Lessons From Anniversaries: October 7, Three Years On

Council on Foreign Relations | Michael Froman

Israel has launched a series of comprehensive military campaigns over the last three years to permanently dismantle regional adversaries and reshape the Middle East. These intensive operations have severely degraded the combat capabilities of Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, while also targeting Iran's domestic nuclear infrastructure alongside the United States.

This strategic shift represents a departure from decades of tolerating low-intensity proxy conflicts punctuated by episodic outbursts of violence. The transition from containment to active neutralisation has transformed covert regional instability into overt warfare. Geopolitical alignments have shifted rapidly. While Syria's new government now cooperates with Washington and Israel maintains its Abraham Accord relationships, Iran has demonstrated that asymmetric warfare can still disrupt the global economy. To avoid a prolonged quagmire similar to past American conflicts, both nations must now coordinate on Gaza's reconstruction through the UN-endorsed Board of Peace, which recently proposed $2.4 billion in humanitarian projects.

Comment

Israel’s military operations in Gaza and Lebanon depart from the episodic containment of the 2006 Lebanon War. This shift reflects an Israel Defense Forces doctrinal transition from managing Hamas and Hezbollah threats to seeking their permanent neutralisation. However, degrading Hamas and Hezbollah capabilities does not automatically translate into political stability without a viable governance framework in Gaza. The reliance on military destruction exposes an Israel Defense Forces doctrinal gap in post-conflict stabilisation planning.

This operational deficit mirrors the United States' experience with the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq following the 2003 invasion. Tactical victories over the Iraqi military quickly devolved into a protracted insurgency due to inadequate civil administration planning. Tactical victory is not strategic success. Without an administrative body like the proposed Board of Peace, military success in Gaza risks repeating the political quagmire that frustrated American objectives in Baghdad.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If the proposed Board of Peace fails to establish local legitimacy in Gaza, does the historical precedent of the Coalition Provisional Authority suggest an inevitable transition to a security-heavy counter-insurgency campaign?

The historical pattern suggests that without a legitimate local administrative partner, international stabilisation efforts rapidly lose traction. My assessment is that a failure of the Board of Peace would force the Israel Defense Forces to maintain an indefinite, direct security presence in Gaza, mirroring the post-2003 security dilemmas faced by American forces in Iraq. This trajectory indicates that tactical degradation of insurgent groups cannot compensate for the absence of a viable civil governance structure.

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