Is Continued US-Iran Hostility Inevitable? Rereading Walt’s ‘Revolution and War’ Thirty Years Later

E-International Relations | Mark N. Katz

United States containment of Iran remains entrenched forty-five years after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, defying strategic expectations that revolutionary regimes naturally moderate their foreign policies over time. Stephen M. Walt’s 1996 framework theorized that mutual recognition of limits eventually produces diplomatic normalization between revolutionary states and status quo powers.

The Islamic Republic continues financing Axis of Resistance proxies like Hezbollah and the Houthis across the Middle East. Washington enforces punitive sanctions while confronting Iranian nuclear ambitions and Persian Gulf energy disruptions. Temporary alignment against Al-Qaeda following 11 September 2001 and Islamic State in the mid-2010s failed to establish lasting diplomatic bridges. Iran shows no willingness to abandon foreign militia networks. Conflict persists continuously. Consequently, both powers remain locked in reciprocal security dilemmas despite clear economic incentives for de-escalation. Can status quo and revolutionary powers break structural hostility without internal political transformation?

Comment

The persistence of Iran’s regional proxy strategy exposes a limitation in conventional theories of revolutionary-state behaviour. Structural realist approaches often expect revolutionary regimes to moderate their external ambitions when confronted by superior coalitions. Tehran has instead developed a forward-defence network centred on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force.

This strategy extends Iranian influence while limiting the need for direct conventional confrontation. Hezbollah in Lebanon and Ansar Allah in Yemen retain distinct organisational interests and varying degrees of autonomy. Their relationships with Tehran nevertheless provide Iran with additional avenues for regional influence and strategic pressure.

Proxy warfare complicates conventional deterrence by creating uncertainty over attribution, escalation and retaliation. It also imposes costs on Iran’s adversaries without requiring sustained direct interstate conflict. However, this model depends on financial support, weapons transfers, logistical access and continued political alignment. Economic pressure could constrain these resources, but local organisational resilience may prevent an immediate collapse of proxy capabilities.

Strategic Question for Discussion

What is more likely to weaken Iran’s regional proxy network: sustained domestic economic pressure or a breakdown in the cohesion and operational effectiveness of its partner organisations?

Domestic economic pressure could gradually restrict Tehran’s capacity to finance, equip and sustain regional partners. However, the resulting effects would depend on the severity of fiscal constraints, the availability of alternative resources and each organisation’s ability to operate independently. A breakdown in proxy cohesion could produce more immediate operational consequences, particularly if regional partners pursue divergent strategic priorities.

The central question is whether economic constraints can translate into a lasting reduction in Iran’s regional influence, or whether its decentralised network can adapt to prolonged pressure.

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