Data breach: SBI admits exposure of its customer data on the Dark Web

The Hindu | Lalatendu Mishra

State Bank of India disclosed a dark web data breach on 21 October 2026 after receiving warnings from CERT-In and the Defence Cyber Agency. Preliminary analysis of 3,75,000 leaked records revealed that 3,897 customer profiles containing personally identifiable information were compromised, including mobile numbers, residential addresses, dates of birth, and loan metadata.

Threat group Siriusim allegedly released the records alongside 2,722 PDF documents containing account applications. This breach exposes affected account holders to targeted financial impersonation scams. SBI insisted core operations remain uncompromised. The Internet Freedom Foundation criticized the five-day delay between threat notifications and regulatory disclosures to stock exchanges. Financial institutions face structural reporting gaps. Under current CERT-In 2022 guidelines and Reserve Bank of India frameworks, entities must notify regulators rather than affected individuals. Statutory provisions under Section 8(6) of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023 requiring direct customer notification do not take effect until 13 May 2027.

The evolution of China’s active defence doctrine

South China Morning Post | Chow Chung-yan

China’s active defence doctrine emerged from the Chinese Red Army’s experience during the Long March and remains central to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), according to Chow Chung-yan. As the PLA approaches its centenary, the author argues that adapting this doctrine to high-technology warfare will matter more than simply acquiring aircraft carriers and stealth fighters.

The Long March is presented as a formative experience in political-military integration. Active defence extends beyond guerrilla warfare: mobile forces seek local superiority, strike isolated enemy elements and withdraw after limited objectives are achieved. The author says stealth, infiltration and rapid concentration helped Chinese commanders offset opponents’ firepower and logistical advantages. Military operations remain instruments of political aims, with territorial occupation valued only when it serves those aims. Today, the doctrine informs integrated air-sea capabilities, hypersonic missiles, carrier strike groups, nuclear submarines and stealth aircraft. The PLA’s test is combining these systems into a coherent combat capability as artificial intelligence and hypersonic warfare reshape conflict.

China economy grows thanks to AI export boom but domestic slump remains a drag

CNN | John Liu

China’s economy expanded by 4.5% year-on-year in the third quarter of 2026, driven by an export boom in artificial intelligence hardware and green technology despite a severe domestic real estate downturn. This growth met the lower end of Beijing’s 4.5–5% annual target while improving upon the 4.3% reported in the previous quarter.

High-tech manufacturing sustained output as fixed-asset investment fell 7.2% and property investment plunged 20.2% over the first nine months. Overseas demand remains vital. Total exports surged 36.3% in September, pushing China's nine-month trade surplus to $938.1 billion compared to $875.1 billion in 2025. Despite temporary trade truces with Washington and Brussels, including tariff reductions on $60 billion of goods, domestic drag persists. Domestic weakness induced the IMF to downgrade China’s 2026 growth projection to 4.5%. With 70% of household wealth tied to real estate, limited government stimulus has yet to correct this structural imbalance.

China has cornered the market on ingredients and production for life-saving medicines.

National Interest | Nick Snyder

China supplies roughly 40 percent of United States critical pharmaceutical inputs by volume and controls 41 percent of key active pharmaceutical ingredient chemical building blocks. Chinese state subsidies, discounted land, and relaxed regulations allow firms like WuXi AppTec to underprice Western competitors while supporting one-fourth of American drug production.

Western attempts to rely on India face structural limits. India depends on Beijing for 70 percent of its overall active pharmaceutical ingredient needs and up to 90 percent for critical antibiotics like cephalosporins. Consequently, simple friendshoring cannot quickly substitute for Chinese manufacturing during a crisis over the Taiwan Strait. To mitigate embargo risks, proposed policies include establishing strategic stockpiles, passing Food and Drug Administration dual-sourcing mandates, and enacting BIOSECURE Act-style divestment timelines. Parallel allied actions under the European Union's Critical Medicines Act and Japan's domestic fermentation restarts reflect a broader attempt to rebuild sovereign biopharma capacity.

Preparing U.S. Land Forces to Fight in an Era of Strategic and Technological Disruption

CSIS | Jerry McGinn, Jason Paul "JP" Gresh, Alek Jovovic

United States land forces are overhauling force structure and doctrine to counter rapid technological disruption from unmanned aerial systems, stand-off precision strikes, and contested logistics environments. While the US Marine Corps has committed to divest-to-invest restructuring through its Force Design initiative, the US Army is establishing operational concepts via its "How the Army Fights" guidance.

However, these modernization goals confront severe structural headwinds from post-Cold War fiscal drawdowns, shrinking recruiting pools, and competing personnel expenditure. Munition stockpiles remain dangerously thin. Beyond direct combat capabilities, the US Army carries a disproportionate share of joint executive agency responsibilities, managing theater logistics, theater sustainment, and integrated air defense. Accelerating the rapid adoption of autonomous systems requires closer feedback loops between military acquisition branches and commercial defense suppliers. Overcoming these persistent institutional bottlenecks is critical to sustaining joint force combat posture across increasingly contested global operational theaters.

Trump appointees asked a federal cybersecurity agency to secretly hack a voting machine

Defense One | Andy Mannix and Doug Bock Clark

Political appointees at the Department of Homeland Security asked the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency months into President Donald Trump’s second term to secretly acquire a voting machine, examine it and report findings to the White House. Career staffers were shocked. The request ran against CISA’s normal practice of alerting vendors to flaws and left employees fearing political interference.

Staff repeatedly said the operation was impossible after relevant agents had been laid off under the Department of Government Efficiency. The appointees eventually dropped the demand. The episode sits against deeper cuts: more than 1,000 CISA employees removed, the agency reduced by about one-third, and a 2027 budget proposal that would cut another $700 million. State election officials report receiving no assistance during critical midterm planning stages and say trust in the information-sharing relationship has collapsed after the declassification of sensitive material they once provided.

Reshaping Defense: Secretary Hegseth’s Latest Initiatives, Point by Point

CSIS | Mark F. Cancian

On 30 September 2026, United States Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth unveiled seven major defense initiatives aimed at fundamentally reshaping military acquisition, base operations, supply chains, and flag officer structure. The overarching reform package includes establishing Autonomous Warfare Command (AUTOWARCOM) as a 12th combatant command by October 2027 to institutionalise unmanned and autonomous system development.

Drawing operational lessons from recent drone employment in Ukraine and Persian Gulf facility strikes, the Defense Department seeks to bypass traditional bureaucracy through accelerated acquisition pathways. The reforms also launch Project Agincourt and the FORTRESS America framework to harden domestic installations, secure critical mineral supply chains, and mandate energy independence for major bases. Additionally, the Pentagon plans a 20 percent reduction in general and flag officer billets while establishing five new college cadet corps. Implementation will require congressional approval for statutory structural modifications. This sweeping overhaul represents a systemic posture shift.

The War on Woke at West Point

New York Magazine | Jasper Craven

On 9 October, the Board of Visitors at West Point convened in the library's Haig Room to review military training, featuring cadet presentations on special-operations combat-diving in Key West and a joint drone targeting project with Palantir. Lieutenant General James B. Bartholomees III highlighted the 224-year-old academy's commitment to developing multi-dimensional, multi-domain leaders, supported by comments from senior fellow Frank Luntz.

However, Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth and aligned conservative military groups contend that civilian leadership has ideologically compromised the institution. In his 2024 book The War on Warriors, Hegseth claims that academic lectures prioritise topics like white rage and transgenderism over tactical readiness, while alleging partisan cable news broadcasts in executive offices. Institutional friction continues to deepen. This conflict between traditional military curricula and political oversight creates direct pressure on academy leadership, potentially driving administrative reform, curriculum restructuring, and reevaluated governance across US military educational institutions.

The Limits of American Power: When Military Force Fails to Deliver Strategic Goals

Foreign Affairs | William H. McRaven

American military superiority does not guarantee political success when force lacks clear aims, a credible theory of victory, or an understanding of an adversary’s choices. William H. McRaven uses the Trump administration’s war against Iran as a case of strategic overreach, arguing that Washington’s objectives shifted from regime change and nuclear constraints to reopening the Strait of Hormuz.

The excerpt presents this sequence as evidence that military action can create new problems even when it is intended to resolve existing ones. It places the episode within a wider pattern of American policymakers misjudging the limits of national power. McRaven’s stated career includes service as a U.S. Navy officer and commander of U.S. Special Operations Command from 2011 to 2014. 

Why Is Strategy So Difficult?

The Atlantic | Eliot A. Cohen

United States military operations against Iran in 2026 encountered severe strategic setbacks despite America's technological superiority, decades of regional presence, and support from Israel, Great Britain, and Gulf partners. Iranian forces continue throttling the Strait of Hormuz, demonstrating how tactical advantages fail without sound strategic alignment. Washington neglected crucial geopolitical contextual dynamics prior to initiating hostilities.

The US alienated European allies needed to counter mine and surface naval threats while failing to prepare Gulf partners for retaliation. Simultaneously, American planners underestimated Chinese and Russian targeting intelligence and weapons transfers supporting Tehran. Although intelligence apparatuses effectively track quantifiable assets such as tanks, missiles, and warships, they fail to evaluate qualitative adversary motivations and broader alignment dynamics. Strategy remains acutely difficult. This operational breakdown reveals how technical dominance cannot compensate for systemic misjudgments regarding coalition cohesion, proxy alignments, and adversary resilience in contemporary regional conflicts.

The U.S. Military Needs To Reorganize

Persuasion | Phillips P. OBrien

Between 28 February and 7 April 2026, the United States military conducted 36,000 sorties against Iranian targets, yet failed to prevent Tehran from rapidly rebuilding its missile stockpiles and forcing American withdrawals from Persian Gulf bases. This failure highlights two competing interpretations of systemic American weakness. One perspective attributes the operational breakdown to institutional hubris and a refusal to integrate Ukrainian uncrewed aerial warfare tactics, leaving forward regional bases exposed to drone swarms.

Alternatively, a structural critique stresses procurement failure, where multi-million-dollar THAAD and Patriot interceptors were rapidly depleted against low-cost munitions. Pentagon expenditures reached $850 billion in FY 2025. To address these strategic vulnerabilities, proposed defense reforms demand freezing Department of Defense budget increases, divesting from legacy capital platforms such as manned fighter aircraft and major surface combatants, and abandoning the centralized Pentagon infrastructure to build a modern, decentralized force posture resilient against attritable threats.

Why the United States Needs Europe in Order to Win the Technology Race

Center for Strategic and International Studies | Federico Steinberg, Riccardo Bosticco

The United States and European Union face a deepening technological rift as aggressive American policies push European decision-makers to pursue digital sovereignty and hedge towards Chinese supply chains. Washington's "AI Action Plan" aims for global technology dominance through exported AI stacks, yet extraterritorial laws like the CLOUD Act trigger intense European security concerns.

Supranational authority in Brussels has responded by coordinating legislative countermeasures including the Tech Sovereignty Package, Chips Act 2.0, and Cloud and AI Development Act. Autonomy carries immense costs. Experts estimate building an independent European technology stack requires €3.6 trillion, while U.S. cloud providers presently hold over 80 percent of Europe's market. Nonetheless, European leaders are diversifying partnerships and curbing reliance on American platforms such as Microsoft Teams and Zoom. Major U.S. technology stacks remain co-dependent on European coordination and critical hardware components supplied by ASML, TRUMPF, and ZEISS. Unilateral U.S. authority risks fracturing this transatlantic alliance, undermining mutual security and market leadership across global technology supply chains.

Katya Adler: France divided over who to blame for riots and what to learn from them

BBC News | Katya Adler

French authorities face intensifying civil unrest after nationwide demonstrations over living costs deteriorated into widespread violence and opportunistic looting across multiple cities. Intelligence reports cited by French media indicate radical left-wing groups, including elements linked to La France Insoumise, coordinated tactics alongside student protesters. This social volatility reflects deep-seated economic discontent and dwindling public trust in democratic institutions across Europe.

Over 3,000 businesses suffered looting during the clashes. In response, former Prime Minister Gabriel Attal advocated temporary social media blackouts to disrupt algorithm-driven mobilization and digital recruitment networks. The widespread unrest has triggered fierce political recriminations six months ahead of the French presidential election, where opposition figures like Marine Le Pen are exploiting security lapses to undermine President Emmanuel Macron's centrist administration. Consequently, state security services face urgent pressure to overhaul public-order policing tactics while managing encrypted digital platforms that accelerate decentralized urban disorder.

Russia Has Moved Beyond Hybrid War: Why Washington Needs a Clearer Response

Defense One | Nikkie Lyubarsky

Russia’s campaign against Western countries is becoming more overt and kinetic, according to Nikkie Lyubarsky, who argues that the familiar label “hybrid war” no longer captures the scale or character of recent operations. Drone incidents in Europe and an alleged Russian intelligence-linked plot in the United States illustrate the widening security concerns described in the article.

Lyubarsky argues that Moscow increasingly accepts the loss of plausible deniability when intimidation, intelligence gathering and pressure on Western support for Ukraine matter more. European states have begun responding more directly to aerial threats, while Washington’s approach appears less consistent. The article points to mixed signals from US officials on criminal allegations, diplomatic engagement and sanctions policy. It argues that this uncertainty can weaken deterrent messaging and leave agencies without a clear mandate. The author calls for senior US leadership to define the threat more clearly and communicate credible limits. The account presents a policy argument based on reported incidents and allegations; it does not establish that every cited event was directed by the Kremlin.

Russia Says It Upgraded Its Jet-Powered Tanks. Are They Really Better Now?

National Interest | Peter Suciu

Russia’s state military conglomerate Rostec recently praised the modernized T-80BVM main battle tank, highlighting its GTD-1250TF gas turbine engine, enhanced armor protection, and 125mm 2A46M-4 smoothbore cannon. Russian officials framed the updated 46-ton vehicle as a versatile direct-fire and mobile artillery system capable of operating alongside spotter drones in Ukraine.

The platform has a troubled operational history. First introduced 50 years ago, early T-80 variants suffered heavy combat losses during the First Chechen War between 1994 and 1996. Chechen forces easily exploited the tank's Korzhina autoloader carousel design, triggering catastrophic internal explosions that earned the vehicle the moniker "steel coffin." In December 1994 alone, 18 out of 84 T-80s were destroyed during the Battle of Grozny due to lacking explosive reactive armor. Consequently, Moscow withheld the platform from subsequent conflicts in Georgia and Chechnya. Russia now deploys the modernized T-80BVM as a second-tier replacement in Ukraine, where attrition remains severe.

Putin Makes Nuclear Threats Over Kaliningrad

Jamestown Foundation | Vadim Shtepa

Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian Foreign Ministry issued nuclear threats against NATO in September and October 2026, alleging Alliance exercises threaten to isolate the Kaliningrad exclave. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte rejected the claims, reaffirming the Alliance's defensive posture against Kremlin rhetoric. Moscow transformed the former East Prussian region into a fortified military outpost housing nuclear-capable Iskander-M missile systems permanently since 2018.

Russian access concerns focus heavily on the Suwałki Gap. Control of this 40-mile corridor between Kaliningrad and Belarus along the Polish-Lithuanian border would sever land links between the Baltic states and the European Union. Despite Moscow's claims of Western economic blockades, Lithuania permits rail transit, while Russia's domestic civilian economy struggles under military spending pressures. The Kremlin uses external crisis narratives to obscure internal political suppression, including the 2001 outlawing of regional political parties and rising local anti-war dissent within the exclave.

A viable path to peace in Ukraine

Asia Times | Jeffrey D. Sachs

Columbia University Professor Jeffrey D. Sachs proposed a single-package peace framework for the war in Ukraine to be adopted by the United Nations Security Council under Chapter VII. Guaranteed jointly by the five permanent members of the Security Council, the proposal mandates Ukraine adopt permanent constitutional neutrality modeled on Austria's 1955 law while rescinding NATO's 2008 Bucharest expansion pledge.

To enforce this geopolitical compromise, an armistice line would freeze current holdings, triggering reciprocal territorial withdrawals, including Ukrainian forces exiting Donetsk and Russian troops leaving Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and Sumy. Sanctions would be lifted during 2027. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe would monitor demilitarized buffer zones, while the European Investment Bank administers a multilateral reconstruction fund supported by Russia and Western states. Ratification by the Verkhovna Rada and the Russian Federal Assembly would permanently conclude hostilities, restoring European energy transit, free navigation in the Black Sea, and intermediate-range missile moratoria.

How Israel Can Turn Hezbollah’s Blunder Into Lasting Defeat

The Dispatch | David Daoud

The Israeli military's establishment of a southern Lebanon security zone following Hezbollah's October 2023 entry into the Gaza conflict presents Tel Aviv with a pivotal strategic opportunity. Israeli forces have eliminated key commanders, degraded missile stockpiles, and created forward defense positions to prevent cross-border raids. This operational posture tests the U.S.-brokered June trilateral framework between Washington, Jerusalem, and Beirut.

The agreement conditions complete Israeli withdrawal on the verified disarmament of Hezbollah by the Lebanese Armed Forces. However, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and army commanders prefer negotiated handovers over forced confiscation to avoid domestic conflict. Hezbollah refuses nationwide disarmament. Operational control declarations in test zones like Srifa and Froun yielded minimal heavy weapon seizures, while new tunnel complexes were discovered near Khiam. Premature Israeli withdrawal without verifiable compliance risks repeating the post-2000 strategic dynamic, where Hezbollah rearmed and expanded its regional combat operations.

Trump and Zelensky appear at loggerheads despite Oslo optimism

BBC News | Paul Adams

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff in Oslo following escalating tensions between Kyiv and Washington over altered American military and diplomatic support. US President Donald Trump recently waived sanctions contained in the Graham Act and approved deals opening US markets to Russian diesel. This policy shift accompanies growing operational friction regarding US defence deliveries to Ukrainian forces.

Air defence stockpiles are critically low. Deliveries of vital Patriot air defence interceptors have slowed to a trickle amid severe global supply shortages, severely eroding Kyiv's capacity to counter advanced Russian missile attacks. Furthermore, Ukrainian forces suffered three days without US satellite early-warning data prior to Russian S-400 missile strikes on 12 October, alongside reported speed throttling of Elon Musk's Starlink satellite internet network. While American officials cited software glitches for the technical outages, Witkoff subsequently departed for St Petersburg with updated peace proposals for Moscow.

The Middle East's Next Energy Boom Has Nothing to Do With Oil

Oilprice | Alan Mammoser

Escalating security risks in the Strait of Hormuz have pushed Brent crude oil prices above $110 per barrel as Persian Gulf tanker disruptions threaten global maritime trade routes. Asian liquefied natural gas (LNG)—natural gas cooled to liquid form for maritime export—surged past $30 per MMBtu, while Japan's trade deficit doubled and domestic electricity prices surged 25 percent.

Cascading maritime chokepoint disruptions are exposing deep structural vulnerabilities in global fuel supply chains and refining distribution networks. India's national crude import bill expanded 46 percent, forcing state refiners to reduce Middle East term contract volumes. Emergency supply buffers face immediate operational limits. To cushion ongoing market deficits, the United States offered 17 million barrels from its Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR)—government-controlled crude stockpiles used to offset major supply shocks—even as Norwegian gas production plunged 12.6 percent ahead of winter. Concurrently, Saudi crude exports reached a five-month high despite domestic crude production dropping to record low levels.

How the Houthis Threaten Saudi Oil

The National Interest | Scott B. MacDonald

Yemen's Houthis launched sustained strikes against Saudi Aramco headquarters and critical energy infrastructure, threatening to sustain global crude prices above $100 per barrel. The offensive demonstrates how non-state actors leverage Iranian ballistic missiles and Chinese component support to disrupt regional energy networks. In response, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan operationalised the August 2026 Mecca Joint Defense Agreement to establish mutual security guarantees.

Deterrence failed. Islamabad committed troops to protect Saudi sovereignty, yet diplomatic frictions with Taliban-led Afghanistan and economic ties to Tehran severely constrain Pakistan's operational deployment. Concurrently, Ankara provided military drones to Riyadh while avoiding direct engagement with Houthi forces to safeguard its $30 billion trade target with Iran. This dynamic highlights the growing friction between mutual defense commitments and complex bilateral dependencies across the region. Despite US air strikes and a temporary bilateral truce, Washington remains reluctant to re-engage directly in Yemen.

Beyond the U.S.-China Binary: The New Landscape of AI Partnerships in the Global South

Center for Strategic and International Studies | Sabeen Dhanani

Developing nations across the Global South face a severe technology divide, with 2.2 billion people remaining unconnected and 96 percent residing in low- and middle-income countries. This infrastructure deficit limits access to cloud services, reliable power, and advanced compute capacity essential for operating artificial intelligence systems. Constructing resilient technical supply chains requires substantial capital and energy production.

China dominates this landscape by pairing hardware financing with open-weight models like Qwen, which accounted for 41 percent of Hugging Face downloads by early 2026, while offering 5,000 training slots to Global South partners. Compute logistics are failing elsewhere. Gulf states aim to boost data center capacity from 1 gigawatt in 2025 to 3.3 gigawatts by 2030, but a $1 billion data center project in Kenya collapsed in 2026 when the domestic grid failed. Meanwhile, India exports open-source architectures, and middle powers utilize multilateral bodies to establish regional governance frameworks.

Cartels, Cameras, and Commercial Data: Nonstate Actors and Ubiquitous Technical Surveillance

Center for Strategic and International Studies | Justin Sherman

A September 2026 Department of Justice inspector general audit revealed that sophisticated transnational organised crime groups are actively exploiting ubiquitous technical surveillance (UTS) to compromise law enforcement operations and target human sources. In one instance detailed in a prior June 2025 audit, a Mexican cartel hired a hacker to breach an FBI assistant legal attaché's mobile phone in Mexico City, matching geolocation logs with municipal camera networks to identify and assassinate cooperators.

Digital exposure creates immediate operational risk. UTS spans five distinct vectors: visual and physical, electronic signals, financial, travel, and online tracking. While major powers like China, Russia, and Iran dominate this domain, non-state criminal entities are rapidly lowering technical barriers to entry. By combining commercial data brokers, advertising technology, automated license plate readers, and artificial intelligence, cartels achieve targeted intelligence fusion once reserved for state security services. Addressing these vulnerabilities requires designated UTS mitigation leads, advanced anti-surveillance training, and privacy-enhancing technologies across United States security agencies.

Reprogramming robots in the mud: How Army special ops trains its new robot technicians

Breaking Defense | Sydney J. Freedberg Jr

The US Army’s John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School is training Robotics Technicians under Military Occupational Specialty 390A to adapt robotic systems to battlefield conditions. The programme’s second class will test its skills at Clarke Range, Alabama, during the first week in November, facing simulated threats designed to disrupt communications, navigation and access to cloud-based tools.

Drawing lessons from Ukraine, the Caucasus and the Middle East, the course trains warrant officers to integrate drones, ground robots and networks, modify systems under pressure and improvise when electronic warfare degrades their capabilities. During an earlier exercise, students equipped a quadcopter with a $1,000 HD camera and a decentralised mesh network to route data around jammed nodes. The technicians are neither solely drone operators nor conventional programmers. Their role combines technical integration, field adaptation and practical resilience, with training designed to include failure. The Army’s approach reflects an operational environment in which technical advantage depends on how effectively personnel adapt equipment to changing threats.

When Is Irregular Warfare Unconventional? Actors, Methods and Sponsorship

Unconventional Warfare Review | Maurice "Duc" DuClos

Irregular warfare is distinguished by who fights, while unconventional warfare concerns the sponsorship of irregular forces. These categories should not be confused with the methods used on the battlefield. Drones, cyber operations and guerrilla tactics do not, by themselves, make a conflict irregular. The identity of the belligerents and their relationships require separate assessment.

Drawing on Stephen Biddle’s Fabian–Napoleonic spectrum, Maurice DuClos argues that state and nonstate forces can employ similar military methods. He defines irregular warfare as a conflict involving at least one irregular or nonstate belligerent. Unconventional warfare, in his framework, occurs when an external actor sponsors an irregular force to pursue strategic objectives. Proxy warfare is broader because a state may also sponsor another state’s regular military. The author argues that analysts should ask three distinct questions: who is fighting, how they fight, and who sponsors whom. This framework challenges classifications based solely on technological novelty, asymmetric tactics or indirect approaches. The supplied extract also questions the alignment between established definitions of irregular warfare and unconventional warfare in US doctrine. Its full doctrinal argument cannot be assessed from the incomplete extract alone.