The Houthis Enter the Iran War and Everything Gets Worse

Center for Strategic and International Studies  |  Michael Ratney

Houthi forces entered the regional conflict in August 2026 by attacking Saudi Arabian energy infrastructure and maritime shipping in the Bab al-Mandab, killing six crew members aboard a cargo vessel. These strikes followed a July 3, 2026 Iranian Mahan Air flight transporting Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps personnel to Sanaa.

Saudi retaliatory strikes against Yemeni airport runways triggered a Houthi blockade targeting Saudi vessels, threatening an alternate Red Sea route that previously carried 80 percent of Saudi oil exports while the Strait of Hormuz remained closed. Operating as an autonomous ideological movement, the Houthis remain unbound by potential broader ceasefire agreements between Washington and Tehran. Consequently, Riyadh announced a 14-nation maritime coalition on July 30, 2026 to safeguard navigation without official United States military participation. Facing a persistent May 2025 U.S.-Houthi ceasefire, Saudi Arabia must now independently defend critical energy assets in its Eastern Province and Yanbu port against multi-vector proxy escalation.

Comment

The dual closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandab effectively neutralises Saudi Arabia’s bypass strategy via the East-West Crude Oil Pipeline to Yanbu. Redirecting hydrocarbon exports towards Red Sea terminals relied entirely on unhindered passage through southern maritime chokepoints. Interdictions by Houthi forces demonstrate that overland pipeline bypasses cannot mitigate maritime vulnerabilities when both terminal sea lines of communication are exposed to anti-ship fires. This disruption exposes severe structural limits in Gulf energy transit when crisis mitigation relies on exposed coastal bypasses.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If overland infrastructure such as the East-West Crude Oil Pipeline to Yanbu fails to isolate energy exports from maritime chokepoint interdiction in the Bab al-Mandab, which alternative transit mechanisms or force-projection concepts remain viable for Gulf producers during simultaneous dual-strait blockades?

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