Can Donald Trump Build a Middle Eastern Shield?

The National Interest | James Jay Carafano

US President Donald Trump initiated negotiations with Middle Eastern leaders on 22 September 2026 to construct a regional security architecture capable of containing Iranian military capabilities. Modeling by SpearMind AI indicates that only four percent of the forty-three regional security initiatives launched since 1945 succeeded within five years.

Historical precedents demonstrate severe structural barriers to collective defense without long-term American operational guarantees. Developing a functional shield requires regional actors to address projected air and missile defense requirements estimated between $75 billion and $250 billion over five years. Currently, regional defense expenditures average five percent of gross domestic product, with local manufacturing covering a mere 0.3 percent of consumption. Domestic production remains negligible. Furthermore, sustaining active air defense umbrella coverage costs between $8.7 billion and $11.7 billion monthly, while ninety-five percent of sustainment depends on offshore suppliers. Long-term cohesion also hinges on repairing strained diplomatic relations, particularly between Israel and Jordan.

Comment

High-rate missile consumption during regional saturation attacks rapidly exposes the physical limits of Gulf air-defence capacity. Relying on foreign supply chains for interceptors like the MIM-104 Patriot leaves non-producing states vulnerable to rapid stockpile depletion during high-intensity operational exchanges. Without indigenous production facilities, regional operational endurance remains strictly tethered to Pentagon re-supply schedules rather than local command decisions.

This vulnerability stems directly from the multi-year manufacturing lead times required for solid-rocket motors used in PAC-3 MSE missiles. Expanding production lines for Lockheed Martin interceptors involves specialised chemical component sourcing that cannot accelerate dynamically during crisis conditions. Consequently, regional security arrangements lacking co-production rights fail to overcome the physical throughput limits of Lockheed Martin and RTX manufacturing facilities.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If expanding assembly lines for platforms like the PAC-3 MSE interceptor requires multi-year lead times, which carries greater weight in deterring regional air attacks — immediate foreign stockpile transfers or long-term co-production rights?

The available evidence points toward immediate foreign stockpile transfers as the decisive factor for short-term deterrence, given the severe operational lag involved in establishing local aerospace manufacturing. However, over an extended campaign, reliance on external shipments creates acute inventory vulnerabilities that co-production arrangements are structurally designed to mitigate. The trajectory indicates that without localised assembly for systems like the PAC-3 MSE, regional defence networks cannot achieve self-sustaining operational depth.

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