The evolution of China’s active defence doctrine

South China Morning Post | Chow Chung-yan

China’s active defence doctrine emerged from the Chinese Red Army’s experience during the Long March and remains central to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), according to Chow Chung-yan. As the PLA approaches its centenary, the author argues that adapting this doctrine to high-technology warfare will matter more than simply acquiring aircraft carriers and stealth fighters.

The Long March is presented as a formative experience in political-military integration. Active defence extends beyond guerrilla warfare: mobile forces seek local superiority, strike isolated enemy elements and withdraw after limited objectives are achieved. The author says stealth, infiltration and rapid concentration helped Chinese commanders offset opponents’ firepower and logistical advantages. Military operations remain instruments of political aims, with territorial occupation valued only when it serves those aims. Today, the doctrine informs integrated air-sea capabilities, hypersonic missiles, carrier strike groups, nuclear submarines and stealth aircraft. The PLA’s test is combining these systems into a coherent combat capability as artificial intelligence and hypersonic warfare reshape conflict.

Comment

Active defence is best understood as a relationship between political purpose and battlefield method. Its operational logic depends on creating a temporary advantage at a chosen point, rather than matching an opponent’s strength across the entire front. This places a premium on the ability to detect vulnerabilities, coordinate movement and concentrate combat power before the opportunity closes. The PLA’s doctrine therefore links manoeuvre to the timing and political limits of a campaign.

Modern systems complicate this method because sensors and long-range weapons can expose concentrations before they achieve surprise. The Type 055 destroyer represents advanced hardware, but a platform alone cannot demonstrate that the wider force can coordinate intelligence, command decisions and timely action. The central test for the PLA is the integration of such capabilities into a combat system that preserves manoeuvre under persistent surveillance.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If persistent surveillance makes surprise harder to achieve, how can the PLA preserve the manoeuvre central to active defence while operating advanced platforms such as the Type 055 destroyer?

The doctrine’s value depends on whether the PLA can convert technological reach into timely, coordinated decisions. Advanced platforms can extend sensing and striking options, but their effectiveness remains tied to information quality, command coordination and the ability to conceal operational intent.

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