China is Not Just Claiming the South China Sea. It is Learning to Govern It

RUSI | Charles Pearson

China Coast Guard vessels intercepted a Philippine resupply mission 60 nautical miles from Second Thomas Shoal on 24 September 2026, asserting administrative authority over disputed waters within Manila's exclusive economic zone. Beijing defended the interception by claiming Manila failed to secure prior Chinese authorization, signaling a strategic shift from asserting territorial sovereignty to enforcing operational governance.

This administrative control relies on incremental regulatory measures, including seasonal fishing bans, nature reserves, and the 2021 Coast Guard Law. Routine compliance gradually codifies Chinese authority without active conflict. Although the 2016 arbitral award invalidated Beijing's historic claims under UNCLOS, Beijing expanded artificial island bases and coast guard patrols to enforce compliance on the water. Neither American Freedom of Navigation Operations nor AUKUS deterrence prevent these daily grey-zone disruptions. Consequently, Manila and its partners must actively reject Chinese permit regimes, expand maritime domain awareness, and preserve assertive transparency to prevent Beijing from establishing permanent jurisdiction.

Comment

China's transition from territorial sovereignty claims to administrative governance represents a fundamental shift in grey-zone doctrine. By establishing municipal structures like Sansha City and enforcing environmental regulations around Scarborough Shoal, Beijing operationalises peacetime jurisdiction beneath the threshold of armed conflict. This administrative approach reframes military resistance into domestic law enforcement non-compliance.

The mechanism relies on statutory instruments such as the 2021 Coast Guard Law, which normalises weapons use within ambiguous jurisdictional zones. Consequently, tactical interdictions against the BRP Sierra Madre function as standard regulatory enforcement rather than military aggression.

Strategic Question for Discussion

Which factor will prove more decisive in countering Beijing's administrative expansion around Scarborough Shoal — multilateral diplomatic rejection of its 2021 Coast Guard Law or direct physical disruption of China Coast Guard enforcement patrols?

The available evidence points toward physical disruption of coast guard patrols as the primary determinant of outcomes in the short term. While diplomatic non-recognition prevents Beijing from achieving legal legitimacy under UNCLOS, administrative control becomes solidified whenever foreign vessels submit to or bypass local Chinese clearance protocols. Sustaining physical access without accepting Chinese permit regimes remains the critical friction point for Philippine operational sovereignty.

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