The EU Stubbornly Continues Its Russian Energy Dependency

Eurasia Review | Andrew Moran

Nearly five years into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the European Union remains a major buyer of Russian energy. CREA data cited by Andrew Moran show the EU took 48% of Russian LNG and 32% of pipeline gas exports from December 2022 to September 2026, while still sourcing 12% of its gas from Russia, down from 45% before 2022.

Russian LNG export revenues have reached a near-four-year high, and oil-and-gas tax revenues are projected to rise about 10% year-over-year to roughly $12 billion. The European Commission disputes Moscow’s claim that Brussels paid $321 billion since 2022, saying the figure was $209 billion. Meanwhile, Donald Trump’s 9 October diesel deal and 60-day sanctions pause drew criticism from Kyiv and Brussels. Audit findings suggest the EU will likely miss its end-2026 deadline to ban Russian LNG amid winter storage pressures. The dependency persists.

Comment

The article’s strongest point concerns alliance cohesion, though its evidence is presented through an opinionated lens. If the CREA figures are accurate, the European Union’s continued purchases of Russian LNG and pipeline gas complicate the political claim that sanctions are denying Moscow the revenue needed to sustain its war. The disagreement over whether Europe paid $321 billion or $209 billion since 2022 also shows how contested measurement has become.

Trump’s reported 9 October diesel arrangement and 60-day sanctions pause test that cohesion from the other direction. A unilateral American accommodation with Moscow would reduce the credibility of joint sanctions policy even if European governments maintain their own restrictions. Kyiv’s warning that cash could “start flowing back into Russia” captures the concern: divergent enforcement allows revenue to reach the Kremlin through whichever partner remains open.

The practical constraint is seasonal. Europe’s difficulty replenishing gas storage before winter gives Russian LNG continuing commercial leverage, making the end-2026 phase-out deadline harder to meet. The European Commission’s stated preference for coordinated transatlantic sanctions reflects the underlying problem: energy security decisions in Washington and Brussels now shape each other’s leverage against Moscow.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If the United States maintains a 60-day sanctions pause while the European Union continues buying Russian LNG, which undermines Western leverage over Moscow more: divided enforcement or Europe’s winter gas-storage constraint?

The pattern suggests that divided enforcement matters more, because it converts sanctions from a shared instrument into a set of national exceptions Moscow can exploit. Europe’s storage constraint is real, but it is a timing problem; policy divergence changes the strategic signal. My assessment is that the 60-day pause would weaken the European Commission’s position even if EU purchases continued at current levels.

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