ETH Zurich research finds 407 cyber incidents targeting the space sector in 2025

Space and Defense

ETH Zurich’s Center for Security Studies recorded 407 cyber incidents targeting 183 space-related organisations worldwide in 2025, revealing critical vulnerabilities across ground stations, supply chains, and IT infrastructure. Authored by Clémence Poirier, the September 2026 report demonstrates that hacktivists and state-aligned groups increasingly target commercial space infrastructure during conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East.

No orbital assets were directly targeted. However, the absence of onboard cybersecurity monitoring leaves spacecraft intrusions largely undetectable, creating a severe intelligence blind spot for military commanders. Modern defense forces rely heavily on dual-use commercial satellites for communications, navigation, and space domain awareness. This integration creates complex command and coordination vulnerabilities, as military decision authority does not extend to private digital supply chains or overseas ground networks. The 2022 cyberattack on Viasat’s KA-SAT network proved how commercial ground disruptions instantly compromise operational command links, necessitating transparent, intelligence-led defense coordination across public and private space sectors.

Comment

The growing integration of commercial satellite capacity into operational military architectures introduces a fundamental fracture in command and control authority. Joint force commanders rely on private satellite communications to maintain tactical connectivity, yet lack legal or operational jurisdiction over commercial ground segments. When cyber operations disrupt terrestrial uplinks or management networks—as demonstrated during the Viasat KA-SAT attack—military command structures cannot directly intervene to restore or defend those critical assets.

This command friction stems from the architectural separation of operational control and network administration. Private satellite providers manage telemetry, tracking, and control (TT&C) systems through proprietary software environments isolated from military cyber defense units. Consequently, when intrusions strike unmonitored commercial ground terminals, joint task force commanders lose immediate operational visibility over the Viasat KA-SAT links supporting forward units.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If military operations increasingly depend on commercial space assets like the Viasat KA-SAT network, how can joint commanders maintain decision authority when cyber defense over terrestrial TT&C systems remains entirely under private control?

The available evidence points toward a growing structural misalignment between operational command responsibilities and commercial network administration. While military task forces can harden their own encryption and tactical terminals, they possess neither the statutory authority nor technical access required to secure third-party ground segments. My assessment is that this authority gap will force defense establishments to either contractually mandate embedded military cyber defense teams at commercial ground facilities or accept inherent command vulnerabilities during crisis periods.

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