The Services Do Not Need a Four-Star Autonomous Warfare Command

RealClearDefense | Steven Wills

The United States faces a debate over whether to establish a four-star autonomous warfare command to oversee unmanned military systems across its armed services. Retired Marine Corps Reserve General Arnold Punaro supports the proposal, drawing comparisons with the creation of U.S. Special Operations Command. Steven Wills disputes that analogy. The organisational problem differs.

Wills considers the interwar development of military aviation a more relevant precedent, when service-specific requirements encouraged distinct capabilities. The US Navy expects unmanned aircraft eventually to constitute as much as 60 percent of a carrier air wing. Wills contends that centralisation could impose uniform requirements, duplicate existing joint processes and introduce service bias into funding decisions. He contrasts America's service-led aviation development with Britain's centralised Royal Air Force, which constrained naval aviation until control of the Fleet Air Arm returned to the Royal Navy shortly before war began in 1939. He concludes that individual services should develop systems they will operate, while joint command structures concentrate on integrating capabilities in combat.

Comment

The central organisational question is whether autonomous warfare benefits more from common ownership or from service-specific experimentation. Autonomous systems encompass different missions, operating environments and relationships with crewed platforms. A carrier-based unmanned aircraft operates within an aviation group, whereas a ground-based unmanned system serves different operational requirements. Placing both under a single acquisition authority could obscure these distinctions before the systems reach the battlefield.

This mechanism matters because requirements shape design choices, procurement priorities and subsequent employment. A central authority translating competing demands into common specifications could favour capabilities that satisfy broad administrative criteria over systems optimised for particular missions. The US Navy's projected unmanned contribution of up to 60 percent of a carrier air wing illustrates the scale of service-specific integration involved. A naval requirement tied to carrier operations cannot automatically serve as a suitable design benchmark for Army ground systems. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council's reduced role in validating service requirements also raises the question of whether another command would duplicate existing coordination.

The interwar aviation comparison gives this concern historical depth. Britain's concentration of military aviation under the Royal Air Force constrained the development of naval aviation, according to Wills, and control of the Fleet Air Arm returned to the Royal Navy only shortly before war began in 1939. That example suggests how institutional priorities can shape capability for years. The US debate over autonomous warfare therefore concerns who controls the requirements that determine what future forces can actually employ.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If autonomous systems become a much larger share of American combat power, how can the US preserve service-specific innovation while preventing incompatible systems and fragmented joint operations?

The strongest distinction is between developing capabilities and integrating them in combat. Service-led development can preserve mission-specific expertise, while joint command arrangements can coordinate their operational employment. The historical experience of the Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm suggests that institutional control over requirements can have lasting effects on capability.

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