Buyer and Supplier: How China Sustains Russia’s War

Kyiv Post | Andrew Thompson

Chinese industrial suppliers and energy buyers are directly sustaining Russia's military production and wartime economy, displacing competing buyers across key Asian markets. Between December 2022 and August 2026, China absorbed 50% of Russian crude oil exports and 51% of its top fossil-fuel export revenues. Western sanctions and export controls cut off traditional European markets, forcing the Kremlin into a structural pivot toward Beijing.

This crucial cash flow keeps Moscow solvent. China now provides 62% of Russia's imported computer numerical control machines and 90% of its microelectronics. Beijing also supplies critical aviation maintenance inputs, accounting for 85% of imported aircraft tires needed for high-tempo Su-34 and Su-35S flight operations. Additionally, Chinese firms shipped 46 tons of PAN precursor material to Alabuga-Volokno, enabling the manufacture of up to 1,300 Geran attack drones. Western economic pressure inadvertently deepens Moscow's asymmetric reliance on Chinese sustainment.

Comment

Sustaining high sortie rates for Su-34 strike fighters relies on external supply lines rather than domestic industrial depth. Russian aerospace forces face severe wear on aircraft tires during intensive combat operations in Ukraine. Because Chinese manufacturers control 85 percent of these imported rubber consumables, Beijing exercises implicit control over the flight readiness of Sukhoi airframes.

A similar sustainment vulnerability limits long-range uncrewed strike platforms. The Alabuga-Volokno plant depends entirely on imported polyacrylonitrile precursor to fabricate light carbon-fibre airframes for Geran-2 loitering munitions. Consequently, Chinese export policies directly dictate the operational ceiling of Russia's Geran-2 inventory.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If secondary sanctions disrupt the flow of polyacrylonitrile precursor to the Alabuga-Volokno facility, can Russian domestic industry adapt its airframe manufacturing, or does the Geran-2 strike campaign face an immediate operational bottleneck?

The available evidence points toward severe operational disruption rather than rapid domestic substitution. Establishing high-purity polyacrylonitrile production requires complex chemical processing infrastructure that Russia cannot construct under existing import restrictions. Consequently, any interruption in primary precursor shipments would immediately constrain monthly Geran-2 airframe output at Alabuga-Volokno.

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