China, Not Iran, Is Trump’s Real Foreign-Policy Debacle

Foreign Policy | Nicholas Bequelin and Yaqiu Wang

The United States has lost significant geopolitical and economic ground to China across multiple strategic fronts during the first nineteen months of Donald Trump’s second presidential term. This systemic setback in U.S.-China competition has emerged as Washington's primary foreign policy debacle, eclipsing the ongoing security crisis and war involving Iran.

Beijing has capitalised on this period to advance its positions in global trade, economic influence, and artificial intelligence development. The strategic shift occurred despite high-level bilateral diplomacy, including a critical Trump-Xi summit. Washington failed to maintain its competitive edge. Consequently, the administration's intense focus on Middle Eastern escalation distracted from the primary long-term threat in Asia and the Pacific. This imbalance has severely compromised the American global deterrence posture. Future stability now hinges on whether the United States can successfully recalibrate its trade policies and technological safeguards to counter rapid Chinese expansion.

Comment

Washington’s focus on countering Iranian proxies has forced a critical strategic trade-off. This focus dilutes the resources necessary to sustain a comprehensive technology blockade against Beijing. While the Pentagon redirects carrier strike groups to the Middle East, the Bureau of Industry and Security faces severe enforcement gaps. These gaps hinder the monitoring of semiconductor diversion networks. Consequently, the immediate tactical containment of Tehran directly undermines the long-term technological containment of China.

This dynamic mirrors the strategic overextension of the Carter Doctrine in 1980. At that time, intense focus on Persian Gulf security compromised broader Cold War balancing in East Asia. By prioritising immediate regional crises, Washington risks hollow victories. These distractions leave the primary peer competitor free to consolidate systemic advantages. Ultimately, tactical naval deployments in the Red Sea are eroding the foundational elements of American technological supremacy against the People's Liberation Army.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If the Bureau of Industry and Security remains under-resourced due to prolonged Middle Eastern contingencies, does the technological containment of the People's Liberation Army become functionally impossible, or can plurilateral export controls by allied nations compensate for the enforcement gap?

The trajectory indicates that unilateral enforcement by the Bureau of Industry and Security is increasingly insufficient without deep integration with partners like the Netherlands and Japan. While plurilateral frameworks such as the Wassenaar Arrangement legacy controls offer a template, the rapid pace of Chinese dual-use innovation suggests that allied coordination cannot fully offset a deficit in American enforcement capacity. Consequently, prolonged naval commitments in the Red Sea will likely continue to yield a net advantage to Beijing's semiconductor supply chain resilience.

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