U.S. Military Operations Against Iran’s Missile and Nuclear Programs

Congressional Research Service | Daniel M. Gettinger and Paul K. Kerr

On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched military operations against Iran’s missile and nuclear programmes. The White House later said the campaign struck more than 450 ballistic missile targets and approximately 800 attack drone targets, while President Donald Trump described the objective as preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and destroying its missile industry.

The Congressional Research Service reports that Iran retains thousands of missiles and one-way attack UAVs despite degradation, while reports suggest it may be rebuilding infrastructure and resuming production from stockpiled components. The IAEA has not inspected attacked nuclear facilities since June 2025, and its March assessment found no damage to facilities containing nuclear material. US assessments differ: the 2025 National Security Strategy said the June 2025 strikes significantly degraded Iran’s nuclear programme, while the 2026 National Defense Strategy said they obliterated it. The uncertainty remains material.

Comment

The central intelligence problem is verification. Strikes can be counted, but their strategic effect depends on what remains survivable, concealed or reconstitutable. The DIA’s April 2026 assessment that Iran retains thousands of missiles and one-way attack UAVs sits uneasily beside the White House claim that Iran’s missile arsenal and production capacity were razed.

The mechanism is that destruction and reconstitution operate on different timelines. Missiles and drones can be expended rapidly, while underground storage, dispersed components and repair teams may allow production to resume even after visible facilities are damaged. Satellite imagery can identify damage at Natanz or restored access to missile bases, but it cannot reliably establish whether enrichment has restarted or how many functional weapons remain in deep storage.

The IAEA’s absence since June 2025 therefore leaves a verification gap at precisely the point where US official assessments diverge. Without inspector access, the difference between “significantly degraded” and “obliterated” cannot be settled from imagery alone, while Iranian missiles and drones continue to strike US and partner sites and vessels in the Strait of Hormuz.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If the IAEA remains excluded from Iran’s attacked nuclear sites, which should carry more weight in policy judgements: satellite-imagery assessments or the divergence between US strategic documents on the June 2025 strikes?

The pattern suggests that imagery can establish physical damage but cannot confirm the status of enrichment, stored fissile material or reconstitution. The divergence between the 2025 National Security Strategy and 2026 National Defense Strategy shows that interpretation, not observation, is now the main source of uncertainty. My assessment is that policy judgements should treat the nuclear question as unverified until IAEA access resumes.

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