How Do You Pick a Good General?

Modern War Institute | Patrick Sullivan

The United States Department of Defense plans to incorporate a Joint Warfighter Evaluation into its selection process for general and flag officers to observe command performance under simulated combat conditions. Proposed mechanisms include mandatory competition in wargames, echoing historic exercises like the Louisiana Maneuvers invoked by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth.

Current selection boards in the United States Army rely primarily on past evaluations, institutional networking, and statutory prerequisites established under the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. Existing mechanisms infer rather than directly test generalship. Combat skill remains distinct from generalship. While tactical simulations evaluate direct command abilities, historical analysis suggests recent military failures in Afghanistan and Iraq stemmed from flawed strategy formulation rather than tactical execution. The historic Prussian Kriegsakademie offered a contrasting model focused on assessing cognitive depth. Integrating rigorous academic evaluation alongside warfighting metrics could better measure comprehensive leadership capacity across complex military enterprises.

Comment

Integrating the Joint Warfighter Evaluation into senior promotion boards shifts command assessment from administrative patronage toward empirical performance metrics. This mechanism creates a standardised operational filter for general officer appointments across joint formations. The framework directly challenges the joint-qualification criteria mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which favoured staff rotation over tactical decision-making. Command selection thus pivots from evaluating institutional service to observing decision velocity under simulated warfare.

A direct parallel exists in the 1941 Louisiana Maneuvers, where General George C. Marshall tested field army commanders under simulated operational strain prior to European deployment. That exercise demonstrated that peacetime seniority failed to predict operational command capability within high-intensity corps maneuvers. The modern structural challenge remains ensuring that Joint Warfighter Evaluation scenarios capture the interagency complexity required by the National Military Strategy.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If the Joint Warfighter Evaluation prioritises tactical wargaming over the interagency staff qualifications established by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which command competencies risk being underrepresented in general officer selection?

Prioritising wargame performance in the Joint Warfighter Evaluation risks over-indexing on immediate tactical decision-making at the expense of enterprise management and interagency coordination. Historical precedent from the 1941 Louisiana Maneuvers indicates that simulated operational filters excel at identifying field commanders but offer limited insight into theater-level strategic formulation. The trajectory suggests that balancing tactical simulations with rigorous strategic assessments remains essential to prevent operational bias in senior leadership.

Share your assessment in the comments below.

To read in details click here