Tell the Truth About Our Longest War

Susan E. Rice

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The nearly 17-year-old Afghanistan conflict, the longest war in United States history, will not end on the battlefield. It can be resolved only at the negotiating table. So, the bold offer last month from President Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan to negotiate with the Taliban “without preconditions” is a welcome initiative. But it faces daunting obstacles. Mr. Ghani’s proposal envisions an outcome in which the Taliban would be recognized as a legitimate political party, prisoners would be released and United Nations sanctions against the group would be lifted. In exchange, the Taliban would have to recognize the Afghan government and respect the rule of law, including women’s rights.

Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, during a surprise visit to Afghanistan this week, said there was evidence that some Taliban factions are interested in talks. The Taliban have not responded formally to Mr. Ghani’s proposal, but in the past they have refused to negotiate directly with the Afghan government, which they deem an American puppet. Instead, the Taliban have insisted on direct talks with the United States that exclude the Kabul government, as a way to discredit it. The United States has long supported an Afghan-led peace process, in which Washington might play a role but would not stand in for the Afghan government.

Assuming the Taliban refuse Mr. Ghani’s offer, it’s timely to ask: Is there an alternative to an indefinite United States military presence in Afghanistan?

The fact is the Taliban remain strong, controlling or contesting over a third of the country. Their share continues to grow slowly, despite persistent Afghan and American efforts to weaken them. The early Obama-era surge to 100,000 United States troops, plus the infusion of an additional 40,000troops from NATO nations, did not defeat or even permanently debilitate the Taliban.

Late in his administration, President Barack Obama drew down American troops to below 10,000 and focused the mission squarely on counterterrorism, fighting Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, while providing only training, advice and assistance to Afghan forces fighting the Taliban. He ultimately ordered a deadly 2016 strike against the Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour, in the hope that his removal would substantially weaken the Taliban. It did not.

Last year, President Trump intensified American airstrikes, increased the United States ground presence by roughly 50 percent and gave his commanders nearly unfettered authority to fight the Taliban. But that has not materially weakened the Taliban, either. Indeed, history has shown that no sustainable number of NATO troops will change the military balance sufficiently to assure an Afghan government victory. The Afghan war remains an “eroding stalemate” in which the Taliban gradually gain ground at the expense of the Kabul government.

Despite Mr. Ghani’s laudable efforts, peace talks remain unlikely to succeed. Successive attempts at negotiations with the Taliban have failed for an array of reasons: the Taliban’s enduring strength on the battlefield and support among some of the rural population; policy disputes within the Taliban that have hamstrung their negotiators; a weak Afghan government split over the wisdom of negotiations; and Pakistan’s duplicitous role in nominally supporting negotiations while sustaining support for the Taliban.

None of these factors has changed. With no realistic prospect for fruitful negotiations, we are waiting for the Taliban to self-destruct or to decide for their own reasons that they are ready to reconcile. In the meantime, the United States has three bad options.

First, the Trump administration could refocus its objectives, returning to the previous administration’s more limited goal of fighting foreign terrorists and providing training, equipment and advice, but not direct combat support, to help the Afghan government control Kabul and other cities. This would enable a reduction in United States forces, while protecting the American diplomatic presence in Kabul and preventing Afghanistan from re-emerging as a major terrorist safe haven. This approach would probably slow, but not halt, the progress of the Taliban.

Second, the United States could withdraw its forces, on the premise that it cannot “win” in Afghanistan. This would leave Afghanistan and the United States vulnerable to a reinvigorated terrorist presence and, perhaps, the replacement of the American-led presence by Russia, Iran, China or India.

In this scenario, the Kabul government would most likely lose more territory to the Taliban and eventually fall. Arguably, the deaths of more than 2,400 American servicemen and women would have been in vain. This choice conjures haunting images of the United States retreat from Saigon in 1975, and no American president has yet been willing to accept this scenario.

Finally, the United States could acknowledge and resolve that its presence in Afghanistan is essentially permanent — but in doing so, it should understand the cost. The United States will stay at whatever troop level our commanders deem necessary to combat terrorists and prop up the Kabul government. Mr. Trump has, in effect, chosen this option at an annual cost of at least $45 billion and about 15,000 American troops. But this approach will not result in the military defeat of the Taliban.

Not surprisingly, Mr. Trump has neglected to explain to the American people that he has signed us up for an indefinite, Korea-style stay in Afghanistan, primarily for the purpose of maintaining stability and — despite his protestations — to conduct military-led nation-building. It remains to be seen if the public and Congress will embrace such a commitment. The Trump administration owes the American people a realistic assessment of the risks and costs of the president’s decisions. He needs to acknowledge that our longest war will go on much longer