Why the U.S. Must Expand Air Defense Authority to the Private Sector

The National Interest | Glen VanHerck, and Ramon Marks

The United States faces growing challenges in protecting critical infrastructure from unauthorised drones, missiles and other emerging threats. Former NORAD and US Northern Command commander Glen VanHerck and security expert Ramon Marks argue that existing homeland-defence arrangements leave important gaps in the protection of privately owned infrastructure.

Federal agencies possess specific counter-drone authorities, but commercial ports, energy facilities, data centres and defence manufacturers cannot generally assume they have equivalent powers to disrupt or disable unauthorised aircraft. The authors argue that recent legislative reforms expanding certain counter-UAS authorities to state and local law enforcement do not adequately address the private sector’s exposure.

They advocate a broader legal framework that would allow qualified private-sector personnel to defend designated facilities under strict federal standards, training requirements and regulatory oversight. Such reform would also require coordination with aviation authorities, compliance with communications laws, clear liability provisions and safeguards against misuse.

Their central argument is that effective homeland defence requires closer integration of government and private-sector capabilities. Protecting critical infrastructure increasingly depends on combining airspace awareness, physical security and cyber defence within a coordinated national framework.

Comment

Expanding counter-drone authority to private infrastructure operators raises a difficult question of operational responsibility. Private companies possess detailed knowledge of their facilities, but independent engagement decisions could create aviation hazards, interfere with communications or damage property beyond a protected site.

The challenge is therefore not simply to decentralise authority. It is to establish clear legal thresholds, training standards, reporting procedures and coordination arrangements that enable rapid responses without fragmenting national airspace management. Detection, tracking and warning capabilities should also be distinguished from active measures that disable or destroy an aircraft.

For India, the debate has relevance to ports, power installations, defence manufacturing facilities and other strategically important infrastructure. Any comparable policy would need to account for national aviation regulations, the authority of security agencies and the risks of unauthorised electronic interference. The broader lesson is that infrastructure resilience requires defined responsibilities, interoperable monitoring and carefully controlled response powers.

Strategic Question for Discussion

How can governments give private infrastructure operators a faster response to hostile drones without compromising aviation safety or central oversight?

A workable approach would combine legally defined emergency powers with government-approved equipment, mandatory operator certification and real-time coordination with relevant authorities. Initial permissions could be limited to designated sites and carefully specified circumstances, with independent review of every engagement. However, the effectiveness of this model would depend on reliable threat identification, clear accountability and safeguards against mistaken or disproportionate responses. Faster action matters, but it must remain lawful, coordinated and proportionate to the threat.

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