By Brian Castner August 26
Brian Castner is the author of “The Long Walk.” He is currently writing a new book, “All the Ways We Kill and Die,” about the individualization of modern war and the search for the bomb-makers of Iraq and Afghanistan.
A Iraqi Turkmen Shiite fighter, who volunteered to join the government forces, holds a position in Amerli, 100 miles north of Baghdad, as the city has been completely surrounded by Islamic State Sunni militants for more than six weeks. (Ali Al-Bayatiali/AFPGetty Images)
We’re caught in a revenge cycle with a death cult, and it’s redefining modern warfare.
The horrific murder of journalist James Foley is case in point. Once, hitting targets of opportunity or instituting a propaganda campaign were peripheral to massed armies killing each other in trenches and cities and jungles. To win, one country crushed another’s will to fight by destroying the widest possible number of targets: fleets, soldiers, cities.
No more. After a century and a half of industrial anonymous bloodshed, the individual is key. The Islamic State attacked America when it killed Foley, without a bomb or mass slaughter.
Since Sept. 11, we’ve been at war not with Pakistan or Afghanistan, but with specific terrorist leaders and materiel experts. They have reciprocated, attacking either symbolic targets or those soldiers that pose the greatest threat.
That the United States has adopted this strategy is not news. Long campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan taught us that detaining or killing every bottom-rung trigger-puller just made the insurgency worse. Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was caught in such a round-up in 2004.
We now use drones or small special operations teams to hit financiers or suppliers or bomb-makers. President Obama expanded the use of Predator strikes in Yemen and Pakistan. He authorized SEAL and Delta Force raids in Libya and Somalia. The hunt for Osama bin Laden was prominent but not unusual; similar smaller operations are undertaken daily. If the strike is successful, it makes the news for one cycle. If not, we hear little. In either case, the resources expended are minimized, but so is the public’s knowledge of the actions taken on our behalf.
Here’s what’s new. The enemies we’re fighting – al-Qaeda affiliates, the Taliban, the Islamic State – have learned to be equally selective in reverse. In 2007, at the height of the surge in Iraq, IED-disarming bomb technicians were seven times more likely to be killed in combat than average soldiers. As the surge progressed, and even as the death rate stabilized or even decreased overall, it doubled for bomb techs. Similar ratios played out during the surge in Afghanistan.