Picking up the PACE: EW battlefield demands updated contingency planning

Breaking Defense  |  Kyle Rempfer, Mark Pomerleau

United States Army I Corps commander Lt. Gen. Matthew McFarlane announced at TechNet Augusta 2026 that traditional linear contingency communications models are obsolete against concurrent multi-band electronic warfare. To survive peer adversary signal detection and high-tech jamming, military commanders are transitioning toward diversified command and control architectures.

This operational shift abandons sequential primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency protocols in favour of dynamic, self-healing communication layers that obscure signal signatures. The new approach integrates commercial infrastructure, low-power mobile ad-hoc networks, decentralized tactical radios, and Low-Earth Orbit constellations like Starlink. By fragmenting, encrypting, and routing data simultaneously across multiple physical mediums, the polymorphic mesh prevents single points of failure without relying on fixed command posts or vulnerable geographic chokepoints. Ultimately, these resilient networking capabilities aim to preserve operational command and control during high-intensity conflict where any electromagnetic emission exposes unit locations to immediate strike.

Comment

Replacing sequential communications hierarchy with polymorphic mesh architectures fundamentally alters tactical decision-making authority within multi-domain formations. When signal fragmentation replaces predictable channel switching, command nodes lose the clear priority hierarchy that traditionally governed tactical reporting. Dispersing data across commercial Starlink terminals and tactical radios requires local leaders to manage fragmented data streams without guaranteed central validation.

This shift creates operational friction for lower-tier battle staff navigating concurrent electronic attack environments. Junior staff officers must process non-sequential intelligence reports across disparate mobile ad-hoc networks while maintaining operational speed against peer target-acquisition capabilities. Consequently, command resilience under this doctrine depends on whether I Corps battalion headquarters can execute mission command when nodes dynamically drop offline.

Strategic Question for Discussion

Which operational trade-off presents the greater command risk when routing tactical intelligence through commercial Starlink constellations and mobile ad-hoc networks — the potential exposure of non-military spectrum footprints or the situational delays caused by reassembling fragmented data streams at battalion headquarters?

The available evidence points toward reassembly delays at the battalion level as the far more acute operational bottleneck. While commercial satellite providers can obfuscate electronic signatures through dynamic spectrum hopping, the cognitive burden placed on staff officers parsing decoupled communications across mobile ad-hoc networks directly threatens decision velocity during rapid engagement cycles.

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