Myanmar and the Growing Influence of China

Institute for Security and Development Policy | Sanjay Pulipaka

The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) remains the cornerstone of Beijing's strategic push to secure direct access to the Indian Ocean, bypassing the contested Malacca Strait. Following the 2021 military coup, China has intensified its dual-track diplomacy, balancing relations between the ruling State Administration Council (SAC) and powerful Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) along its southern border.

This pragmatic approach allows Beijing to safeguard critical infrastructure, including the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port and twin oil and gas pipelines, despite Myanmar's escalating civil war. By leveraging its influence over border-based EAOs like the United Wa State Army (UWSA), China exerts significant leverage over both the junta and the resistance forces. Stability along the shared border remains Beijing's primary operational priority. As Western sanctions further isolate the SAC, Myanmar's economic dependence on China will deepen, cementing Beijing's role as the dominant external arbiter of the country's fragmented political future.

Comment

Beijing's management of the Myanmar crisis demonstrates a calculated strategic trade-off between immediate border security and long-term maritime access. During Operation 1027, China tacitly facilitated the offensive by the Three Brotherhood Alliance to eliminate cyber-scam syndicates in Laukkai. This tactical alignment with ethnic militias temporarily undermined the State Administration Council in Naypyidaw. However, it also disrupted the local security environment required to operationalise the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone.

The downstream consequence of this trade-off is Beijing's heightened dependency on volatile non-state actors to protect the Yunnan-Myanmar energy pipelines. By empowering the United Wa State Army as a regional mediator, Beijing has locked itself into a fragmented security architecture. Consequently, the State Administration Council's diminished authority in Shan State forces Beijing to renegotiate security guarantees for the Shwe gas project with local militias.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If the State Administration Council continues to lose territorial control in Shan State, does Beijing's reliance on the United Wa State Army as a security guarantor remain viable, or does it invite uncontrollable local escalation?

The available evidence points toward an increasingly fragile arrangement, as the United Wa State Army's expansionist ambitions risk clashing with rival ethnic militias. My assessment is that Beijing will find it difficult to prevent localised conflicts from disrupting the Ruili-to-Kyaukphyu corridor as central authority continues to decay. This trajectory indicates that China may eventually be forced to directly intervene diplomatically to freeze frontlines rather than relying solely on proxy-managed security.

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