The aim of Operation Epic Fury had been to diminish Iran's strategic capabilities. It began in late February 2026, but the Iranian regime has put up a more resistant fight than had been anticipated. Tehran has made use of the Strait of Hormuz as a weapon and, as a result, Washington has been forced to reduce its objectives. Rather than targeting Iran's nuclear programme, the current focus is simply on ensuring that the shipping lanes remain open.
This is a sharp contrast to the swift success of the precision strikes carried out by Operation Midnight Hammer on Iranian nuclear facilities the previous summer. In order to meet this ongoing threat, it is recommended that American policymakers give up their search for clear, short-term results and instead adopt a prolonged strategic competition. This strategy is similar to the all-encompassing containment approach which the United States used against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. By limiting Tehran's access to sensitive Western technology and capital, Washington will be able to take advantage of the regime's internal contradictions and economic weaknesses. The regime is still very vulnerable. In the end, keeping up the pressure on Iran's periphery will increase the costs of its regional proxy activities.
The shift from the brief and decisive operations of Operation Midnight Hammer to the lengthy and tedious campaign of Operation Epic Fury demonstrates that short and sharp military actions are not effective against regimes such as Iran. The United States discovered this the hard way during the early years of the Cold War. If a regime's survival depends on resisting foreign powers, then hitting it just once or twice will not undermine its determination. Iran's skillful use of the Strait of Hormuz shows that it is not possible to rely solely on one-off displays of force in order to ensure that important sea routes remain safe.
The fact that the situation is like this is in agreement with the containment mechanisms described in historical documents such as NSC 68. Instead of depending on occasional cruise missile attacks, Washington can, by establishing multilateral export controls and restrictions on technology, gradually weaken Iran's domestic industrial capacity over many years. As a result, containment of Tehran is achieved not by bringing about the immediate collapse of the regime, but by worsening the internal contradictions of the Islamic Republic.
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