Corridors, Coasts, and Contestation: Sino–Bangladesh Relations in the Bay of Bengal and the BCIM Space

Institute for Security and Development Policy | Shahab E. Khan

The visit to Beijing by Bangladesh's Prime Minister Tarique Rahman in June 2026 has led to a further strengthening of bilateral relations, as shown by fifteen memoranda, a new joint communiqué, and a proposal for the China–Myanmar–Bangladesh Economic Corridor. This swift diplomatic advancement makes use of transactional multipolarity in order to obtain important Chinese investments in coastal infrastructure, such as a new framework for Mongla Port and the Pekua submarine base.

As Dhaka deals with a highly restricted international environment after 2025—one characterised by interdependence that is being used as a weapon and by geopolitical struggles over supply chains—the need for energy and financing for infrastructure means that Beijing has to be an essential partner, even though the interim government signed the Bangladesh–U.S. Reciprocal Trade Agreement on February 9, 2026, in order to gain access to Western markets. The difficulty lies in balancing these conflicting alignments. In the end, the absence of a clear national foreign policy consensus under the 'Bangladesh First' doctrine leaves Dhaka with serious strategic weaknesses within the Beijing-Washington-Delhi geopolitical triangle.

Comment

Under Tarique Rahman's administration, Bangladesh's establishment of the Pekua submarine base and its adoption of the Mongla Port framework reveal a basic strategic dilemma between maritime infrastructure supported by China and access to Western markets. Although the Bangladesh–U.S. Reciprocal Trade Agreement, signed on 9 February 2026, provides important tariff advantages, these economic benefits are now being used against Dhaka as it becomes more deeply involved in Beijing's Belt and Road initiative. This situation compels the government led by the BNP to maintain a dangerous balance: its tactical maritime assets require Chinese technical assistance, while its national economic survival depends on Western trade routes.

The technical dependency resulting from the construction at the Pekua facility—which was carried out with the help of China and is intended to house Ming-class submarines—leads to an ongoing security concern. This situation has a direct effect on Dhaka's ability to comply with the market access provisions linked to security in the U.S. National Security Strategy 2025. As a result, the fact that Chinese technical staff are physically present at Pekua acts as a structural trigger that might automatically lead to the loss of the tariff exemptions obtained under the bilateral trade agreement with Washington.

Strategic Question for Discussion

How then be able to prevent the Bangladesh government the security impact caused by the continued technical dependence on Chinese personnel at the Pekua submarine base from triggering the restrictive geopolitical provisions contained in the Bangladesh–U.S. Reciprocal Trade Agreement?

The evidence shows that Dhaka intends to isolate its military sites by limiting Chinese access to the non-operational areas of the Pekua submarine base. That said, I believe that Washington's rigorous verification procedures, as set out in the National Security Strategy 2025, will regard any Chinese presence at the facility as a violation of the security commitments agreed upon in the reciprocal agreement. This kind of tension implies that Bangladesh's dual-track diplomacy will encounter serious structural constraints as supply-chain geopolitics develop.

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