Pakistan’s Artificial Intelligence Warfare

The Diplomat | Kunwar Khuldune Shahid

Pakistan registered 1,045 terror incidents and 1,139 related deaths in 2025 according to the Global Terrorism Index, driving the military to integrate artificial intelligence into its national security framework. Third-quarter fatalities in 2026 rose by 83 percent over the previous quarter, compounding cross-border friction with India and Afghanistan.

Escalating internal violence drives this operational pivot. Specialized units including the Army Center of Emerging Technologies and the Air Force-run Center for Artificial Intelligence and Computing manage technology integration alongside state-owned Global Industrial & Defense Solutions. Operational assets now include Shahpar-II combat drones, the Spider Anti-UAV system, and imported Turkish YIHA-III platforms for border surveillance and strike missions. Law enforcement agencies deploy specialized police drone units in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and trial Chinese robotic wolves for clearance operations in Balochistan. Concurrently, Inter-Services Public Relations utilizes algorithmic monitoring to filter critical speech, creating friction between counterterrorism mandates and political dissent monitoring.

Comment

The Pakistan Air Force's deployment of CENTAIC algorithms alongside Baykar-supplied UAVs reveals a shift toward rapid, sensor-to-shooter targeting cycles in asymmetric counter-insurgency. Centralising data processing within air force intelligence structures creates operational friction when tactical information must be relayed to Army frontline units in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. This architectural bottleneck delays kinetic strikes against mobile insurgent cells along the Durand Line.

The technical bottleneck stems from incompatibilities between GIDS-manufactured ground control stations and Chinese-supplied surveillance nodes. Without standard communication protocols across the service branches, raw telemetry from Shahpar-II platforms requires manual reconciliation at regional command posts before targeting coordinates reach field commanders. Consequently, CENTAIC's operational software architecture limits the real-time execution of joint strike missions across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If CENTAIC's centralised software processing continues to delay tactical data sharing between service branches, which factor will dictate border control efficacy along the Durand Line—the operational range of Shahpar-II drones or the ground-level intelligence latency of army units?

The available evidence points toward ground-level intelligence latency remaining the primary operational constraint, regardless of sensor range improvements. While Shahpar-II loitering capabilities extend aerial surveillance coverage across remote border terrain, raw sensor feeds offer limited tactical utility without real-time integration into battalion-level command structures. The pattern suggests that technical upgrades at CENTAIC will yield diminished returns until inter-service data-sharing protocols are standardised across local sector headquarters.

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