SPENCER BOYER
Congress’ failure to push through urgently needed aid to Ukraine has dominated transatlantic discussions for the past several weeks. As the specter of a new administration disinterested in U.S. involvement in European security once again looms large, debates about European strategic autonomy—or significantly reducing European dependence on U.S. security—are back. The key issue, however, goes much deeper than the direction of U.S. policy towards Europe or Russia, or even transatlantic security more broadly.
The present moment will clearly define whether enough Americans are ready to elevate U.S. engagement with allies and partners to a core value and voting issue in 2024 to maintain American leadership for the second half of the decade. Recent polling by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs shows that only 40 percent of Trump Republicans believe the U.S. should take an active role in world affairs or that America’s European alliances are mutually beneficial—two core tenets of America’s post-World War II foreign policy.
This is just one troubling indicator that much of the American public does not appreciate the value of international engagement. While foreign affairs only rarely moves voters, this summer’s NATO summit in Washington, D.C., commemorating the 75th anniversary of the alliance’s founding, offers a unique opportunity to remind Americans why multilateralism and alliances matter in times of peace and war—and in a crucial year.
The Kremlin’s war on Ukraine, which just entered its third year, and unprecedented transatlantic cooperation in pushing back on Russian aggression are emblematic of a larger multilateral ecosystem under assault. It is clear to all objective observers that Putin’s blitz against Ukraine and subsequent human rights violations against its people are not only a gross violation of international law, but also an attack on the global rules written in no small part by the United States in the aftermath of World War II.
Let’s reflect for a minute on what the international system used to be.
That was then…
Before 1945, nearly unlimited state sovereignty was the name of the game. Few international agreements existed to regulate the conduct of independent nations. Aside from organizations such as the League of Nations, the International Labor Organization, and the Permanent Court of International Justice, there were very few international institutions. Those in existence did little to further an international rule of law or modify state behavior—and they sometimes made things worse. In a dispute between France and Turkey in 1927, for instance, the Court of International Justice ruled that states were for all intents and purposes allowed to do anything not expressly prohibited by international law.
Aside from the failed 1928 Kellogg–Briand Pact that renounced war as a policy tool, there was no general prohibition on territorial acquisition through force. While pre-existing laws like the Hague Convention of 1899 mandated humane treatment of prisoners, their scope remained limited and they failed to address the broader concerns of international humanitarian law.
While some bilateral trade agreements existed, the global economy operated in a regulatory vacuum. Emerging international rules attempted to safeguard workers, minorities, and foreign property, but there were no rules protecting what we now consider fundamental human rights or preventing mass extermination based on race, religion, ethnicity, or political belief. This fragmented legal landscape exposed the world's vulnerability and highlighted the urgent need for a more robust and comprehensive set of rules to prevent future conflicts.
This used to be now….
The devastation of World War II galvanized the United States and its allies into action, compelling them to forge a new international order built on a robust system of rules that at least attempted to safeguard basic liberal values and human rights. For all its flaws, the founding of the United Nations in 1945 signaled the dawn of this new era and cemented the indispensable leadership role of the United States within it. The subsequent decades witnessed unprecedented progress in international law and institutional development, extending far beyond the immediate post-war focus.
In particular, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights established a groundbreaking code of fundamental human rights. Building upon the precedent of the Nuremberg Military Tribunal of Nazi Germany’s war crimes, moreover, the 1949 Geneva Conventions advanced international humanitarian law, protecting civilians and captured soldiers during conflicts. These milestones reflected a profound shift towards a more interconnected world increasingly governed by principled laws and institutions. War is still a scourge on our planet, but the world has moved in the direction of accountability for those who violate our collective laws and principles.
And of course, 1949 saw the creation of NATO—the greatest collective security organization in world history. NATO forces were not involved in a single military engagement throughout the Cold War and alliance members have never been attacked by an adversary. Over the years, U.S. interests have continued to be furthered through NATO in military operations and missions outside the North Atlantic geographic area.
Over the decades, NATO has been involved in numerous critical engagements, including in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa. It also contributes to maritime security and air policing in several NATO countries and carries out disaster relief operations in furtherance of global stability. The only declaration of Article 5 of NATO’s founding treaty, which states that an attack on one is an attack on all members, was for the defense of the United States after the 9/11.
This is the international system…now
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, however, revitalized NATO in ways we could not have imaged at the beginning of the Biden administration. In addition to supplying non-lethal assistance to Ukraine through the Comprehensive Assistance Package program, NATO has developed a robust family of military plans to better protect the eastern flank of the alliance. It has also worked closely with the European Union and EU member states, many of whom are also NATO member nations and have made nearly $100 billion available in military, humanitarian, and refugee assistance to Ukraine since the start of the war. They have also agreed to commit over $50 billion more to support Ukraine’s recovery, reconstruction, and modernization, including assistance measures to help Ukraine undertake the reforms necessary for EU accession.
In 2014, European NATO allies invested 1.4 percent of their collective GDP on defense—well below the pledge made at the Wales NATO summit that year. That number will reach $380 billion or two percent in 2024, a figure now considered a floor rather than a ceiling by the alliance. In 2014, only three allies met the two percent defense spending target; 18 will do so this year. Instead of weakening NATO, Putin got an alliance that is more united, capable, and larger with the recent additions of Finland and Sweden.
Despite daring Ukrainian drone strikes deep into Russia territory and continued heavy losses by Russian forces, Russia has regained some of its military momentum after retaking the Ukrainian town of Avdiivka in February. Overall, the war is at a strategic stalemate and needs America’s continued material and financial leadership. While Europe watches the U.S. government’s political drama regarding funding for Ukraine, internationalists of all ideological stripes can proactively work to warn the American public about the consequences of not supporting Ukraine and America’s NATO allies in the fight against Russian aggression—in the hopes that voters will collectively take these considerations into account when they make their decisions in November. NATO’s 75th anniversary summit in Washington, D.C. in July will receive broad media, non-governmental organization, private sector, and congressional attention, and will provide an ideal platform for making the case that international institutions and engagement matter now more than ever.
Nothing will show alliance unity more than a renewed American commitment to deliver Putin a strategic defeat in Ukraine—and that will take continued U.S. resources, including the administration’s $60 billion supplemental funding request. That legislation must pass as soon as possible. Every continued delay is a gift to Putin. But at the NATO summit, the U.S. government and think tank community will have an opportunity to remind the country that there is no global issue we can solve without our friends and allies. Our NATO allies and other partners in Europe and around the world are our force multiplier, giving America a comparative advantage over governments in countries like Russia, China, and Iran. We have an opportunity to foot stomp to lawmakers and influencers that this is a legacy we cannot afford to discard; it took too long to build it.
The evolution of multilateralism from 1945 to today demonstrates both its power and the dangers of its abandonment. One path forward advances President Harry Truman's vision of a global order rooted in mutual interests, collective security, and democratic values, with America as a principled leader. The other leads to isolation, diminished American legitimacy, and an inability to exert true leadership in the world. The cooperative path fosters greater unity and international collaboration, making the world more likely to align with the United States on critical issues—and the world safer for America and its values. Isolation breeds antagonism and jeopardizes America's long-held global leadership role.
As important as Ukraine is for all of us, it’s one part of a much broader decision we must make about America’s place in the world.
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