The End of Gaza

Foreign Affairs | Khaled Elgindy

Israel continues to conduct persistent airstrikes across the Gaza Strip despite the October 2025 cease-fire framework negotiated under U.S. President Donald Trump's administration. This ongoing kinetic activity has killed hundreds of civilians, including approximately 300 children over a twelve-month period, following the release of the final Israeli hostages.

The framework established a phased political track meant to facilitate large-scale reconstruction and restore municipal infrastructure. U.S. envoy Jared Kushner promised early in 2026 that essential services would be restored swiftly to stabilize the enclave. Progress remains stalled. Gaza sits in a volatile political vacuum without functional administrative bodies or sovereign governance mechanisms. Without a clear transition strategy, constant tactical military engagements risk fully undermining the initial diplomatic deal. The absence of effective international oversight leaves the region vulnerable to renewed large-scale combat operations, indefinitely delaying long-term stabilization efforts.

Comment

The failure to couple cease-fire commitments with operational enforcement mechanisms places severe strain on U.S. security architecture across the Middle East. Without formal monitoring apparatuses like those previously embedded in the 1994 Cairo Agreement, tactical strikes steadily erode the diplomatic capital required to maintain regional normalization efforts. Partners in the Gulf perceive American security guarantees as increasingly conditional when unilateral kinetic operations proceed without institutional constraint.

This friction manifests in diminished intelligence-sharing agreements coordinated through US Central Command at Al Udeid Air Base. Gulf allies increasingly restrict access parameters to prevent direct association with unmonitored unilateral campaigns. Consequently, CENTCOM's regional coordination facilities in Qatar face expanding operational friction with regional partners.

Strategic Question for Discussion

Which factor presents a greater barrier to sustaining security integration under US Central Command — the lack of formal compliance frameworks like the 1994 Cairo Agreement or the political costs borne by Gulf host states at Al Udeid Air Base?

The available evidence indicates that the primary vulnerability lies in the domestic political strain imposed on host states surrounding Al Udeid Air Base. While formal monitoring frameworks like the 1994 Cairo Agreement provide operational clarity, Gulf regimes cannot absorb the reputational costs of unconstrained regional strikes indefinitely. Consequently, operational restrictions at CENTCOM facilities are likely to constrain U.S. regional posture faster than treaty deficits.

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