Deterrence in the Pacific: Rethinking Geography and Building Resilience

Small Wars Journal | Christopher Lee

The US Joint Force is moving from linear power projection to a distributed, multi-domain network of allied capabilities in the Pacific in order to meet the threats posed by advanced Chinese and North Korean missiles. This change alters the character of the regional battlespace by considering the various allied countries as interconnected operational nodes instead of as isolated outposts which would need large and vulnerable reinforcements from the continental United States.

In the past, traditional cartography supported a centralised logistics model which is nowadays very susceptible to precision-guided weapons such as China's DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicle. In order to reduce this vulnerability, the incorporation of Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2) and land-based Multi-Domain Task Forces creates multiple overlapping layers of sensor and strike redundancy. Such redundancy has now become an operational necessity. The concepts in question have been confirmed during multinational exercises such as Talisman Sabre, and have also been secured through arrangements like the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement in the Philippines regarding the critical distributed sustainment nodes.

Comment

The introduction of Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2) throughout the Indo-Pacific marks a basic change in operational command arrangements. By bringing together a number of different sensor networks, CJADC2 reduces the risk to central command posts from precise attacks launched by systems such as the DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicle. The decentralised nature of this architecture enables the US Army's Multi-Domain Task Forces to keep their local command powers even if the main satellite communications are impaired by Chinese electronic warfare.

A serious result of this decentralisation of command is the greater dependence on the PACOM Mission Network to establish standards for data sharing with our regional allies. Since the joint exercises such as Talisman Sabre will only be successful if the bilateral data-classification obstacles are resolved, not just if interoperable hardware is deployed, it is the operational speed of the PACOM Mission Network that will determine whether the coalition partners are able to carry out synchronised multi-domain strikes in contested situations.

Strategic Question for Discussion

What impact will the continuing bilateral data-classification obstacles existing among the Indo-Pacific partners have on the operational speed of the PACOM Mission Network in the event of a severe conflict?

The evidence currently available indicates that the unresolved classification problems will probably cause the PACOM Mission Network to have to function at the lowest level of security clearance, greatly delaying the arrival of real-time targeting data. I believe that this delay will mean that the individual countries will have to depend on locally authorized persons who have been previously delegated the power, rather than adopting a fully integrated joint response. As a result, the network's effectiveness will be based on having in place data-sharing arrangements that have already been approved before hostilities begin.

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