ratio. This dynamic forces commanders into uncomfortable risk calculations: maintaining a high state of defence rapidly depletes finite magazines, leaving the fleet vulnerable to subsequent, higher-tier threats. Observers noted that relying on expensive assets to eliminate cheap threats raises profound questions about the sustainability of such tactics in a conflict against a peer adversary with vastly larger missile inventories.36
The lesson is clear: mass matters, cost can be decisive and "good enough" precision delivered at scale can generate significant operational advantages over highly exquisite, but numerically limited, systems.
Inverting the Cost Curve: From Exquisite Defence to Attritable Mass
The 190:1 cost-exchange ratio (CER), in which defenders expend multi-million-dollar interceptors against $20,000 drones, has fundamentally shattered traditional naval doctrine, transforming "tactical success" into "strategic defeat" through magazine exhaustion. This disparity enables adversaries to pursue an attritional strategy: launching large numbers of low-cost drones to deplete expensive interceptor stocks and strain defence budgets.
Cost-Effectiveness Trumps Platform Capabilities. The cost-effectiveness has become more important than individual platform capabilities. Houthi operations demonstrate how sustained economic pressure can achieve strategic objectives without decisive military victory. Attacks that don't succeed force opponents to use more expensive defensive weapons, creating attritional economic pressure.37
The conflict proved that a non-state actor can impose a continuous, financially exhausting defensive posture on superpower nations. Operating at a disadvantageous cost-per-kill ratio is strategically unsustainable over multi-year deployments, forcing militaries to fast-track the development of lower-cost counter-drone solutions, including electronic warfare systems, anti-drone guns and directed-energy weapons such as lasers and high-power microwave systems.
The "Magazine Depth" Dilemma. Warships possess a finite number of Vertical Launch System (VLS) cells. In high-intensity, prolonged littoral engagement, a destroyer can rapidly exhaust its primary interceptors. For rearming VLS cells, a vessel must return to a specialised port, as at-sea VLS replenishment remains functionally unfeasible. Destroyers, exhausted of interceptors, were forced to withdraw thousands of miles to ports like Gibraltar for reloading.
A ship running low on ammunition becomes highly vulnerable. The threat of rapid depletion of missile tubes during coordinated swarm attacks is a significant vulnerability. Modern navies must re-evaluate their replenishment logistics and design future surface combatants with adaptable, reloadable or high-capacity vertical launch systems.38
The Need for Agile Force Structures. Deploying large, expensive destroyers to counter small, distributed littoral threats overstretches fleet resources and creates operational inefficiencies. Future naval force structures must achieve a better balance between large blue-water capital ships and smaller, agile and modular littoral platforms optimised for low-intensity security missions.
The First Combat Baptism of Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs). For decades, naval theorists debated the viability of anti-ship ballistic missiles, viewing them primarily as high-end carrier-killer concepts developed by major militaries such as China. The Red Sea conflict marked the first time ASBMs were deployed in active combat—and an irregular militia fired them.
The Houthis demonstrated that mobile, land-based ASBMs utilising simplified commercial optical and radar seekers pose a severe multi-vector threat. Because ballistic missiles approach targets from a steep, high-altitude trajectory at extreme speeds, they severely compress a warship's reaction and engagement window. The proliferation of these weapons proves that even non-state actors can now threaten capital naval vessels without fielding a conventional air force or navy.
Multi-Vector Saturating Attacks. The Houthis regularly launched synchronised, multi-vector strikes combining slow-moving drones, low-altitude sea-skimming cruise missiles and high-altitude ASBMs simultaneously. These tactics were explicitly designed to oversaturate a warship's Aegis or combat management radar systems.
The Houthis launched explosive-laden USVs against commercial and naval shipping. The U.S. Navy adapted its defensive posture, frequently calling upon MH-60S/R Sea Hawk helicopters armed with Hellfire missiles to engage and destroy these small boats before they could impact the hull of a destroyer. The lesson is that traditional naval architecture must increasingly incorporate close-in, multi-domain defences against swarming surface threats.39
Limits of Land-Based Deterrence and Strike Degradation. Naval power applied from the sea has distinct limitations when attempting to permanently eliminate mobile threats ashore. Despite U.S. and British air/missile strikes against 60 targets in 16 locations in January 2024, followed by additional attacks, Houthi attacks persist.40
Despite months of pre-emptive and retaliatory precision strikes by U.S. and UK carrier-based aircraft and Tomahawk land-attack missiles targeting Houthi radar installations, command centres and launch sites, the group maintained its operational capability. The Houthis capitalised on survivability through simplicity:
- Utilising rugged geographic terrain like caves and valleys.
- Relying on highly mobile, truck-mounted launch platforms.
- Operating under strict emission control (EMCON), revealing their positions only moments before firing.
Naval powers find their strength dissipates quickly when attempting to obtain strategic effects ashore, even when the adversary lacks modern air-defence networks and naval powers possess air supremacy. This forces navies to employ what Corbett labelled "direct territorial attacks," which proves strategically ineffective.41
The lesson is clear: unless a military commits to a high-risk, large-scale ground intervention, purely standoff aerial bombardment cannot completely neutralise a deeply entrenched, distributed adversary.
Limits of Remote Airpower. The US-UK strike campaign underscores that remote precision air strikes alone are often insufficient to completely dismantle a decentralised, mobile and well-entrenched asymmetric adversary. Air campaigns can degrade an opponent's capabilities but rarely eliminate the underlying logistical pipelines, political drivers or strategic motivations that sustain a long-term campaign.
Adaptability in Battlefield Innovation. One key lesson from Navy engagements with Houthi missiles and drones is the need to be adaptable on the battlefield and use existing systems differently. Examples include using Hellfire missiles against unmanned surface vehicles in air-to-air configurations and aviation platforms shooting down UAVs.42
Conventional Platforms Defeating Unmanned Platforms. Conventional platforms are effectively defeating unmanned platforms. Navy weapons are working as designed and personnel know how to use them properly, building confidence in integrating capabilities with the Air Force and allies.43
For example, several 127 mm shells from destroyer guns actually shot down Houthi drones, demonstrating the unexpected effectiveness of traditional gun systems against unmanned threats.
Swarm Attacks and Electronic Disruption. Houthi tactics demonstrate a change in naval warfare for smaller belligerents from ship-to-ship battles to swarm attacks, electronic disruption and attritional harassment. They use unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) that are frequently disguised as fishing vessels, made of wood or fibreglass, making them hard to detect.
USVs are used in combination with missiles to increase offensive intensity. The Houthis have taken advantage of weaknesses in advanced naval platforms using cheap drones, precision-guided missiles and unmanned surface vehicles.
Fleet Size and Crew Stress. Operations underscore the stress of risking a navy's finite number of warships and crews. Combat is stressful; replacements are necessary. Crews need time to decompress and warships need time to be repaired and rearmed. The commander of HMS Diamond explained: "The levels of concentration [are] exhausting, long periods of nothing much happening and then a few really, really short intense spikes of your life being at risk".44
The lesson is stark: naval powers require numbers to flex globally and sustain operations amid persistent threats.
Closing the Kill Chain: Rapid Iteration of Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs). In the modern information environment, software dominance is as critical as hardware capability. During the Red Sea operations, the U.S. Navy's Information Warfare (IW) community achieved a significant strategic advantage by accelerating the feedback loop and rapidly iterating Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs).45
The U.S. Navy established a functional "reach-back" apparatus centred around the Naval Information Warfighting Development Centre (NIWDC) and the Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Centre. Combat data regarding Houthi drone flight algorithms, missile trajectories, radar cross-sections, software updates and engagement protocols recorded by deployed destroyers was instantly transmitted back to the fleet in near real-time.46
Analysing this data allowed the U.S. Navy to refine its non-kinetic, electronic warfare "soft kill" capabilities, utilising directed energy and jamming to neutralise threats without expending kinetic interceptors.
Training and Crew Quality Remain Paramount. The U.S. Navy analysed its Red Sea campaign and found that successes resulted from creating well-trained crews, conducting realistic live-fire training exercises and paying attention to the smallest details of training and maintaining the skills of officers and crew.
No Definitive Military Solution Exists. It is unlikely that the U.S. Navy, joined by European allies, can devise a definitive military solution to eliminate Houthi missile and drone attacks. A continuing naval stalemate with Houthis is not a win. Seeing no real military fix, Washington has begun exploring diplomatic solutions, even reaching out to Tehran for backchannel negotiations.48
Maritime Security Doctrine Updates Required. Maritime security doctrines should prioritise dealing with asymmetrical threats. Governments in the region should work together to create an adaptable maritime security system that can handle unusual technologies and tactics utilised by non-state actors.
States need to add more tools to defensive toolkits, especially ways to stop drone assaults on land and at sea. Iran's ongoing assistance has been very important, demonstrating how outside actors can empower non-state actors with greater asymmetrical power.49
Merchant Ship Vulnerability vs Surprising Resiliency. The Red Sea conflict provided invaluable empirical data regarding how modern commercial vessels absorb damage from missile and drone strikes. Merchant ships proved surprisingly resilient against small payload drones and light cruise missiles, often sustaining damage but remaining afloat. The introduction of explosive-laden Uncrewed Surface Vessels (USVs) changed the equation. Waterline impacts from kamikaze sea drones pose a significantly greater structural threat to shipping than aerial strikes, forcing naval escorts to shift their defensive focus downward toward the water's surface.
Coalition Coordination Difficulties. Coalition partners conduct different missions in the same region under different rules of engagement, complicating operations. While the United States and Britain conducted strikes on land targets in Yemen, several EU members (France, Italy, Spain) decided to remain entirely defensive under Operation Aspides, worried that strikes ashore are escalatory. This makes operations at sea more difficult despite similar objectives.50
Fragmented International Coalitions and the Weaponisation of Trade. The geopolitical execution of the Red Sea conflict revealed a fragmented international security environment. Rather than a unified global response to protect the freedom of navigation, nations fractured along political fault lines. While the U.S. led Operation Prosperity Guardian, European nations preferred independent command under Operation Aspides and regional powers like India conducted distinct, non-coalition operations (Operation Sankalp) to preserve tactical autonomy.
By selectively targeting vessels based on their corporate registration, destination ports or geopolitical alliances, the Houthis effectively weaponised global supply chains. This selective blockading strategy demonstrated that non-state actors can alter global maritime routes, force costly diversions around the Cape of Good Hope and impose immense economic pressure on specific target nations without enforcing a traditional, physical naval blockade.
As the commercial dual-use technologies continue to advance and diffuse globally, the asymmetric strategies refined by the Houthis in the Red Sea are highly likely to be adopted by other non-state actors and militant insurgencies across other strategic maritime chokepoints—such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Malacca Strait or the Taiwan Strait. The challenges for the West will remain, as debate continues over how modern navies can adapt to land-based drones and anti-ship missiles.
International navies and defence planners must adapt their doctrines, weapon systems and force designs to meet these challenges, or risk seeing long-standing principles of global sea control and free commerce increasingly contested.
Information Operations: Legitimacy Through Resistance Narratives
The Houthi-Iranian axis transformed Red Sea maritime disruption into a sophisticated Information Operation (IO), framing piracy as a legally and spiritually sanctioned act of "maritime resistance" against Western hegemony. This strategy relied on dual-layered strategic messaging targeting regional and domestic audiences, amplified by the Iranian state apparatus.
Houthi Dual-Layered Messaging. The Houthis projected themselves to the regional and global Muslim audiences as the lone vanguard willing to take military risks for Palestine, bypassing the Sunni-Shia divide. They sanitised kinetic shipping strikes as humanitarian interventions and lawful detentions to halt genocide, embedding these actions within a religious narrative of prophetic duty via media channels.
The Houthis branded every strike, regardless of the target's actual nationality, as solidarity with Gaza. CENTCOM's insistence that the attacks were indiscriminate missed the point. The Houthis were contesting moral standing with a regional audience, not technical accuracy with the U.S. A non-state actor with no UN seat or full territorial control achieved outsized recognition as a principal belligerent.
Every missile launch produced slick multimedia propaganda. When the U.S. and UK responded with degradation strikes, the Houthis weaponised the attacks to stage massive rallies. Within this matrix, kinetic retaliation from a global superpower did not deter the Houthis. In its place, it served as the ultimate validation of their domestic and regional legitimacy.
For the domestic Yemeni audience, the confrontation served to divert deep public anger over economic collapse and governance failures toward an existential nationalist defence. By engaging the U.S., the Houthis revived Yemen's historical identity as a "graveyard of empires," reframing a civil war faction as sovereign defenders against imperialism.
Iranian Amplification and the IO Loop. Iran acted as the strategic hub, providing critical ISR data while maintaining plausible deniability. Iran's information operations ensured that maritime disruption resonated beyond the battlefield and magnified the perception of coalition vulnerability. Iran leveraged through satellite channels, social media, proxy outlets, state media and diplomatic channels to preserve the image of Houthi independence, protecting itself from retaliation while weaponising Global South grievances against Western double standards.
Deterrence Failure and the Escalation Imperative
As per the theory of deterrence, two ways deterrence can be achieved: deterrence by denial or deterrence by punishment. A defender aims to persuade an adversary that the costs of an action will vastly outweigh its benefits, typically through either deterrence by denial (making the attack fail) or deterrence by punishment (inflicting severe costs in retaliation).
The coalition's posture remained denial-based, focused on preventing damage rather than punishing aggression. Defensive escort is a denial strategy aimed at the attack, not a punishment strategy aimed at the attacker. The Houthis interpreted this restraint as tolerance. Each successful strike or near miss reinforced their narrative of defiance and survivability. Consequently, deterrence by denial failed to generate psychological dissuasion, compelling the coalition to climb the escalation ladder.
The coalition was forced to transition from deterrence by denial to deterrence by punishment. Climbing the escalation ladder to active degradation strikes, targeting launch sites, radar installations, command centres and munitions depots inside Yemen, was the only remaining mechanism to alter that calculus directly. By shifting the risk to the Houthis' organic military infrastructure, the coalition sought to forcibly diminish their capacity to strike while introducing a tangible cost to their continued defiance.
The shift from defensive escort operations to offensive degradation strikes against the Houthis represents a classic case of deterrence failure in asymmetric conflict.
Conclusion
The Houthi attacks in the Red Sea represent far more than a temporary disruption to international shipping. They illustrate how relatively weak non-state actors can exploit emerging technologies, external support networks and favourable geography to challenge the military and economic interests of far more powerful states. The Houthis' ability to threaten one of the world's most important maritime chokepoints without a conventional navy demonstrates that the traditional relationship between military power and strategic effect is undergoing profound change.
The Red Sea crisis has highlighted the growing effectiveness of low-cost, commercially available technologies such as drones, anti-ship missiles, unmanned surface vessels and networked targeting systems. The asymmetry in costs is striking: weapons that may cost only thousands of dollars can compel the deployment of some of the most sophisticated and expensive naval platforms ever built. This creates a strategic dilemma for conventional militaries, whose force structures and doctrines were largely designed to confront state adversaries rather than agile, dispersed and technologically adaptive non-state actors.
The Houthis have also demonstrated the importance of political will, strategic patience and calibrated escalation. Despite repeated warnings and military strikes by the United States and the United Kingdom, they have shown a high tolerance for punishment and an ability to sustain operations. Their actions suggest that deterrence through punishment may be ineffective against ideologically motivated groups that derive domestic legitimacy and international visibility from confronting stronger opponents. In such circumstances, military superiority alone may be insufficient to secure desired political outcomes.
For global trade, the implications are equally significant. The disruption of maritime traffic through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait has exposed the vulnerabilities of an interconnected global economy that relies heavily on a few critical sea lines of communication. Even temporary interruptions can generate cascading effects on shipping costs, insurance premiums, supply chains and energy markets. The episode serves as a reminder that economic globalisation remains dependent on maritime security and freedom of navigation.
From a military perspective, the Red Sea crisis raises important questions regarding future force structures, operational concepts and resource allocation. Large surface combatants will remain indispensable instruments of national power, but they may require complementary capabilities better suited to contested littoral environments characterised by persistent drone threats and distributed attacks. A greater emphasis on layered air and missile defence, unmanned systems, intelligence fusion and cost-effective counter-drone technologies is likely to shape future naval modernisation efforts.
Ultimately, the Houthi campaign underscores a broader reality of twenty-first-century conflict: the barriers to acquiring meaningful military capabilities have fallen dramatically. Emerging technologies are spreading rapidly beyond state control, empowering smaller actors to impose disproportionate costs on their adversaries. The monopoly once enjoyed by powerful states over precision strike, surveillance and long-range effects is steadily eroding.
The Red Sea may therefore be viewed not merely as a regional crisis but as a preview of future warfare. The challenge facing military planners and policymakers is not only how to respond to the current threat posed by the Houthis, but how to adapt to an era in which inexpensive technologies, non-state actors and hybrid methods of warfare increasingly redefine the nature of conflict. Those who recognise and adapt to these changing realities will retain strategic advantage; those who do not risk preparing for the wars of the past while confronting the threats of the future.
Subsequent Developments: Operation Rough Rider and the 2026 Iran Crisis
2025 U.S.-Houthi ceasefire (Operation Rough Rider). On 6 May 2025, Trump announced an Oman-brokered ceasefire, under which neither side would target the other, including vessels, in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait.51
The Rough Rider agreement was narrow and asymmetric. The ceasefire was limited in scope. The Houthis agreed to stop attacking U.S. vessels and interests, but they explicitly stated that the arrangement did not apply to Israel or to their broader regional agenda. It said nothing about non-US, non-Israeli-linked shipping.
In the Iran-Israel-U.S. confrontation (2026), the Houthis did not directly open a new front in Hormuz. Still, they served as a strategic pressure valve, forcing U.S. planners to split resources across two maritime chokepoints in the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz. They threatened to abandon the ceasefire if the U.S. directly entered the war against Iran and continued missile launches against Israel.52
Initially, the Houthis held back, puzzling analysts given their history. That restraint ended on 28 March 2026, when they resumed missile strikes on Israel, explicitly tying their actions to the wider war.53 By June, with Hormuz still substantially blockaded, the group threatened to revive direct attacks on Red Sea shipping — raising the prospect of both chokepoints being contested simultaneously. The renewed Houthi operations in the Red Sea could reinforce pressure on international shipping while Iran exerts influence in Hormuz.
The Linkage Between Houthi Red Sea Operations and Iran's Actions in the Strait of Hormuz
The 2026 Iran war validated this paper's central thesis: that low-cost, asymmetric maritime disruption by an Iran-aligned non-state actor can impose strategic costs on major powers disproportionate to its material strength without possessing conventional naval capabilities.
When Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz following the February 2026 strikes, the parallel was immediate. Hormuz carries roughly a fifth of the world's seaborne oil; Bab al-Mandeb roughly a tenth of global trade.54 Iran's mining and harassment of shipping in the Gulf were the state-level analogue of what the Houthis had already demonstrated at the sub-state level — that chokepoint denial, rather than traditional fleet-on-fleet engagements, is now a primary instrument of coercion.
The Houthi campaign of 2023 was an early manifestation of a new era of maritime warfare, in which drones, missiles, proxy forces and strategic chokepoints can generate global economic and geopolitical effects disproportionate to the resources employed. The linkage between Bab el-Mandeb and Hormuz underscores how future conflicts may be fought across interconnected maritime spaces, where disruption of trade and energy flows becomes a central instrument of state and proxy power.
In a conflict involving Iran, the Strait of Hormuz presents a mirror-image vulnerability. Iran's regular forces and proxy networks could replicate the Red Sea playbook to disrupt global energy flows, using a swarm of fast-attack craft, sea mines, UAVs, cruise/anti-ship missiles and selective interdiction of commercial shipping to threaten traffic and force rerouting. The Red Sea precedent shows that coalition responses — escorts, strike-and-clear operations and rules-of-engagement dilemmas — will face similar operational friction in Hormuz: high collision among naval, air and space domains; contested maritime ISR; and legal-political constraints on offensive action near sovereign waters.55
The operational parallels are striking: both theatres showcased the fusion of irregular tactics with precision technology, the leveraging of geography to offset conventional inferiority and the deliberate targeting of economic lifelines to achieve political leverage.
While the 2025 ceasefire under Operation Rough Rider curtailed direct attacks on U.S. vessels, the Houthis retained the capacity to strike third-party shipping, employ naval mines and regenerate drone and missile arsenals. This resilience mirrored Iran's own approach in Hormuz, where ballistic and cruise missiles, fast boats and mines were deployed systematically to deter U.S. carrier groups and disrupt global energy flows.56
Both actors leveraged proxies and irregular tactics to impose disproportionate costs on conventional navies. The Houthis' continued presence in the Red Sea tied down U.S. resources, while Iran integrated its proxies into a layered anti-access/area denial strategy in Hormuz. In both theatres, information operations amplified the military effect: Houthis framed their survival as resistance, while Iran cast Hormuz disruptions as a sovereign defence. The common thread was sustainability—strikes or sanctions neutralised neither force and both demonstrated the ability to rebound quickly.
The continuity between these campaigns underscores a central risk: localised ceasefires or tactical pauses do not eliminate hybrid maritime threats when state sponsors sustain them. Instead, the Red Sea and Hormuz became interconnected chokepoints, forcing adversaries to divide attention and resources. This dual pressure highlights the evolving nature of maritime security, where insurgency and statecraft converge to contest control of the global commons.
The continuity between Houthi operations and Iranian strategy underscores a central lesson of modern warfare: control of the commons is no longer guaranteed by conventional fleets alone. Instead, it is contested through layered, hybrid approaches that blur the line between insurgency and statecraft, redefining maritime security in the 21st century. Strategists must therefore treat Houthi operations not as isolated irregularities but as a template for how state-proxy blends can weaponise choke points like Hormuz, shaping force posture, coalition burden-sharing and the rules governing maritime protection in any Iran-centric contingency.
Post Script
The July 2026 Houthi escalation marks the most serious challenge to Red Sea maritime security since the attacks on international shipping began in late 2023. By combining a declared maritime blockade with precision strikes against Saudi oil infrastructure, the Houthis have transformed the Bab el-Mandeb Strait into one of the world's most dangerous geopolitical flashpoints.
A truce agreed in 2022 between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia collapsed in July 2026. Tensions spiked on 13 July when Saudi-backed forces struck the runway at Sanaa International Airport to prevent an Iranian diplomatic transport from landing. This collapsed the Houthi-Saudi dรฉtente and produced a rapid escalation ladder.
The Houthis announced on 20 July a maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia, warning that Saudi-linked vessels transiting the strategic waterway would be targeted. Shortly afterwards, the group reinforced the warning by emailing shipping companies, directing them not to load or unload cargo at Saudi ports or risk being attacked "in any location" within its operational reach.
The maritime blockade threatens to disrupt global energy markets by targeting Saudi Arabia's principal Red Sea export route. Oil prices pushed past $100 a barrel on Thursday for the first time since May, while the cost of shipping insurance through the southern Red Sea doubled for some companies.
The Houthis said they attacked two tankers, the Encelia and Layla, saying the vessels had violated a naval blockade imposed by the group on Saudi Arabia in the Red Sea. The Houthis said they targeted the tankers with a number of ballistic and cruise missiles as well as drones.57
A Yemeni security source said that Saudi Arabia targeted a naval base in Hodeida and a military camp on Kamaran island on 24 July 2026. The Houthis said the attacks were a "dangerous escalation" and vowed that "these recent crimes will not go unanswered."58
Houthi forces launched attacks on facilities belonging to Saudi state oil giant Aramco in the coastal cities of Jizan and Yanbu, two of Saudi Arabia's most strategically important oil facilities on the Red Sea on 26 July 2026. Reuters reported that air defence systems in Saudi Arabia intercepted two ballistic missiles from Yemen. Missiles aimed at Yanbu were intercepted by a Patriot battery operated by Greek forces stationed in Saudi Arabia under a bilateral arrangement. A video circulating on social media showed dark clouds rising above a refinery in Jizan belonging to Aramco, the Saudi oil giant.
The escalating conflict has raised fears that the Houthis could block the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, which connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. If both the Bab al-Mandeb and Hormuz straits were blocked, the resulting supply chain crisis would cause major economic damage across the world.
Strategic Significance of Yanbu. The selection of Yanbu as a target was strategically significant. Yanbu is the critical vulnerability for Saudi Arabia. With Hormuz shut, Yanbu became Saudi Arabia's only functioning crude-export corridor, handling roughly 92% of seaborne crude exports in June. Saudi Arabia rerouted its entire export posture around the Red Sea. A sustained, effective interdiction of Yanbu is not a marginal irritant; it removes Saudi Arabia's last sea-based export outlet. Combined with Hormuz closure, it could block roughly a quarter of world oil and gas supply.
The Houthi maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia represents more than another episode in Yemen's civil war. It reflects the transformation of the Red Sea into a central theatre of geopolitical competition where non-state actors can influence global energy markets and international trade. The Houthis are using a classic asymmetric pattern: they cannot defeat Saudi Arabia or its partners militarily in open combat. Alternatively, they seek to impose political and economic costs through threat amplification.
Even if the blockade is never fully enforced, its existence reshapes the regional security environment, compels military and commercial adaptation and reinforces the reality that control of maritime chokepoints has become one of the defining strategic contests of contemporary geopolitics.
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait has once again proven to be a volatile global flashpoint. Without urgent and sustained diplomatic intervention to address geopolitical grievances and secure vital maritime corridors, the region risks sliding into a broader, more destructive conflict with severe worldwide economic consequences.59
The July 2026 Houthi blockade and attacks on Saudi oil facilities represent a dangerous escalation that transcends the boundaries of the Yemeni civil war, striking directly at the heart of global trade and energy security. With two of the world's most critical maritime passages now under threat, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, Arabic for "Gate of Tears", has lived up to its name.
Endnotes
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- Maj Gen P K Mallick, VSM (Retd), Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh: Geopolitical Implications, VIF Monograph, March 2021. indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com ↑
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- Maj Gen P K Mallick, VSM (Retd), Social Media in Violent Conflicts – Recent Examples, Vivekananda International Foundation, VIF Brief, August 2021. indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com ↑
- Maj Gen P K Mallick, VSM (Retd), "Importance of Bab el-Mandeb Strait," Financial Express, 05 January 2024. financialexpress.com ↑
- "Yemen: Houthis' Militarized Islands are Stoplights in the Red Sea," ISPI, 24 November 2023. ispionline.it ↑
- Maj Gen P K Mallick, VSM (Retd), "The Houthis, A Deep Dive into Their Arsenal and Diverse Dimensions of Houthi Power," Financial Express, 15 January 2024. financialexpress.com ↑
- Maj Gen P K Mallick, VSM (Retd), "Navigating Troubled Waters: Understanding the Impact of Houthi Attacks (Part II)," Financial Express, 13 January 2024. financialexpress.com ↑
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- Aya Batrawy, "Drone attack in Abu Dhabi claimed by Yemen's rebels kills 3," The Associated Press, 18 January 2022. apnews.com ↑
- Can Kasapoฤlu, "MENA Defense Intelligence Digest | Assessing and Addressing the Houthi Threat," Hudson Institute, 4 January 2024. hudson.org ↑
- Betul Yuruk, "Transfer begins of 1.1 million barrels of oil from decaying Yemen tanker to avert catastrophic leak: UN," Anadolu Agency, 25 July 2023. aa.com.tr ↑
- Alexander Clarkson, "The Houthis Mean Business in the Red Sea," World Politics Review, 3 January 2024. worldpoliticsreview.com ↑
- Maj Gen P K Mallick, VSM (Retd), "Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea and the Shifting Paradigms of Modern Warfare," Financial Express, 04 January 2024. financialexpress.com ↑
- "Timeline: Houthi Attacks," Wilson Center, 26 July 2024. wilsoncenter.org ↑
- Benoit Faucon, "Iranian Spy Ship Helps Houthis Direct Attacks on Red Sea Vessels," Livemint, 23 December 2023. livemint.com ↑
- Maj Gen P K Mallick, VSM (Retd), "Implications of the Houthis Attacks on Global Maritime Trade," Financial Express, 08 January 2024. financialexpress.com ↑
- "What Red Sea Disruption Means for Global Supply Chains," Geopolitical Futures, 4 January 2024. geopoliticalfutures.com ↑
- Christopher J. McMahon, "Maritime Trade Warfare," Naval War College Review, Vol. 70, No. 3 (2017). digital-commons.usnwc.edu ↑
- United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the Convention. un.org ↑
- Maj Gen P K Mallick, VSM (Retd), "The day after: A critical analysis of the US-UK strikes against Houthi rebels in Yemen and its repercussions (Part I)," Financial Express, 17 January 2024. financialexpress.com ↑
- Maj Gen P K Mallick, VSM (Retd), "The Day After: A Critical Analysis of the US-UK Strikes Against Houthi Rebels in Yemen and its Repercussions (Part II)," Financial Express, 18 January 2024. financialexpress.com ↑
- Tom Watling & Alisha Rahaman Sarkar, "Mapped: How the US and UK attacks on Houthi rebels took place and what weapons were used?" The Independent, 16 January 2024. independent.co.uk ↑
- Maj Gen P K Mallick, VSM (Retd), "Navigating the Fallout of US-UK Strikes on Yemen's Houthis: Assessing the Implications," Financial Express, 22 January 2024. financialexpress.com ↑
- Maj Gen P K Mallick, VSM (Retd), "Decoding the Tower 22 Attack in Jordan: Challenges and Future Perspectives — Part I," Financial Express, 02 February 2024. financialexpress.com ↑
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- "The Guardian view on strikes on the Houthis: action to contain this crisis might fuel it," The Guardian, 12 January 2024. theguardian.com ↑
- Sam Cranny-Evans & Dr Sidharth Kaushal, "Securing the Red Sea: How Can Houthi Maritime Strikes be Countered?" RUSI, 10 January 2024. rusi.org ↑
- Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, "Targeting Iranian Spy Ships," Lieber Institute, United States Military Academy, 24 March 2025. lieber.westpoint.edu ↑
- Sadia Sulaiman, "Non-State Actors with Tech and Tactics: A Case Study of Houthis in Yemen," Rabdan Security and Defence Institute, 28 November 2025. rsdi.ae ↑
- Sadia Sulaiman, "Non-State Actors with Tech and Tactics: A Case Study of Houthis in Yemen," Rabdan Security and Defence Institute, 28 November 2025. rsdi.ae ↑
- Ramon Marks, "Houthi Red Sea Attacks Carry Hard Lessons for the West," National Interest, 19 March 2024. nationalinterest.org ↑
- Ronins Grips, "Lessons from Red Sea Combat for Indo-Pacific Strategy," 27 April 2026. ↑
- "What the Navy is learning from its fight in the Red Sea," Navy Times. navytimes.com ↑
- Sadia Sulaiman, "Non-State Actors with Tech and Tactics: A Case Study of Houthis in Yemen," Rabdan Security and Defence Institute, 28 November 2025. rsdi.ae ↑
- Mike Fredenburg, "US missile depletion from Houthi, Israel conflicts may shock you," Responsible Statecraft, 07 August 2025. responsiblestatecraft.org ↑
- "CNO Franchetti: 'We're continuing to learn' countering drones, missiles in the Red Sea." nationalsecuritymedia.gwu.edu ↑
- Kevin D. McCranie, "Lessons from the Red Sea: Considerations for Naval Strategy in the 21st Century," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 150/5/1,455, May 2024. usni.org ↑
- Ibid. ↑
- Mark Pomerleau, "CNO Franchetti: 'We're continuing to learn' countering drones, missiles in the Red Sea," DefenseScoop, 02 October 2024. defensescoop.com ↑
- Ibid. ↑
- Sadia Sulaiman, "Non-State Actors with Tech and Tactics: A Case Study of Houthis in Yemen," Rabdan Security and Defence Institute, 28 November 2025. rsdi.ae ↑
- Kevin D. McCranie, "Lessons from the Red Sea: Considerations for Naval Strategy in the 21st Century," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 150/5/1,455, May 2024. usni.org ↑
- Joshua Tallis, "How the Biden Administration Won Tactically but Failed Strategically in the Red Sea," War on the Rocks, 2 April 2025. warontherocks.com ↑
- "US Navy updating tactics for sensors, weapons based on Houthi attacks," Defense News. defensenews.com ↑
- Ramon Marks, "Houthi Red Sea Attacks Carry Hard Lessons for the West," National Interest, 19 March 2024. nationalinterest.org ↑
- Sadia Sulaiman, "Non-State Actors with Tech and Tactics: A Case Study of Houthis in Yemen," Rabdan Security and Defence Institute, 28 November 2025. rsdi.ae ↑
- Kevin D. McCranie, "Lessons from the Red Sea: Considerations for Naval Strategy in the 21st Century," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 150/5/1,455, May 2024. usni.org ↑
- Bridget Toomey, "President Trump announces ceasefire between US and Houthis," FDD's Long War Journal, 07 May 2025. fdd.org ↑
- Gregory Johnsen, "Feature Commentary: An Assessment of Operation Rough Rider," CTC Sentinel, Vol. 18, Issue 6, June 2025. ctc.westpoint.edu ↑
- "Houthis join Iran war fight, threatening Red Sea shipping amid Hormuz closure," Euronews, 8 June 2026. euronews.com ↑
- "2026 Iran War," Britannica; "2026 Strait of Hormuz Crisis," accessed June 2026. britannica.com ↑
- Ria Reddy et al., "Iran Update Special Report," Institute for the Study of War, 08 June 2026. understandingwar.org ↑
- Bridget Toomey, "President Trump announces ceasefire between US and Houthis," FDD's Long War Journal, 7 May 2025. longwarjournal.org ↑
- "Houthis claim strikes on two Saudi tankers as US attacks on Iran widen," The Guardian, 23 July 2026. theguardian.com ↑
- Helen Sullivan, "Iran-backed Houthis claim missile attack on Saudi Arabia," BBC. bbc.com ↑
- Emily Feng, "Amid U.S.-Iran war, Houthis declare a blockade of another key strait: Bab el-Mandeb," NPR, 21 July 2026. npr.org ↑
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